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PREFACE 
 
During my years in the Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) of the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, I have been very lucky to engage in some of the most exciting 
aerospace projects of the time. Some of these revolutionary systems included a 100 
passenger commercial blended-wing-body aircraft that burns 20% less fuel than the 
state-of-art commercial transports; personal air vehicles (PAVs) with vertical takeoff and 
landing (VTOL) capabilities; compound helicopters cruising up to 300 knots; unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV) with inflatable wings that are launched from the Navy vessels; and 
a 5-inch wingspan micro-air-vehicles for a world competition. I was also involved in a 
next generation sizing and synthesis project in which advanced ways of designing 
revolutionary types of aircraft was investigated under sponsorship from NASA Langley 
Research Center. Yet, it is an irony that the I found my thesis topic from a more of an 
evolutionary way of designing new aircraft. 
It was actually during the US Air Force CSAR-X project that I started to become 
curious about designing aircraft while accounting for future evolution. In 2006, the Air 
Force issued a request for proposal to acquire more than 250 helicopters to replace the 
aging HH-60 Black Hawk fleet, whose primary mission has been performing search-and-
rescue for downed pilots. In this program, the vehicle selection among the candidates 
was subjected to a series of block requirements, given as Block 0, Block 10, and Block 10 
plus. The fundamental difference between each of these three blocks’ requirements was 
cruise speed. This requirement became progressively more demanding, increasing from 
130 knots to 215, and finally to 250+ knots. Eventually, Boeing’s proposal to provide a 
derivative version of the CH-47 Chinook won the contract, primarily because of its 
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growth potential to meet Block 10 and 10 plus requirements with minimal cost. The 
CSAR-X was one of the largest early-21st century U.S. acquisition programs, and its 
progressive requirements represent a larger trend in aerospace design.  
My experience with this program influenced me greatly, and I began to ask how 
aircraft designers could predict and prepare for future growth. The ability to anticipate 
evolving requirements is especially important during the very early stage of the aircraft 
development process, when design freedom and potential for cost reduction are greatest, 
knowledge about the aircraft is the smallest, and thus program uncertainty is the 
greatest. I quickly realized that we confront similar problems in our daily lives. Buying a 
car or choosing a house to live in could fall into this category of decision-making where 
goals and needs vary in time. This is especially the case if one is expecting some sort of 
family growth. Even buying a pair of shoes for my two-year-old son and three-month-old 
daughter (at the moment of writing this thesis) involved a balanced decision making. On 
the one hand, there were the fitness and comfort the little ones would feel; on the other 
hand, there was the frequency with which a lazy father would have to prepare for new 
shoes, based on the forecasted rate of growth of children’s feet.  
It was this curiosity that led me on this long journey. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Modern aerospace systems rely heavily on legacy platforms and their derivatives. Several 
successful aircraft designs that were introduced a half decade ago are still in operation. 
Historical examples show that after a vehicle design is frozen and delivered to a 
customer, successive upgrades are often made to fulfill changing requirements. Given the 
long life of aerospace systems and the continual change of military, economic, and 
political conditions, an aircraft designer must seek optimum solutions subject to evolving 
requirements. Current practices of adapting to emerging needs with derivative designs, 
retrofits, and upgrades are often reactive and ad-hoc, resulting in performance and cost 
penalties. Recent DoD acquisition policies have addressed this problem by establishing a 
general paradigm for design for lifelong evolution. However, there is a need for a unified, 
practical design approach that considers the lifetime evolution of an aircraft concept by 
incorporating future requirements and technologies.  
This research proposes a systematic approach with which the decision makers can 
evaluate the value and risk of a new aircraft development program, including potential 
derivative development opportunities. The proposed Evaluation of Lifelong Vehicle 
Evolution (EvoLVE) method is a two- or multi-stage representation of the aircraft 
design process that accommodates initial development phases as well as follow-on phases. 
One of the key elements of this method is the Stochastic Programming with Recourse 
(SPR) technique, which accounts for uncertainties associated with future requirements. 
The remedial approach of SPR in its two distinctive problem-solving steps is well suited 
to aircraft design problems where derivatives, retrofits, and upgrades have been used to 
fix designs that were once but no longer optimal. The solution approach of SPR is 
xxxii 
complemented by the Risk-Averse Strategy Selection (RASS) technique to gauge risk 
associated with vehicle evolution options. In the absence of a full description of the 
random space, a scenario-based approach captures the randomness with a few probable 
scenarios and reveals implications of different future events. Last, an interactive 
framework for decision-making support allows simultaneous navigation of the current 
and future design space with a greater degree of freedom. A cantilevered beam design 
problem was set up and solved using the SPR technique to showcase its application to 
an engineering design setting. The full EvoLVE method was conducted on a notional 
multi-role fighter based on the F/A-18 Hornet.  
With the proposed framework for decision making under evolving requirements and 
technologies, the decision makers would be able to systematically evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages of various growth options for a given vehicle. 
Consequently, design decisions offering a long-term benefit could be achieved even in an 
ever-changing operational and/or technological development environment. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Today’s needs for aerospace systems—whether they fall in the military, commercial, or 
space sector—rely heavily on legacy platforms and their derivatives. Some of the more 
successful aircraft designs that were introduced a half decade ago are still in operation. 
The best example is the B-52 strategic bomber, which was first conceived at the end of 
World War II and produced between 1952 and 1962. It is projected to be operational 
well into the mid-21 century [1]. Also, many of Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook medium-lift 
tandem helicopters, which were first produced in 1961, are still in operation and are 
planned to be operational at least until the 2030s, although many modifications and 
upgrades have been made to the original configuration over the past four decades. 
Manned space missions are still largely dependent on NASA’s space shuttle, which is a 
1970s legacy design with upgraded avionics. Historical precedents have shown that once 
a vehicle design is frozen and delivered to the customer, successive upgrades are often 
made to the original concept, whether such modifications were planned from its 
inception or not. Indeed, a large portion of the U.S. aircraft procurement programs are 
devoted to evolving existing designs rather than initiating new creations [2]. 
Considering the gradual lengthening of aircraft life cycles, it is expected that future 
aerospace systems will operate for a longer time, thus they are more likely to be under 
operational and technological environments that are far from the ones that are initially 
conceived. Because of tightening budgets and time constraints, increasingly competitive 
markets, and lengthening of aircraft operational life, retrofit and/or derivative 
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developments would be more common. In this context, it would be relevant to 
investigate the issues and challenges behind designing aerospace systems considering 
their lifetime evolvement and to formally structure a way to address such issues.  
1.1 Organization of the Document 
Throughout the study, the author has made efforts to adhere to the formal scientific 
method to define the problem, perform a literature search, and formulate and implement 
a new solution approach. Using this formalism, a series of Observations, Research 
Questions, and Hypotheses are presented whenever appropriate. An Observation is a 
formalized insight learned from experience, interview, or literature. Observations induce 
Research Questions that are formal inquires on what should be studied and answered. A 
Hypothesis proposes a solution to the problems defined by research questions. 
Hypotheses are proved or disproved through a series of experiments that are carefully 
planned and executed. The process is iterative, in which knowledge gained through the 
process requires revisiting the formulated research questions and hypotheses until they 
converge. 
1.2 Motivation 
1.2.1 Catalyst for Aircraft Upgrade/Retrofit/Derivatives 
Aircraft design can be characterized as the process of finding an optimal combination of 
vehicle concepts and technologies to meet or exceed all imposed requirements. Defining 
or eliciting such requirements is often considered the beginning of the design process and 
is followed by exploring the concept and technology spaces in an attempt to converge 
towards a single design solution. After the solution is finally selected and frozen, the 
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external environment in which the vehicle system is to be utilized constantly changes 
over the course of its operational life. Enemy threats advance at fast rates as a result of 
adopting new technologies or combining existing ones in new ways. The commercial 
sector is subject to unexpected, disruptive events, such as the outbreak of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Changes in the political 
climate also affect the doctrine of a nation, which is inexorably linked with its strategic 
approach to future weapon systems procurement. This can be seen in the effect on the 
West of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Accordingly, customer requirements continually evolve in response to such 
variations in enemy threats, market conditions, and politics. Evolution in customer 
requirements, in turn, renders existing aerospace systems uncompetitive or even 
infeasible. Uncompetitiveness and infeasibility can be resolved by retrofitting existing 
productions, introducing derivative models, or designing another new system. Figure 1 
illustrates the gradual and constant evolution of threat, market, and technology and also 
illustrates two different options to respond to the changing need. Figure 1 (a) shows an 
option to acquire another new system as a solution to requirement change. Another 
approach, shown in Figure 1 (b), is improving existing systems through smaller multiple 
capability improvements. The first approach is not always desirable due to time and 
budget constraints. The automobile industry follows this block improvement strategy. 
Automakers come up with minor updates on existing models every year and make major 
modifications every four years. Automakers’ practice of making minor/major 
modifications in a one/four-year time span is certainly a balanced strategy considering 
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competition, speed of technology advancement,  customer need, cost associated with 
model changes, etc.  
In summary, the two main drivers for upgrading an existing aerospace system are: 
(a) to adapt to evolving customer requirements; and (b) to maintain competitiveness by 
keeping pace with technological advancements. These observations are formally stated as 
follows: 
 
Observation 1: Aircraft designs evolve throughout their lives in order to meet constantly 
changing customer requirements and to keep competence through integration of 
new technologies.  
 
1.2.2 Trends in New Aerospace Systems Development  
Since the first successful powered flight of the Wright brothers’ Flyer I in 1903, aviation 
technology has advanced at a remarkable speed, expanding the capabilities of aerospace 
systems to an extent that was only possible in dreams a century ago. In the meantime, 
the complexity of such aerospace systems has been extraordinarily increased along with 
the development time and cost. A typical modern military aircraft development program 
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Figure 1: Evolution Capability and Threat over Time (adapted from [3]) 
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involves multiple stakeholders, and thus multiple missions, multiple manufacturers, and 
even multiple countries.  
With the growing complexity of aerospace systems, development time of a new 
aircraft has revealed a gradual increase from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. For 
example, Figure 2 shows the average acquisition time of the U.S. armed forces from 1969 
to 1997. The figure shows a gradual increase in acquisition time in the case of the Navy 
and Air Force. In the 1990s, the U.S. Air Force and Navy acquisition programs took 
more than 100 months on average from project approval to initial operation capability 
(IOC). Specifically, in the case of the F-22 Raptor, it took more than two decades from 
the inception of the modern fighter jet to IOC [4].   
Not surprisingly, such prolonged development time directly resulted in excessively 
higher-than-expected RDT&E and procurement cost. Empirical relationships between 
development cost and development time constructed from the Lean Aerospace Initiatives 
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Figure 2: Average Acquisition Cycle Times [5]  
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(LAI) of MIT surveying 154 Air Force development programs shows in Eq (1) that 
development cost increases proportional to development time to the fourth power [5].  
 
4(1.36+0.03 )
RDTE
$RDTE T≈  (1) 
where $RDTE is the cost of RDT&E in million dollars and TRDTE is time spent for 
RDT&E in months. 
Such expanded development time and cost imposes high risk in the development of a 
new aircraft. The risk of program being canceled would increase due to unstable 
government funding or a lengthy period of time being necessary to reach the break-even 
point. Moreover, a long lead-in time to the IOC runs the risk of outdating most 
technologies embedded in the system, hampering technological competitiveness of newly 
fielded system. 
Due to the ever-increasing time, cost, and risk of starting a new aircraft 
development program, modern aircraft systems are expected to be operational for a 
longer time, further aggravating the mismatch between the current operational, threat, 
market, and political environments and those defined when the program was first 
initiated. In order to close the gap between the actual and predicted requirements, 
modifying existing designs would become more common to not only aerospace systems 
but also any complex systems requiring a large amount of development time.    
1.3 Background: Aircraft Design for Growth Potential 
Modern aircraft designers are practicing provisions for growth potential within the 
setting of traditional aircraft design, consisting of conceptual, preliminary, and detail 
design phases. An illustration of conventional aircraft design processes that are 
 7 
commonly found in publications such as Raymer [6], Roskam [7], Fielding [8], and 
Toreenbeek [9] are presented in Figure 3 along with the main design activities and the 
approaches to provide growth potential.  
First of all, growth provisions, if any, can be allowed by permitting design margins 
in the sizing and synthesis process during the conceptual design. The allocation and 
appointment of the so-called margins are often based on expert opinion, engineering 
intuition, and historical precedents rather than analytical and rational methods. 
Additionally, modular design approaches and the use of standard components and 
common interfaces are practiced during the subsystem and component design phases [6]. 
However, more emphasis should be placed on the early phases of the design where 
design freedom is the largest and implication of the design decision is the greatest 
throughout the life of the system. Once a poor decision is made early on, the 
compensating effort by fine-tuning and optimizing at the sub-system level in later phases 
 
Figure 3: Traditional Aircraft Design Approach for Growth Potential  
 8 
would be only marginal. This section examines the implication of design decisions during 
the aircraft sizing and synthesis process under evolving requirements.   
The aircraft design process is about making a series of decisions to define vehicle 
attributes, which minimizes its objective function while satisfying all imposed 
constraints. In order to further discuss the concept of aircraft growth potential, consider 
the aircraft design process in numerical optimization terms 
 
) 
s.t. ( ) 0
min (
( 1,..., )
i
f
i lg =≤
x
x
x
 (2) 
where f is the objective function, which embodies a quantity that is desired to be 
minimized or maximized, such as takeoff gross weight, life cycle cost, mission 
effectiveness, etc.; 
n∈x  is the design vector in n-dimensional space, parametrically 
representing the design decisions that influence the physical construct of the aircraft, 
such as wing area, aspect ratio, engine thrust, inclusion of specific technologies, etc.; and 
lastly, gi (i = 1,…,l) is the constraints that contain target metrics the final design needs 
to satisfy or exceed*. Here, the constraint functions could be formulated to include point-
performance requirements, such as turn rate, acceleration, and takeoff field length; 
mission requirements, such as payload, range, and loiter time; and military specifications 
and/or commercial regulations on safety, noise, emissions, etc. 
One aspect of solving the optimization problem is notionally illustrated in Figure 4. 
This figure shows an aircraft design space bounded by two dominant design variables—
wing loading and thrust to weight ratio—and constrained by three representative point-
                                                                                       
*Bold face differentiates vector properties from scalar properties throughout the document. 
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performance requirements: turn rate, takeoff field length, and landing field length. Any 
point design lying within the shaded region is declared to satisfy all prescribed 
constraints. Within this feasible space, a designer has the freedom to further optimize 
the aircraft in the direction of improving a given objective function’s value. The feasible 
optimum is typically located on the edges of the feasible space; as shown by the red dot 
in Figure 4(a). Sometime after the design is frozen, however, the gap between the 
designed-in requirements and the actual requirements begins to be manifest as variable 
constraint lines. It is safe to presume that the requirements will likely evolve in the 
direction of increased capability (heavier payloads, extra weapons, longer range, etc.), 
shrinking the feasible space until design infeasibility occurs as illustrated in Figure 4(b). 
As far as the infeasibility problem is concerned, two different solution approaches 
can be considered. One approach, shown in Figure 5(a), is to anticipate future changes in 
the design requirements and plan accordingly. By building in some margin for growth, 
the designer is trading current sub-optimality with future feasibility. Figure 5(b) shows 
an alternative strategy that does not incorporate any provisions for the future. Instead, 
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Figure 4: Aircraft Constraint Analysis 
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an optimum design is first sought for the present requirements (Design A). Should the 
infeasibility problem occur later in the future, it is attempted to be addressed by 
creating a new vehicle (Design A’) that can represent any one of the following cases: a 
retrofit of Design A, a derivative of Design A, or an entirely new design. 
The strategy of designing-in growth margins from the beginning would result in an 
aircraft with an extended operational life. Without having to recourse to later upgrades, 
such a system could offer production cost savings in the long run. Nevertheless, this type 
of design-for-margin approach inevitably introduces conservatism and redundancy to the 
system, resulting in compromised vehicle performance and/or high operation and support 
(O&S) cost. In contrast, the build-now-and-upgrade-later strategy would yield a superior 
optimal solution—in terms of simplicity, compactness, and O&S cost—according to the 
present requirements. 
An analogous case of embedding growth margins to an aerospace system is the 
design of a family of aircraft and a multi-role aircraft. It is not rare in a commercial 
aircraft design that a family of aircraft that are based on a common platform and 
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standard parts is considered from the beginning to maximize the market capture with 
minimum cost. Often, the use of common features across the platform inevitably brings 
about some level of performance sacrifice.  
Figure 6 shows the impact of commonality—that is, sharing an airframe 
configuration—on the performance of a military fighter designed for multiple customers’ 
requirements. The measure of performance shown here is the relative maximum range of 
the multi-service fighter compared to that of an Air Force only version. It can be seen 
that the desire to make a single vehicle platform satisfy multi-service requirements 
stemming from different branches of the US armed services results in a notable reduction 
in the aircraft’s maximum range.  
Alternatively, if all four fighters were to possess the same maximum range, then the 
operating cost per flight hour of the multi-service versions would be higher. A case in 
point, the US Air Force rejected the N-102 proposal submitted by the then Northrop 
Corporation in 1953, citing that the proposed lightweight fighter’s airframe would not be 
optimal for any particular engine [3]. This was a clear example of how the decision to 
 
Figure 6: Impact of Commonality on Multi-Service Fighter Range [10] 
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commit to an overly conservative design backfired—Northrop engineers had made the 
mistake of intending the N-102 airframe to be compatible even under the most 
speculative engine growth scenarios. 
In contrast, the build-now-and-upgrade-later strategy would yield a superior optimal 
solution in terms of simplicity, compactness, and O&S cost. Because this approach also 
allows the identification of the best possible design from a mission-performance 
perspective, it was the preferred strategy of the U.S. government during the Cold War 
era when aircraft development operated under the paradigm of achieving the best 
possible performance. However, post-Cold War policies as well as the increasing 
competition in the global market imposed strict budgetary and scheduling constraints, 
making “the best performing aircraft strategy” obsolete.  
The best modern strategy would thus likely fall somewhere between these two polar 
opposites, where the penalty of design modifications and the cost of over-design are 
balanced. In other words, some provisions for growth would have to be designed-in from 
the early development phases, while the very real possibility of having to also make 
upgrades to the original aircraft is concurrently acknowledged. From the standpoint of 
decision makers (e.g., policymakers, customers, manufacturers, designers, vendors, etc.), 
the heart of the matter is knowing what and how much growth provisions are necessary 
to hedge both the competitiveness and feasibility of the system against evolving 
requirements. 
1.4 Research Objectives and Chapter Overview 
Motivated by the need to consider the lifetime evolvement of an aircraft concept from its 
inception, the objective of this dissertation is to present a structured decision-making 
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framework that facilitates the systematic evaluation of either: (a) the advantages and 
disadvantages of various evolution options; or (b) a new production as a response to the 
evolution of potential requirements and/or technology advancement scenarios.  
In the remainder of the study, some of the challenges a design engineer may face 
when conceptualizing an aircraft according to not only the present requirements but also 
its potential evolutionary growth are outlined. The case for a new approach that can 
account for such growth potential is presented throughout CHAPTERs II-IV by 
highlighting the limitations of state-of-the-art design practices and potential elements to 
overcome those limitations. The idiosyncrasies of the proposed approach, which is 
envisioned to have the greatest value in the conceptual aircraft design phase, are detailed 
in CHAPTER V. After some preliminary results and findings from a simplified proof-of-
concept implementation of the proposed method are discussed in CHAPTER VI, a full 
implementation of the proposed method on an aircraft system design is presented in 
CHAPTER VII. Lastly, the conclusion and the roadmap for future research is presented 
in CHAPTER VIII. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
MODERN SYSTEM DESIGN METHODS INCORPORATING 
VEHICLE EVOLUTION  
 
The quest for a structured decision-making framework incorporating a lifelong aircraft 
evolution motivated in CHAPTER I begins with surveying established methods, 
processes, and philosophies that address the same or similar issues and goals in 
developing not only aerospace but also complex systems in general. The inquiry that is 
attempted to be answered in this chapter is formally stated as: 
 
Research Question 1: For a complex system development, how do decision makers 
intelligently and systematically prepare for and implement lifelong product 
evolution? Are there formal methods or strategies that incorporate future 
requirements and technologies in the initial design? (Observation 1) 
 
Not surprisingly, similar questions were asked in the past. For example Biery and 
Lorell [3] wrote, “In what ways, and to what extent, can designers adequately preplan 
for future system upgrades?” As such, a number of high-level strategies have been 
proposed and adopted over the years in the US military sector for acquisitioning new 
war fighting capabilities. These high-level strategies are henceforth referred to as 
participative or heuristic methods in this paper, due to their usefulness as guidance.  
To answer the research question and formulate a new or improved approach later, a 
basic understanding of engineering design process is necessary. Thus, formal engineering 
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design methods in a broad sense are reviewed to provide a foundation for the proposition 
of a new design approach in the later chapters of the thesis. On a related note, an 
emergent trend in the aerospace domain has been the continual publication of advanced 
design methods. All of these formal strategies share the common goal of eliciting 
increased disciplinary and/or system-level knowledge earlier, rather than later, during 
product development to facilitate more informed decisions. A number of these existing 
methods were interpreted to be relevant for the issues of evolving aircraft requirements, 
technologies, and capabilities. The intricacies of the surveyed design methods are 
summarized under the heading of normative or rational methods, referring to their 
nature as formalisms for solution, rather than guidance. 
2.1 Participative and Heuristic Methods 
Three different but similar management strategies that attempt to address problems 
associated with the development of a complex system under evolving requirement and 
technology are identified and summarized here. They are pre-planned product 
improvement (P3I), evolutionary acquisition (EA), and spiral development (SD). History, 
objectives, and applications of these methods are briefly discussed and compared. 
2.1.1 Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) 
A consensus was formed within the US government in the 1970s that, at the time, 
military procurement programs were too inefficient in terms of cycle-time and overall 
expense. For instance, prolonged development times directly led to excessively higher-
than-expected RDT&E cost. Similarly, long lead-in times to IOC run the risk of 
outdating most embedded technologies as both customer needs and threat environments 
are likely to be different from those defined when the program was first initiated [11]. In 
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order to address such issues, a government acquisition strategy known as the pre-planned 
product improvement (P3I) was introduced in the late 1970s. The key idea behind P3I is 
the “design of a system from its origins to incorporate future performance enhancements 
[3].” Mackey also comments about P3I, stating: “P3I differs from past modification efforts 
in that it stresses preplanning for improvements while the system is still in the initial 
design stages [12].” 
In April of 1980, the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA) sponsored 
a three-day seminar to discuss P3I. In 1981, the Rand Corporation published a 
comprehensive report on its assessment of P3I as an alternative strategy for aircraft 
acquisition [3]. As the Rand report pointed out, P3I is based on the premise that a 
designer can anticipate needed improvements or possible changes in requirements well in 
the future. This assumption overlooked the uncertain nature of requirement and 
technology evolution and severely limited the usefulness of P3I. Rand report mentioned 
the difficulties of forecasting the future, concluding that “preplanning very far into the 
future is an unworkable concept.” Rand also recommended that the Air Force “adopt a 
P3I strategy only for circumstances where subsystems are already in development but not 
mature enough to be incorporated in the initial version of the aircraft.”  
A few past attempts to incorporate the P3I strategy into aircraft design were 
identified and reported as part of the case studies in §3.2. Those successful P3I 
implementations were limited to the subsystem level technology integration and were 
planned for only short term.  
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2.1.2 Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) 
A year after P3I had been officially recognized by the ADPA, the Armed Forces 
Communications and Electronic Association (AFCEA) formed a task force to study a 
new acquisition strategy that appeared similar to P3I for command and control (C2) 
systems [12]. Termed Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) by AFCEA, the strategy 
emphasizes the time-phased nature of system requirements and the notion of 
incrementally supporting technology maturation to reduce development cost, risk, and 
time [13]. Figure 7 graphically accentuates the differences between the traditional 
acquisition and EA procedures. In a traditional acquisition setting, the desired 
capability—defined to be bounded by the threshold and objective capabilities—is the 
only capability endeavored to be acquired. The EA strategy, however, advocates the 
initial acquisition of a core, baseline capability; preplanned and non-preplanned 
capabilities are subsequently added to the baseline capability on a needed basis. 
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Figure 7: Traditional Acquisition vs. Evolutionary Acquisition [5] 
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EA was adopted as a preferred Department of Defense (DoD) strategy in 2000 for 
rapid acquisition of mature technology [14]. The US Air Force subsequently mandated 
the use of EA that leverages upon the Spiral Development (SD) process as the 
acquisition strategy for the C2 systems as a means of “quickly [adapting] to evolving 
requirements and ever-shortening technology life-cycles [15].” In December of 2004, the 
new National Security Space Acquisition Policy (NSSAP) 03-01 also mandated EA as 
the preferred acquisition approach to DoD space programs [16]. According to the Air 
Force instruction, EA is  
an acquisition strategy whereby a basic capability is fielded with the intent to 
develop and field additional capabilities as requirements are refined. The key 
concept is to rapidly develop and field useful increments of capability … and to 
leverage user feedback in refining required capabilities for additional increments. 
DoD defines SD as 
a method or process for developing a defined set of capabilities within one 
increment, providing opportunity for interaction between the user, tester, and 
developer communities to refine the requirements, provide continuous feedback and 
provide the best possible capability within the increment. 
EA strategy relying on SD process is illustrated in Figure 8 from the DoD instruction 
5000.1. The full capability is achieved by the baseline capability and three increments. In 
this process, the end-stage requirements are not known at the program initiation. As the 
spiral loops in the figure represent, requirements are refined through demonstration and 
risk management, and each increment provides the best possible capability to the user.  
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Figure 8: DoD’s Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development 
2.1.3 Spiral Development (SD) 
Although both EA and SD were adopted as DoD acquisition strategies, the concepts 
were developed independently. SD was developed by Barry Boehm [17] as a risk-driven 
management process for developing complex systems. SD originated from the software 
development community but has been successfully applied to complex or system-of-
systems challenges in other domains, which include satellite constellation, unmanned 
aerial vehicles systems, space launch vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, and the F/A-
18E/F [18-23]. 
Being represented by the diagram originally proposed by Barry Boehm shown in 
Figure 9, spiral development calls for a “building block” approach to develop a complex 
system while capability is incrementally added through iterations with the users. The 
goal of this process is to reduce technological and budgetary risks associated with 
product development and to deliver the initial capability faster to the customer. The 
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end-state of the product is, thus, not defined from the initial stage of the product 
development but gets refined depending on user feedback and technology maturation.  
2.1.4 P3I versus EA and Challenges 
Since the DoD embraced EA and SD, there has been some confusion as to the correct 
meanings behind the acronyms and the ways EA differs from P3I. For clarity, the Under 
Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum [19] defining EA, SD, and P3I on April 12, 
2000. According to the memorandum,  
Evolutionary acquisition and spiral development are similar to pre-planned product 
improvement but are focused on providing the warfighter with an initial capability 
which may be less than the full requirement as a trade-off for earlier delivery, 
agility, affordability, and risk reduction. 
In addition, the Air Force instruction also differentiates EA and P3I as follows:  
 
 
Figure 9: Original Spiral Development Diagram [18] 
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Evolutionary acquisition differs from a Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) 
acquisition strategy in that future increments are not definitively planned and 
baselined until the current increment is about to be executed. 
In summary, P3I and EA are similar in that both strategies acquire capability 
incrementally, but the difference is that P3I is more about preplanning for the upgrades 
on top of the initial, one hundred percent capability, whereas EA defines threshold and 
the full capability and achieves the full capability through multiple increments after the 
threshold is fielded. Moreover, these increments may or may not be pre-planned in the 
beginning of the program. Because of the uncertain nature of the evolution of threats 
and user needs, incremental capability is refined over time as the random variables are 
realized. This fundamental difference makes EA more relevant to situations in which 
unknown requirements and technologies are desired to be integrated. The Rand study on 
P3I also pointed out its limitations of dealing with various sources of uncertainty, such as 
those originating from future requirements, funding, and technology.  
Thus far, the conditions for implementing EA on a real aircraft development 
program have proved to be far from ideal [20]. A successful implementation of this 
recently adopted policy would require significant structural and attitudinal changes 
within organizations that include: the Congress, who funds the program; industry, who 
delivers the product; and the respective military departments, who deploy and operate 
the aircraft. The hot-button issue here is how, in the absence of steps to avert the risk of 
following a new paradigm, aircraft manufacturers can recognize the value of developing 
an aircraft in accordance with the EA philosophy? 
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2.2 Normative and Rational Methods 
Although the new DoD’s policy calls for a new paradigm of “design for system 
evolution” and also provides guidance to aircraft system managers and engineers, its 
usefulness is still limited as an acquisition strategy. This section of the chapter seeks 
formalized design methods the design engineers can use effectively to comply with the 
new acquisition policy. Although traditional aircraft design process was briefly 
introduced in §1.3, it is necessary to review the theoretical and procedural aspects of 
design in this study. Then, advanced, modern design methods with some of the relevant 
elements to this topic are reviewed.  
2.2.1 Engineering Design Process 
For many years, design has been in the realm of art rather than science. It was a more of 
a “trial-and-error” or an “ad-hoc” type of way to find a solution(s), which meets the 
need. A systematic work of design method or process was proposed by Morris Asimow 
[21] in 1962. Asimow’s the morphology of design is a comprehensive process with seven 
phases from finding the need to plan, to creating the detailed sketch of the product, and 
planning for manufacture, sales, use, and disposal.  
While Asimow’s method provides a general guideline by which all engineering design 
problems at any hierarchical level can be attempted, the successful application of such 
method in a real world application requires various challenges to be hurdled. Especially, 
when the designed products are complex systems such as modern aircraft, where more 
than one customer expect multiple functions and the system is essentially the 
complicated interaction of subsystems, it could become extremely complicated to 
proficiently perform the tasks in the design methods.  
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 Dieter [22] for example, adopts and modernizes the Asimow’s method in an attempt 
to provide specific tools to facilitate the activities in the design phases. Especially, Dieter 
integrates some of the system engineering techniques into the early phases of the design 
process as shown in Figure 10. Among the elements in Dieter’s design process, Quality 
Functional Deployment (QFD) under the step of “Define Problem” and Morphological 
chart under “Concept Generation” are introduced in more detail herein.   
Quality function deployment is a tool that enables design engineers to analyze the 
wants and needs of a customer, prioritize them, and choose design characteristics and 
specifications in order to find a solution that meets these customer needs. This focus 
towards customer satisfaction is a way of ensuring that quality is built into the product. 
QFD was first developed in Japan in the early 1970s and was rapidly adopted by many 
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Figure 10: The Engineering Design Process by Dieter 
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U.S. companies, including IBM, Texas Instruments, Chrysler, General Motors, Rockwell 
International, Hughes Aircraft, etc. [22-24]. The techniques have been proven in the 
domain of aerospace systems development as well. The DoD Joint Strike Fighter 
Program also employed QFD under the activity named Strategy-to-Task Technology 
QFD II Analysis [23] in the Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
framework that is introduced in the next section.  
QFD is a graphical method that uses a QFD diagram also known as the house of 
quality because of its shape. The example QFD diagram shown in Figure 11 was created 
by the Georgia Tech graduate team for the 2002-2003 American Institute of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics (AIAA) aircraft design competition [24]. In the figure, the customer 
needs are placed on the left side. For each of the items that the customer wants, or the 
so-called “voice of customers”, the customer importance ratings are quantified and 
placed in the diagram. Armacost [25] used Analytic Hierarchy Process with QFD to 
prioritize the customer needs. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi-criteria 
decision-making technique that was developed by Saaty [26, 27] in the 1970s. Then, the 
design characteristics that can be controlled to meet customer requirements are placed 
under the roof of the house and mapped to the customer needs. Outcome of the QFD 
exercise is the list of engineering characteristics and their relative importance and target 
values, which can be used to construct evaluation criteria, constraint thresholds, and 
design objectives for the evaluation of design concepts. More interested readers are 
referred to [28, 29] for examples. 
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Figure 11: The House of Quality [24] 
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A morphological analysis (MA) is a method that arranges the system functions and 
sub-functions in a logical order to enable the synthesis of numerous alternatives or 
configurations. Morphological analysis was invented by Zwicky in 1948 [30, 31] and has 
been used in a number of applications of policy making [32, 33], generation of scenarios 
and strategies for risk analysis  [34], evaluation of military strategies [35], and synthesis 
of aircraft configurations [24]. The method is graphical and utilizes a matrix, often called 
a morphological matrix.  
An example morphological matrix from [24] is presented in Table 1. As shown in the 
matrix, the system is broken down into different subcomponents and parameters 
necessary to the design solution. These subcomponents and parameters are listed 
vertically, and possible solutions to these different subcomponents and parameters are 
Table 1: A Morphological Matrix [24] 
 
Design 
Attributes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
C
on
fi
gu
ra
ti
on
 
Vehicle Layout Conventional Joined Wing 
Blended Wing 
Body 
   
Wing Position Joined Wing High Wing Low Wing Mid Wing   
Fuselage Cylindrical Area-Ruled Oval No fuselage   
Engine Location Under Wing Tail Mounted Over Wing Rear Fuselage Distributed Embedded 
High Lift 
Devices 
Conventional 
Slat & Flaps 
Advanced Slat & 
Flaps 
Circulation 
Control 
Upper Surface 
Blowing (USB) 
  
Controls Tail Plane Canard Conventional Hybrid   
Number of 
Engines 
2 3 4    
P
ro
p
u
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n
 Engine Type Electric Turboprop Turbofan 
Advanced 
Turbofan 
  
Nozzle Type Separate Flow Mixed-Flow     
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 Wing Materials 
Aluminum 
Alloy 
Composites Hybrid    
Fuselage 
Materials 
Aluminum 
Alloy 
Composites Hybrid    
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listed horizontally. Once this matrix is created, the designers can create various design 
concepts by combining different solutions to the subcomponents and parameters. The 
purpose of this method is to develop as many combinations of ideas as possible. By so 
doing, concepts that might not be considered ordinarily are generated. 
While Asimow and Dieter focused on the steps and tasks of the design process, some 
presented philosophical aspects of design. Hill [36] compared the design method to the 
scientific method that was described briefly in the beginning of this thesis. The difference 
would be that the scientific method is to discover knowledge where as design method is 
to create a new product which advances the state-of-the-art of the field in some ways. 
Each step of the scientific method is matched to a step in the design method. For 
example, the synthesis of concept or alternative in the design process is the counterpart 
of generation of hypothesis. Vanderplaats [37] compared design to analysis, stating 
“analysis is the process of determining the response of a specified system to its 
environment… Design, on the other hand, is used to mean the actual process of defining 
the system… Clearly, analysis is a sub-problem in the design process because this is how 
we evaluate the adequacy of the design.” 
Suh [38] proposes the four distinct phases of the design process: the problem 
definition phase in which vague customer needs are embodied into a set of coherent 
requirements; the solution synthesis phase in which the functional requirements are 
decomposed and solutions are sought in the physical domain; an analytical phase in 
which quantitative evaluation of the generated solutions are made in terms of the 
requirements; and the feasibility check phase where conformance of the design to the 
requirements is evaluated. The process is graphically represented in Figure 12. While 
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using different terminology, essentially identical three or four step models are also found 
in other literature. For instance, Jones’s model of the design process [39] has the three 
steps of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation; Cross [40] proposed a model of exploration, 
generation, evaluation, and communication, the fourth step stressing the importance of 
effective delivery of the end product needs to the next process, such as production. It is 
very important to note that the design process is highly iterative within the phases and 
between the phases such that the designer often needs to go back to the previous stages 
to make changes and redo the following steps. 
What is also important to consider in design process is to understand the 
hierarchical nature of design. Suh [38] philosophizes the hierarchical aspect in the 
functional domain and physical domain of problems as follows: 
There are two very important facts about design and the design process, which 
should be recognized by all designers: FRs and DPs have hierarchies, and they can 
be decomposed; FRs at the ith level cannot be decomposed into the next level of 
the FR hierarchy without first going over to the physical domain and developing a 
solution that satisfies the ith level FRs with all the corresponding DPs [in the 
physical domain] … In the design of complicated systems, the hierarchical 
approach simplifies the design process a great deal 
Therefore, it is important to consider in which hierarchy the designer should define 
problem and in which hierarchy the designer should compose solutions at a certain phase 
of the design process.  
Need
Problem 
Definition
Synthesis Analysis
Feasibility 
Check
Solution
 
Figure 12: Four-Step Design Process Adopting Suh [38] 
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2.2.2 Aircraft Sizing 
The traditional aircraft design process, consisting of conceptual, preliminary, and detail 
design phases, was briefly introduced in §1.3 to discuss the issue of planning for future 
vehicle upgrades in the traditional design process setting. This section further discusses 
the aerospace systems’ specific design issues referred to as “aircraft sizing”. While 
aerospace systems design can be conducted following the design processes introduced in 
this section, the systems intended to be operated in air require special attention to the 
vehicle’s weight. Aircraft sizing, conducted as a sub-process of conceptual design, is 
defined by Ramer [6] as “the process of determining the takeoff gross weight and fuel 
weight required for an aircraft concept to perform its design mission.” In addition, 
DeLaurentis [94] describes aircraft sizing as “a mathematical algorithm that determines 
the size and weight of an aircraft based on a specified mission and contributing 
disciplinary analyses.” Anderson [41] lays outs seven intellectual pivot points for 
conceptual design as shown in Figure 13. While the process starts from the requirements 
and ends by down selecting the best design that meets all requirements, the iterative 
steps from 2-6 can be viewed as an aircraft specific sub-process of aircraft sizing. The 
traditional aircraft sizing process begins with estimating the weight of the airplane, 
which affects all downstream analyses resulting in calculated aircraft gross weight, 
including the structure, fuel, and payload. The process is repeated until the estimated 
weight and calculated weight converge.  
Recently, Nam [42] suggested a more generalized and modern definition of aircraft 
sizing as the process of balancing available thrust, fuel (or energy), and volume with the 
required thrust, fuel (or energy), and volume determined by the point performance and 
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mission performance requirements. Borer [43] formulated a method of sizing an aircraft 
for multiple missions that is particularly relevant in the design of military fighters. The 
sub-processes of the aircraft sizing are constraint analysis, mission analysis, and weight 
estimation, formally suggested by Mattingly [44] and Nam. A detailed review of 
conventional and modern aircraft design process is found in Nam [45] and Borer [46]. 
2.2.3 Modern System Design Methods 
Various methods and processes to maximize system affordability were developed since 
the 1990s in the aerospace systems design community. Mavris and DeLaurentis [47] 
defined system affordability as “value to the customer, including a balance between 
benefits, costs, availability, and risks.” The ideals and objectives of the design methods 
that were developed under the paradigm of “design for affordability” are in line with the 
 
Figure 13: Seven Intellectual Pivot Points for Conceptual Design [41] 
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goals of P3I, EA, and SD in that better ways to reduce life cycle cost and development 
time and to improve customer satisfaction are sought.   
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) was a design process that was 
formally identified in the NCAT [48] as “a management methodology that incorporates a 
systematic approach to the early integration and concurrent application of all the 
disciplines that play a part throughout a system’s life cycle.” In order to improve 
product quality and reduce design time and life cycle cost, IPPD takes into account the 
product’s entire life cycle during the early design phase. The IPPD process is enabled by 
the integrated product team (IPT) of all disciplines, such as design, production planning, 
manufacturing, maintenance, etc., to integrate not only the product development but 
also the process development for manufacturing and support [49]. 
Schrage [50] proposed a comprehensive IPPD formulation to help the U.S. Navy’s 
acquisition reform effort and engineering education and training. The Generic IPPD 
methodology, as illustrated in Figure 14, consists of four key elements: quality 
engineering methods, computer-integrated environment, top-down design decision 
support process, and systems engineering methods. These elements are shown in the top 
portion of the figure. In the middle of the figure is the design process from identification 
of the need to decision making, which is essentially identical to the design processes 
reviewed in the previous section. The left and right elements of the design process are 
the key enablers or techniques. The system engineering methods on the right side of the 
figure are product design driven and are the key enablers in decomposing the problem. 
The other side of the flow contains the quality engineering methods that are process 
driven and recompose the solutions. 
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Figure 14: The Generic IPPD Methodology by Schrage [50] 
Robust Design Simulation (RDS) by Mavris, one of the elements in the Generic 
IPPD method, is a systematic framework that identifies the design that not only 
performs well in the well-defined initial operational environment but also in a changing 
operational environment. RDS adopts the concept of quality and robustness from 
Taguchi methods and Six Sigma and creates a method that is tailored to aerospace 
systems design. RDS also incorporates uncertainty in aircraft operational environment.  
In Taguchi methods, the change in operational environment is captured by the noise 
variables, and then the best setting of the control variables minimizes the signal-to-noise 
ratio (S/N). In RDS, for a baseline aircraft configuration, the control variables and noise 
variables are identified. Alternative designs are created by using the Design of 
Experiment (DoE) techniques, and the variability due to noise variables are quantified 
using Monte Carlo analysis. The robust solution is found through maximization of the 
probability of an overall figure of merit achieving or exceeding a specified target. 
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Figure 15: Flowchart of Robust Design Simulation [51] 
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Technology Identification, Evaluation, and Selection (TIES) by Kirby [52] prescribes 
a method to investigate, evaluate, and determine which technologies can be infused at 
the systems design stage. The key elements of TIES methods is the identification of 
potential technologies, their impact on the system being studied, compatibility with 
other technologies, and costs and risks associated with the further development of the 
interested technologies. The TIES methods have been successfully applied to the design 
of a high speed civil transport [53], a short haul civil tiltrotor [54], and an uninhabited 
combat aerial vehicle [55]. 
Mavris et al. suggested the Unified Tradeoff Environment (UTE) in which the 
combined effects of mission requirements, vehicle attributes, and technologies into one 
environment are assessed [56]. The UTE treats the requirements and technologies the 
same as vehicle design variables. Thus, impact of requirements, vehicle attributes, and 
technologies on the baseline vehicle is simultaneously studied. The UTE has been applied 
to the U.S. Army’s Future Transport Rotorcraft, NASA’s Short Haul Civil Tilt Rotor, 
and the development of the F/A-18E/F [56-60], to list a few. 
Behind the advanced design methodologies introduced in this section are techniques 
that enable eliciting increased disciplinary and system-level knowledge earlier, for 
instance, surrogate modeling techniques such as Response Surface Methodology (RSM) 
[61] and Artificial Neural Network (ANN). The RSM approximates the complicated 
physical behavior of the model into 2nd order polynomials as known as Response Surface 
Equations (RSEs), which allow an instantaneous evaluation of aircraft performance 
characteristics. ANN based surrogate models are inspired by the structure of the human 
brain and are constructed by complex connections between the neurons. These ANN 
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based models’ origin can be traced back to a 1943 article by neurophysiologist Warren 
McCulloch and mathematician Walter Pitts entitled “A Logical Calculus of Ideas 
Immanent in Nervous Activity” [62]. While many resources exist on the theory and 
application of neural networks to a wide range of problems, the DARPA Neural 
Networks Study by MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory [63] is a comprehensive reference to the 
use of neural networks. 
Surrogate modeling is further facilitated by systematically creating samples using 
Design-of-Experiment (DOE) techniques. Many types of DOE have been invented and 
applied to various engineering problems successfully. Among them, Box-Behnken designs 
by [64] and Central Composite Design (CCD) have been widely adopted in the domain 
of aerospace design along with RSM [65]. ANNs is known to work better with space-
filling sampling techniques, such as Latin-Hypercube Sampling (LHS), developed by the 
Sandia Laboratory in 1981 [66].  
One of the goals in the development of modern design methods was effective 
communication between the designers and the decision makers. As a means to facilitate 
more informed decision, visualization of the design space became important. As a result, 
visualization tools, such as prediction profilers, contour plots, and multivariate profilers, 
and surface profilers were introduced and used in aerospace systems design. Enabled by 
surrogate models in the background, these tools allow instantaneous design space 
exploration, involving the decision makers in the loop. For example, prediction profilers 
as shown in Figure 16 graphically represent the mapping between the system attributes 
and design requirement—range, speed, and payload. The slopes of the lines in each of 
the boxes are partial derivatives of the aircraft attributes with respect to the design 
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requirement evaluated for a particular design point, which the designer can change by 
moving the red vertical lines.  
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Figure 16: An Example Prediction Profiler [67] 
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2.3 Chapter Conclusion and Objective 
The three strategies discussed in the section 2.1 can be viewed as system development 
strategies which can be adopted as managerial level design guidelines in dealing with 
problems of time-phased requirement change, technology maturation, and various source 
of uncertainties. Although EA and SD provide guidance to aircraft system designers, 
their usefulness is still limited as acquisition strategies or processes.  
Historically design has been belonged to the realm of art rather than science. Recent 
efforts in brining the scientific process to design have been surveyed and reviewed in this 
chapter. Emerging methods in the aerospace systems design community are an effort to 
bring more knowledge into the early design process and to provide better traceability of 
design and customer satisfaction. Advanced methods, such as RDS, TIES, and UTE, 
provide for the means to incorporate technologies, requirements, and/or uncertainty into 
the sizing and synthesis process of an aircraft. However, those methods were developed 
to focus on finding a single design solution for the currently defined problem. The 
implementation of evolutionary aircraft development requires a design method that 
provides time-phased design solutions for a set of time-phased requirements and 
technology options.  
In summary, 
 
Observation 2: While acquisition policies such as P3I, EA, and SD have established the 
paradigm of design for lifelong evolution and have been useful as design 
guidelines, a formalized method as to how contemporary aircraft designers can 
incorporate the theory into the aircraft design practice has been elusive. 
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Conventional and modern design processes set up a single-stage design 
formulation with which the decision must be made here and now.  
 
For aircraft designers to be able to capture future requirements and technologies in 
the current design, a fundamentally different design problem formulation is required. 
Such a new problem setup considering lifetime evolution of a complex system is 
formulated in the subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CASE STUDIES ON AIRCRAFT EVOLUTION 
 
As discussed in CHAPTER II, the paradigm for military system development has shifted 
from a single step approach to an evolutionary approach. Although much literature 
provides the needs and guidelines for such development philosophy, a design 
methodology as to how a system is designed in accordance with this philosophy has been 
missing.  
From the perspective of aircraft design, a logical question that arises in preparing 
for such evolutionary development of a system is, “How can design engineers devise 
effective solutions incorporating evolving requirements and technologies?” A tie-in 
question that must also be addressed is, “What are the issues and challenges in 
preparing and implementing the provisional steps for the uncertain future?” These 
questions are formally stated as: 
 
Research Question 2: How can the traditional, single-stage design formulation be 
expanded to enable integration future design states and time-phased decision 
making? How can potential vehicle evolutionary paths be planned and 
quantitatively evaluated from the origin of the design? (Observation 2) 
 
Research Question 3: What would be the barriers and challenges in implementing the 
preplanning strategy in aircraft design? What would be the elements needed to 
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improve the current process to respond to the new policy of evolutionary 
acquisition? (Observation 2) 
 
As one of the attempts to answer above questions, a three-part case study was 
performed to gain further insights into the implementation aspect of the pre-planning 
type strategies outlined in the previous section. The focus of such an exercise was to gain 
insights to which key aspects are missing or overlooked from the traditional aircraft 
sizing and synthesis process but are essential to the successful implementation of the pre-
planning strategy. What follows is a brief summary of the key lessons learned from 
surveying the literature. The following questions were kept in mind when reviewing the 
past cases: What initiated the modification programs? To what extent have the vehicles 
been expanded over time? How were the modifications implemented? What constrained 
the growth of the vehicle? What attributed to the program’s failure or success? 
3.1 Part I: Aircraft Evolution Trends 
The first part focuses on general trends associated with modification programs. This part 
quantitatively tracks the evolution history of some selected aircraft in the following 
categories: military fighter, military bomber, military rotorcraft, and commercial 
transport. The focus of this part of the case study is to answer a series of questions, such 
as: What initiated the modification programs? To what extent have the vehicles have 
been expanded over time? How were the modifications implemented? What constrained 
growth? Depending on the category an aircraft fell into, some common issues and pitfalls 
were identified. 
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3.1.1 Military Fighters: Northrop F-5, Lockheed Martin F-16, and Boeing F/A-
18 
For many military fighter jets, their evolution was driven by the need or desire to 
improve lethality and survivability. These objectives were endeavored to be achieved by a 
number of subsystem upgrades, such as a larger weapons payload, avionics enhancement, 
and more powerful propulsion systems. Consequently, the evolution trends of U.S. 
fighters show a gradual increase in both vehicle weight and available thrust. External 
pods to hold additional armament and fuel became unavoidable, which in turn increased 
both aircraft weight and drag. This inevitable degradation in vehicle performance was 
attempted to be offset by installing more powerful derivative engines whose gravimetric 
and volumetric characteristics did not change much. All the while, the airframe’s 
geometry remained relatively fixed. The original wing shape and area were not modified 
as often, resulting in a continual increase in wing loading values. It would thus appear 
that whatever penalty a sub-optimal wing imparted on the vehicle’s performance, it did 
not justify the cost of re-designing the wing. 
3.1.1.1 Northrop F-5 
Increase in weight over time is typical of most of aircraft as the customer established the 
need for more equipment and capability. F-5 was no exception to the trend. Figure 17 
shows the evolution of weight and thrust of Northrop F-5. The takeoff gross weight more 
than doubled over its twenty-year evolutionary path from the T-38A to the F-5E. 
Engine thrust also increased in the order of 3350 lb (T-38A), 4080 lb (F-5A), 4300 lb 
(CF-5A), and 5000 lb (F-5E). The F-5G, which was the third generation F-5, weighed 
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26,290 lb with one F404-GE-100 engine rated at 17,000 lb (F-5G’s immediate predecessor 
was a twin-engine design).  
Northrop designed F-5 to be a low-cost, light-weight, multi-mission fighter, having 
foreign allies in mind. To appeal to diverse range customers other than the U.S. 
government, the design team stressed the flexibility and growth potential of the airframe. 
One example of design flexibility is the nose room of 40 cubic feet to accommodate 
various kinds of equipment according to the customer preference. Performance upgrade 
was facilitated by the advancements in engine technology. The maximum thrust of the 
GE-J85 engine used in the F-5 series increased from 1,150 lb for J85-5 to 8,160 lb for 
J85-13 to 10,000 lb for J85-21 with relatively small increase in engine weight and 
geometry. This allowed for upgrading of the F-5 propulsion system with minor 
modification to the airframe [3].  
It is interesting to watch how wing area and wing loading has evolved in comparison. 
As evident from Figure 18, the wing was enlarged only one time. The wing area 
increased from 170 ft2 to 186 ft2 when the CF-5A was upgraded to F-5E. As a result of 
adding weight without updating the wing, wing loading gradually increased from its 
 
Figure 17: Northrop F-5 Weight and Thrust Growth [68] 
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originally designed wing loading of about 60 lb/ft2 to 70 lb/ft2. Wing loading is one of 
the most important design parameters and it seems that the penalty of having a wing at 
an off-design point did not offset the cost saving of keeping the wing design unmodified. 
3.1.1.2 Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon 
Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Fighting Falcon is one of the best-selling military aircraft in the 
world. Since the first production model was delivered to the U.S. Air Force in 1979, 
more than 4,000 F-16s have been produced, according to Lockheed Martin 
(www.lockheedmartin.com). The F-16 was originally designed as a lightweight, daytime, 
air-to-air fighter, but it has evolved into a multi-role, all-weather aircraft over the past 
twenty years. Having more than 110 different versions, the designation is tracked by 
block numbers. The evolution history of the F-16 is well documented by Hehs [69]. 
Starting from Block numbers 1 and 5, new block numbers were added whenever major 
upgrades were implemented. Almost every upgrade was accompanied by upgrades in 
avionics, weapon systems, and engines. 
 
Figure 18: Northrop F-5 Wing Loading Growth [68] 
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Expanding its realm from air superiority to include ground-attack and all-weather 
capability, more equipment and payload were added, leading to an inevitable increase in 
vehicle weight. For example, the empty weight of the Block 50 is 19,200 lb, which is 
about 24 percent heavier than the 15,600 lb Block 10. The wing area has undergone a 7 
percent increase, growing from 260 ft2 to 300 ft2, representing the maximum possible 
growth before having to modify the fuselage. Both the horizontal and vertical tail areas 
also were enlarged by approximately 15 percent. 
The evolution of the F-16 took advantage of the electronic revolution and advances 
in jet engine technology. The performance loss due to additional weight and drag (due to 
external attachments) was offset by the increase in the engine thrust from 23,000 lb on 
the YF-16 to 30,000 lb on the Block 50. Although the capabilities of radars, computers, 
and data links have been upgraded vastly, such electronic systems could be enclosed 
within the originally designed body thanks to the rapid advancements in electronic 
technology.  
3.1.1.3 Boeing F/A-18 Hornet 
The case study of the F/A-18 Hornet was conducted in two parts: the first part tracked 
the evolution history, focusing on the growth of the vehicle itself, and the second part 
focused on the historical background behind the birth of the F/A-18E/F program.  
3.1.1.3.1 Evolution History of F/A-18 Hornet  
The F/A-18 Hornet is a twin engine, mid-wing tactical fighter for the U.S. Navy. It is 
the first strike fighter of the United States designed to perform both air-to-air and air-to-
ground missions. F/A-18 Hornet was derived from Northrop’s YF-17, one of the 
contenders for the USAF’s Light Weight Fighter Prototype program that was initiated 
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in April, 1972, along with the General Dynamics YF-16 [70]. Later in the 1970s, the U.S. 
Navy launched a program called the Navy Air Combat Fighter (NACF) program to 
procure a carrier-borne, multi-role fighter to replace both the A-7 and the F-4 and to 
complement the F-14 Tomcat. In May, 1975, McDonnell Douglas and Northrop as a 
subcontractor won the NACF to produce the F/A-18s [71].  
Since the YF-17 was designed for the U.S. Air Force as a light weight fighter, a 
series of changes were made to the YF-17 to suit the needs of the Navy and to fulfill 
both fighter and attack missions when the F/A-18A was developed. Those changes 
included “catapult provisions, all-weather avionics, increased wing area, strengthened 
fuselage, strengthened landing gear, special arresting provisions for carrier operations, 
more internal fuel, a little more engine thrust, and a Sparrow missile capability [72].” 
The first generation of F-18s, designated as F-18A/B, went into operation in 1983. An 
upgraded version with updated missions and jamming devices, designated as C/D, 
became operational in 1993. Except for the early production models, the C/D versions 
were powered by F404-GE-402 enhanced performance engines. 
In the 1990s, the need for a more capable Navy strike fighter was emerged, which 
called for another round of the F/A-18 upgrade program, designated as the F/A-18E/F 
program. F/A-18E/F, powered by upgraded F414-GE-400 engines, is significantly larger 
and more capable than the C/D versions while inheriting the traits of the previous 
versions. Jane’s All the World Aircraft 2006-2007 summarizes the changes from the C/D 
to E/F version as follows: 
F/A-18E/F is a stretched version of C/D; landing weight increased by 10,000 lb; 2 
ft 10 in fuselage plug; wing photographically increased by 100 ft2; larger horizontal 
tail surfaces; LEX increased to 75.3 ft2 from 56 ft2 of C/D; additional 3,600 lb of 
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internal fuel and 3,100 lb of external fuel; two more weapons hardpoints; air 
intakes redesigned to increase mass flow and reduce radar cross-section; F414-GE-
400 engines; reduced observable measures by saw-toothed doors and panels, 
realigned joints and edges and angles antennas. 
Figure 19 shows the geometrical characteristics and relative growth from YF-17 to 
F/A-18A and F/A-18E. F/A-18C, missing in the figure, is geometrically identical to the 
A version. F/A-18B, D, and F versions are two seat models of A, C, and E. They are 
identical except that the two seat versions have about 400 lb less internal fuel volume to 
accommodate another pilot [73]. While the geometric similarity between the versions is 
evident from the figure, wing area increased from 350 ft2 to 500 ft2; engine thrust 
increased from 15,000 lb to 22,000 lb per engine; empty weight even increased from 
17,000 lb to 30,564 lb. The degree of growth from the C/D to E/F version was so 
dramatic that some government officials wanted to call the F/A-18E/F program a new 
aircraft program rather than an aircraft upgrade program*. Some of the major milestones 
and specifications of F/A-18 derivatives are summarized in Table 2.  
                                                                                       
*There was a disagreement between the government officials on the classification of the Super Hornet 
program as a major modification. A CRS report [74] to the Congress stated that “some observers describe 
the F/A-18E/F as an upgraded and larger version of the F/A-18C/D, with increased range and payload 
capacity and more space and weight observers assert that the differences between the baseline Hornet 
aircraft and the E/F model are so great that they would describe the Super Hornet as an entirely new 
aircraft.” In 1994, as per the official request by Senator William V. Roth Jr., GAO investigated the matter. 
For more details on the issue, refer to the GAO report [75]. 
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Figure 19: Evolution of F/A-18 [76] 
 
Table 2: F/A-18 Hornet Missions, Specifications, and Milestones [70, 74, 76-79] 
 YF-17 F/A-18A/B F/A-18C/D F/A-18E/F 
Service US Air Force US Navy and 
Marines 
US Navy and 
Marines 
US Navy and 
Marines 
Type Prototype Strike fighter Strike fighter Strike fighter 
Mission 
capabilities 
Day time air 
superiority 
Escort and carrier-
based interdiction 
+Night attack +Long-range, all 
weather 
Manufacturer Northrop McDonnell Douglas McDonnell Douglas Boeing 
Engine J-101 Turbojet F404-400 F404-402 F414-400 
Thrust (SLS) 15,000 lb 16,000 lb 17,754 lb 22,000 
Wing area 350 ft2 400 ft2 400 ft2 500 ft2 
LEX area 46 ft2 54 ft2 54 ft2 75.3 ft2 
Wing span 35.0 ft 37.6 ft 37.6 ft 42.9 ft 
Empty 
weight 
17,000 lb 21,830 lb 24,372 lb 30,564 lb 
Internal fuel   10,860 lb 10,860 lb 14,700 lb 
External fuel   6700 lb 6700 lb 9800 lb 
First flight June 9, 1974 November 18, 1978 September 3, 1987 December 1995 
First Delivery N/A May 1980 1991 1999 
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3.1.1.3.2 Background of the F/A-18E/F Program 
In the late 1980s, the U.S. Navy was facing a situation where they had to find some way 
to replace the aging F-14 in its air-to-air fighter role and the A-6E in its air-to-surface 
attack role. The U.S. Navy considered combinations of following options [80, 81]: 
• SLEPs on A-6 and then buy JSFs to replace A-6  
• Continued use of F/A-18C/D 
• Upgrade F/A-18C/D to E/Fs (1,000 new productions) 
• Upgrade F-14 to add attack capability, F/A-14D (600 new productions and 400 
retrofits) 
• Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA), later A-12 Avenger II 
• Navy variant of F/A-22 (NATF) 
• Carrier-capable version of F-117 
The Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program began in 1983 as a long range, low 
observable, high payload medium-attack aircraft to replace the A-6, IOC in the mid-
1990s. In January 1988, it was designated as the A-12. The program was terminated in 
January 1991, after disclosure of severe cost and schedule overruns and technical 
problems [82]. Procurement of Navy variant F/A-22 (NATF) was planned to start in 
1999, when the F-14 would begin to retire in large quantities, based on the service life of 
27 years. The consideration for NATF was dropped in 1991 [82]. The series of program 
cancellations was largely affected by the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 
the carrier version of the F-117 was never endorsed by the Navy leadership, the only 
surviving options to modernize the U.S. Navy fleet by the early 1990s were the F-14D 
and the F/A-18E/F [74]. 
Evidence exist that the requirement for the F/A-18E/F—formalized in the ORD in 
1991 and revised in 1997—was affected by the outcome of the F-14D program. In 1992, 
the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the Defense Acquisition Board 
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(DAB) review of the F/A-18E/F development program. In the hearing, various 
combinations of the F/A-18C/D, F/A-18E/F, F-14D, and STC-21 (a super Tomcat) 
were reviewed in terms of the procurement cost, operation and support cost, and 
capabilities. The conclusion from the hearing was that “F-14D [is] not as survivable in 
strike role, more expensive to procure, more expensive to operate and support, less 
capable in strike role [83].”  
In addition, Bolkcom [81] reports in support of the E/F program that  
… the F-14’s long-range air defense mission, known as the outer air battle, will be 
less important in the post-Cold War era, when naval aircraft are expected to be 
used at shorter ranges in littoral (off-shore) operations in Third-World scenarios… 
Navy officials emphasized in 1991-92 that affordability and inventory requirements 
were the driving factors in their support of the F/A-18E/F over the F-14D, whose 
higher-performance air-to-air radar and greater range and payload capabilities they 
considered less essential for fleet defense with the demise of a Soviet threat.  
The F-14D program was truncated significantly, and a total of 37 new aircraft were 
constructed. Eighteen F-14As were remanufactured to D variants. The F-14D was first 
delivered in 1991 and completed its retirement from U.S. Naval service on March 10, 
2006 [84]. 
On the other hand, the E/F program officially received Milestone IV/II approval in 
May, 1992, to start engineering & manufacturing development (EMD) [4]. Later, the 
production quantity of F/A-18E/F was also reduced several times from 1,000 in 1993 to 
548 in 1997 and to 462 in 2003. The F/A-18E/F would be the only modern Navy 
Attack/Fighter aircraft until the procurement of JSF begins after 2010.  
In conclusion, the evolution of the F/A-18 was largely affected by the unexpected 
change in the operational environment brought by the demise of Soviet Union. The 
requirement for F/A-18E/Fs formalized in the ORD in 1992 was affected by the outcome 
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of other U.S. Navy programs, especially the F-14D program. An interesting point is that 
while the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union completely changed the needed 
capability of the U.S. Navy Air Wing in the 1990s and beyond and resulted in a series of 
program cancellations, the requirement for the F/A-18 still grew. An important lesson 
from this history is that the capability of a vehicle system should evolve in a way that it 
can offer more, not less, even in a situation where overall needed capability of the fleet 
decreases. 
3.1.2 Military Helicopter: Boeing CH-47 Chinook 
The Boeing CH-47 Chinook is a tandem, medium-lift helicopter for the U.S. Army and 
international customers. Since the first fully equipped CH-47A entered service in 1962, 
upgraded CH-47B and CH-49C went into production in the mid-1960s. In the mid-1970s, 
the need for the modernization of the U.S. Army’s medium-lift helicopter was established. 
The U.S. Army decided to improve the existing CH-47 A, B, and C fleet instead of 
initiating a new development program to minimize cost and technological risk. Biery and 
Lorell [3] stated that “the Army estimated that a new development program would have 
cost from three to five times more in R&D funds than modification of the CH-47 without 
providing a commensurate improvement in capabilities.”  A total of 441 CH-47 A, B, 
and Cs were stripped and reassembled with the upgrades on seven subsystems as listed 
in Table 3. To extend the life of the CH-47 beyond 2030, Boeing subsequently upgraded 
CH-47Ds to CH-47Fs. Total 394 existing CH-47Ds are planned to be modified to CH-
47Fs integrating the upgrades listed in Table 3 starting in 2003. 
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Table 3: CH-47 Major Modification Programs [11, 85] 
Program Upgraded Subsystems 
A, B, and C 
to D 
Composite rotor blades 
Improved Lycoming T55-L-712 engines 
Higher capacity transmission 
Upgraded electronics 
A multipoint suspension system for sling loads 
Advanced flight control system 
Improved APU with generator and hydraulic pump 
D to F Improved airframe structure to reduce vibration 
Structural enhancements  
Integrated cockpit control system 
Improved avionics with digital advanced flight control system 
More powerful engine with digital fuel controls (T-550L714 at 4900 SHP) 
Modularized hydraulics and triple cargo hooks 
 
Some of the key specifications of CH-47 are summarized in Table 4. The evolution of 
the CH-47 clearly shows how growth can be manifest in both capability and weight. 
From the CH-46A to the MH-47E, the engine’s horsepower increased from 2,650 hp to 
4,867 hp while vehicle gross weight increased from 21,400 lb to 54,000 lb. Again, the 
basics of the airframe were relatively untouched. The rotor design also remained fixed 
except for the CH-47A, which had a slightly shorter rotor. It is thus not difficult to 
realize that modern CH-47s are operated at a disc loading that is 64% higher than that 
of the original design point. This is a testament to the ingenuity of Boeing engineers, as 
it represents doubling the load-carrying capability of the vehicle without significantly 
altering the rotor system. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the newer, heavier 
versions can retain the same level of handling qualities, maneuverability, and agility. 
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Table 4: CH-47 Evolution [86-88] 
Models CH-47A CH-47B CH-47C CH-47D MH-47E 
First delivery 1962 1967 1968 1982 1991 
Empty weight 18,112 19,555 20,547 23,093 26,918 
Gross weight (lb) 33,000 40,000 46,000 50,000 54,000 
Payload weight (lb) 13,400 18,600 23,450 22,686 27,082 
Ferry range (nm) 835 1,086 1,233 1,255 1,260 
Power rating (hp) 2,650 2,850 3,750 4,500 4,867 
Fuel capacity 621 621 1,129 1,068 2,068 
Rotor diameter (ft) 59.1 60 60 60 60 
 
3.1.3 Commercial Transport: The Boeing 737 Series 
Although the case study has been conducted mostly focusing on military systems, a 
commercial transport was added to the study for comparison purposes. Boeing’s 737 is 
the most successful commercial jet in history. Since its first delivery in 1967, more than 
5000 B737s have been delivered to customers and more than 6,866 units have been 
ordered through the end of March 2006, according to the Boeing Company [89]. More 
than 10 different versions of the 737 have been introduced up to date, starting from the 
737-100 of the 1960s to the most recent 737-900ER.  
Table 5 summarizes major milestones of the 737 family, including first order, first 
flight, first delivery dates, etc. In accordance with the first order dates, the 737 series can 
be grouped together into three different groups. The first generation of the 737 includes 
737-100 and 737-200, followed by the second generation from 300 to 500, and the third 
generation from 600 to 900 (or the Next Generation according to Boeing.) Different 
versions within each generation usually share the common design with either shortened 
or lengthened fuselage. For example, 737-400 and 737-500 are shortened and stretched 
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versions of 737-300. In addition, 737-600, 800, 900, and 900ER are shortened or 
stretched-body versions of 737-700.  
General specifications for the 737 family were collected from various sources as 
shown in Table 6. The 737 family showed gradual increase in size, weight, and engine 
power. The 737-900ER is almost twice as heavy as the 737-100 and is powered by 
187,700 lb maximum thrust General Electric CFM56-7 engine, compared to the 14,000 lb 
JT9D-9 installed in the 737-100. Not only the size and weight of the vehicle grew over 
time, but also the number of seats and range. Depending on the models, third generation 
models carry roughly twice the number of passengers a thousand more nautical miles 
than the first generation models.  
It seems that Boeing took an approach of designing a family of aircraft rather than a 
single version. Major milestones of some derivative models show some hint of concurrent 
development. 737-400 and 737-500 are stretched and shortened-body versions of 737-300 
and were introduced four and five years after the 737-300 was introduced respectively. 
Table 5: Boeing 737 Series Introduction Dates [89] 
Model First Order Rollout First Flight Certification First Delivery 
737-100 2/15/65 1/17/67 4/9/67 12/15/67 12/28/67 
737-200 4/5/65 6/29/67 8/8/67 12/21/67 12/29/67 
737-200C 2/15/66 8/12/68 9/18/68 10/1/68 10/30/68 
737-200 Adv 7/16/70 3/26/71 4/15/71 5/3/71 5/20/71 
737-300 3/5/81 1/17/84 2/24/84 11/14/84 11/28/84 
737-400 6/4/86 1/26/88 2/19/88 9/2/88 9/15/88 
737-500 5/20/87 6/3/89 6/30/89 2/12/90 2/28/90 
737-600 3/15/95 12/8/97 1/22/98 7/1/98 9/19/98 
737-700 11/17/93 12/8/96 2/9/97 11/7/97 12/17/97 
737-800 9/5/94 6/30/97 7/31/97 3/13/98 4/22/98 
737-900 11/10/97 7/23/00 9/1/00 3/1/01 5/16/01 
737-900ER 7/18/05         
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Moreover, the 747-600, 800, and 900 are based on the 737-700, having the same wings 
and empennage, but with different fuselage lengths and engine scales.  
Figure 20 illustrates the evolution of the general arrangements from the 737-600 to 
the 737-900ER, which are significantly different in fuselage length. The 737-900ER is 36 
ft longer than the 737-600. Comparing the body of a 737-600 to that of a 736-900ER, it 
is surprising that they have the same-sized wings (although the 900ER has winglets) as 
well as horizontal and vertical tails. It is thus likely that the wing design is not 
optimized for a specific version, but rather represents Boeing’s strategy of saving 
manufacturing costs through platform sharing.   
Designing a family of aircraft would entail a significantly different approach than 
designing for a single aircraft, balancing multiple missions and markets, cost, and design 
efficiency. A strategy or design methodology for an aircraft family development is a very 
interesting subject warranting further investigation, and is further discussed in §8.2.2 as 
part of the future research opportunities. 
Table 6: Boeing 737 Series Specifications [79, 89, 90] 
Model TOGW (lb) Range (nm) Pax Max Thrust (lb) Wing Span Length # of Orders* 
737-100 97,000 2,240 80/101 14,000 93ft 0 in 94 ft 30 
737-200 107,000 2,400 88/113 14,500 93ft 0 in 100 ft 1,114 
737-300 138,500 3,400 128/149 22,000 94ft 9in 109 ft 7 in 1,113 
737-400 150,000 3,200 146/170 23,500 94ft 9in 119 ft 7 in 486 
737-500 133,500 2,420 108/132 20,000 94ft 9in 101 ft 9 in 389 
737-600 145,500 3,050 110/132 22,700 112 ft 7 in 102 ft 6 in 86 
737-700 154,500 3,365 126/149 26,300 112 ft 7 in 110 ft 4 in 776 
737-800 174,200 3,060 162/189 27,300 112 ft 7 in 129 ft 6 in 772 
737-900ER 187,700 3,200 180/215 27,000 112 ft 7 in 138 ft 2 in 46 
*as of 1 January 2001 
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Figure 20: Boeing 737 Series General Arrangement [91] 
3.2 Part II: Preplanned Aircraft Upgrades 
The second part of the case study was devoted to identifying the attributes that acted as 
major contributors in determining the success or failure in upgrading/retrofitting existing 
aircraft. The study first collected cases in which growth provisions were pre-planned, 
regardless of whether they were actually implemented or not.  
The Grumman F-14 evolved from the Navy’s VFX program, which was supported 
by the Navy Fighter Study (NFS) in 1967. According to a Rand report [3]: 
The NFS placed great emphasis on growth potential in the new design so that 
when they became available advanced technology engines and avionics could be 
incorporated with little or no airframe modification. … An important criterion 
determining the choice had been the growth potential exhibited by the Grumman 
design. 
 56 
Grumman’s proposal for the VFX design showed two major growth provisions. 
According to Mackey [12],  
The F-14 was designed from the start to incorporate an advanced engine, the F-
401, the Navy’s version of the Air Force’s F-100 engine which was then in 
development. The aircraft was also designed to accommodate various avionics and 
armaments improvements, specifically in infra-red detection and targeting. Theses 
variants were subsequently designated the F-14B and the F-14C. 
Incidentally, the F-14 development is considered to be one of the most successful P3I 
case.  
Another very successful example of pre-panning is the design of the B-1B Lancer. A 
contract was awarded to the Rockwell International Corporation to develop the B-1B in 
1982 when P3I was a popular movement within the aerospace community. The aircraft 
was designed “on the assumption that it would need to have a long and effective service 
life, and that its environment would be in constant change [92].” Therefore, the design 
team made a concerted effort to produce an airframe that was flexible and adaptable. 
For example, the wing was designed to sweep between 15 and 67.5 degrees in order to be 
effective in a wide range of mission profiles. A standard weapons interface, as per MIL-
TSTD 1760, was adopted to allow the seamless integration of future war fighting 
capabilities. Reprogrammable avionics were adopted instead of, at the time, the more 
common hard-wired system. Lastly, an oversized engine was selected as a hedge against 
future thrust requirements. The F101-GE-102 engine, at the time, was under a separate 
P3I program anyway, representing the then-popularity of pre-planning.  
EA was also reportedly successful in the development of the avionics system for the 
F/A-18E/F. Recognizing the tremendous difference in the rate of obsolescence between 
the electronics and airframe industries, the design team chose to inherit more than 90% 
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of the E/F version’s electronics from the previous C/D system for the initial batch of 
production. Subsequently, pre-planned upgrades were made on an incremental basis that 
included [4] 
…improved cockpit instrumentation, a new and improved forward-looking infrared 
(FLIR), and an electronically scanned array for the radar. Other improvements 
have been added to the program during the past several years, including a 
reconnaissance pod, a helmet-mounted cuing system, and some integrated 
electronic defensive countermeasures. 
The EA approach is thus considered instrumental to the successful development of the 
F/A-18E/F under time and budget constraints. 
From the start, both multi-mission flexibility and growth possibilities were 
emphasized on the design of Northrop’s F-5, because the company envisioned having 
international customers. Two distinctive growth provisions were integrated to the 
airframe, one of which was the inlet design. In the development of the F-5G, the inlets 
were shaped such that future, upgraded versions of the F404 engines could be installed. 
The shaping of the nose was also controlled to possess sufficient internal volume to cater 
to different customer requirements. 
Similar to how the development of the F-5 designed-in growth provisions to the 
airframe, measures to ensure the production of stretched variants were conceived from 
the inception stages of the Boeing 727 [93]: 
From 1959 we had growth potential constantly in mind, and one of the limitations 
to growth potential is wing fuel capacity. In addition, we wanted to have an 
airplane that could be sold to the U.S. military, and we knew this would require 
longer range. Thus, we bent the front spar to allow the center section to have an 
increased fuel capacity (it is very thick as well). 
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Boeing engineers also decided to mount the engines under the wings, because such a 
configuration would allow for a wider center of gravity margin, should the fuselage be 
stretched later. 
3.3 Part III: Challenges in Designing for Future  
The last part mainly focuses on challenges in planning and executing modification 
programs. Both pre-planned and ad-hoc upgrade programs are studied. This part of the 
case study asks—what attributed to the program’s failure or success? Special attention 
was paid to whether growth provisions were planned from the initial design or not and 
whether they are implemented and why. 
One of the most challenging aspects of designing for growth potential is the fact that 
the future cannot be predicted with certainty. Uncertainties exist in forecasting the 
market dynamics, funding, customer requirements, technology availability, etc. From the 
aircraft manufacturers’ standpoint, the biggest uncertainty would be what customers 
want in the future. Once the answer is figured out, the next question then is what they 
can offer in a response to the future need. The answer(s) to this question involves 
complex combinations of finance, competition, collaboration, and technological 
opportunities. Uncertainties from these sources imply that there is the inherent risk of 
wasted investment in preparing for growth in a prior manner.  
Biery and Lorell [3] stated that one of the reasons for the N-102’s rejection was the 
presence of technological risk: “reflecting on the pace of advances in air vehicle 
technology in the previous decade (1943-1953) the Air Force doubted anyone could 
adequately anticipate the direction of future technology.” In their recommendations to 
the Air Force, the authors commented, “pre-planning very far into the future is [an] 
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unworkable concept,” preferring instead to support pre-planning on a more restricted 
scope. That is, the risk of forecasting could be somewhat mitigated by limiting the 
provision for growth to specific sub-systems (e.g., engine, avionics, etc.) when they are 
still under development but not mature enough yet to be implemented on the initial 
production aircraft*. Many of the successful upgrade programs were indeed found to have 
planned for short-term, sub-system specific scenarios. The integration of newer 
technologies also did not occur until their readiness was close to maturation. 
Besides the issue of uncertainty, there were cases when technology insertions failed 
to deliver the promised performance enhancement, regardless of whether such upgrades 
were pre-planned or not. Numerous modification programs suffered from unexpected, 
expensive design changes, schedule slippage, and cost over-runs, because physical 
constraints such as volume availability, maneuverability, and handling qualities were 
either overlooked or not analyzed with sufficient modeling and simulation.  
The cases of the A-4 Sky Hawk and F-4/M Phantom from the Rand report [3] are 
good examples. In the case of the A-4 Sky Hawk upgrade program, a camel’s hump-like 
structure was added behind the cockpit to compensate for the lack of volume to 
incorporate the new avionics system. The re-engining of the F-4K/M Phantom for the 
Royal Navy required entire redesign of aft-fuselage, inlets, and ducts of the vehicle, 
eventually costing more than developing a new aircraft. The case of the T-45 
modification for aircraft carrier operation is a notorious example of an upgrade program 
gone wrong. Insufficient modeling and simulation work in the early design phases 
                                                                                       
*In the conceptual design phase, integration of technologies with technology readiness level 6 or higher is 
typically considered for a new aircraft, according to Mark Alber, Section Chief of Advanced Concept at 
Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford, Connecticut [Interviewed on October 10, 2007, by the author]. 
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prevented the deficiencies in aircraft handling characteristics from being identified until 
the operational testing phase, leading to extensive re-designs and tests. Due to this 
belatedly discovered problem, the original schedule had to slip several times, until the 
operational test was finally completed 10 years after full scale development had started 
[13]. 
The findings and lessons from the case studies on past aircraft modification 
programs are consolidated in the following observations. The observations then induce 
two research questions: 
 
Observation 3: Uncertainties associated with future requirements, market, government 
funding, and technology maturation made pre-planning into the far future difficult 
and risky. (Research Question 3) 
 
Observation 4: Insufficient understanding of the key physical constraints through 
sufficient modeling and simulation early on often caused project delays, cost over-
run, less-than-expected performance, and even infeasible design. (Research 
Question 3) 
 
Research Question 4: How can a practical aircraft conceptual design methodology by 
which the lifetime evolvement of an aircraft is incorporated into the initial design 
under the presence of uncertainty be formulated? How can a decision-maker find 
a balanced design under the presence of uncertainty? (Observation 3) 
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Research Question 5: How can the possibility of having unexpected technical difficulties 
in upgrading existing designs be reduced? (Observation 4) 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary and Scope of the Research 
This chapter reviewed the trends and issues of aircraft design evolution and long-term 
planning for such design modifications. Besides the technical barriers identified and 
summarized in the observations, social, political, environmental, and economic aspects 
related to a development program also played key roles during the decision-making 
process. In the case of commercial transport, market fluctuation and competition are the 
most important factors in planning for the development of a derivative aircraft. Thus, 
systematic market forecasting through system-of-systems (SoS) approach and game 
theoretic approaches would be relevant. However, to limit the scope of the problem, this 
study intends to focus on the technical challenges associated with designing aircraft for 
growth at the vehicle systems level. Since uncertainty in future requirements was 
identified as the key challenge when someone tries to incorporate future properties into a 
present physical entity, the goal of the study is solidified as the development of a new 
design methodology capable of quantitative evaluation of the evolution paths of a vehicle 
while incorporating requirement uncertainties at the vehicle systems level. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
 
People make decisions in their everyday lives, the consequences of which are governed by 
uncertainties. The decision-making process is often implicitly based on the anticipated 
probabilities of the future outcomes and associated consequences. People often predict 
the future by extrapolating their experiences. Other factors, such as irrational 
predilection, tolerance to loss, and fear also play roles during the process. Whether they 
are conscious of the decision they make or not, people have some internal logic to come 
up with a decision handling an uncertain future.  
Historically, the senior leadership of organizations needed a more structured way to 
populate possible outcomes of uncertainty, i.e. scenarios, playing games with the 
conceivable scenarios, and making decisions, namely, scenario planning or scenario 
analysis. Mathematicians also developed a field of study named stochastic programming 
to address the issues of optimization under the presence of random variables. As an 
attempt to answer Research Question 4, these two distinctive areas of research related to 
decision making under uncertainty are reviewed in this chapter.  
4.1 Stochastic Programming with Recourse 
Stochastic programming (SP) is a sub-field of mathematical optimization that is 
concerned with making decisions under uncertainty. Here, the term “stochastic” means 
that the decision-making problem involves one or more modeled uncertainties in the 
form of random parameters, whereas the term “programming” is equivalent to 
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“optimizing” in the language of mathematics, and essentially refers to the process of 
converging at a decision. An underlying assumption in this field of study is that a 
decision maker either knows or is in the position to estimate the probability distribution 
of a random parameter and [94].  
4.1.1 Formulation  
Among the multitude of SP models, Dantzig [95] and Beale [96] formally introduced a 
multi-stage model in 1955 that would come to be known as stochastic programming with 
recourse (SPR). This branch of study deals with situations in which some corrective or 
“recourse” actions are allowed once the random parameters are realized, although the 
cost of such a posteriori recourse is not free. Shapiro and Philpott describe the two-stage 
recourse program as follows [97]: 
Here the decision maker takes some action in the first stage, after which a random 
event occurs affecting the outcome of the first-stage decision. A recourse decision 
can then be made in the second stage that compensates for any bad effects that 
might have been experienced as a result of the first-stage decision. The optimal 
policy from such a model is a single first-stage policy and a collection of recourse 
decisions defining which second-stage action should be taken in response to each 
random outcome. 
Depending on the type of the objective function to be minimized, two-stage 
stochastic programming with recourse is further classified as stochastic linear 
programming and stochastic non-linear programming [98]. As a sub-field of stochastic 
linear programming, stochastic integer programming deals with discrete decision 
variables. Also, as the number of stages is expanded to more than two, the method falls 
into stochastic dynamic programming, the term coined by Bellman [99].  
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Since most engineering design problems deal with non-linear objective functions and 
constraints, the mathematical formulation is given in the most appropriate form to deal 
with non-linear functions: 
 
min (
( 1,..
) ( , )
s.t .( ) 0 ,. )
Qz
ig
f
l
∈
 +   
≤
≡
=
x
x x
x
ω Ω
ωE
 (3) 
where ,( )Q x ω  is the optimal value of the second-stage problem defined as 
 
( ) ( , )
s.t. ( ,
, min ,
, ) 0 ( 1,..., )
F
j L
Q
G ≤ =
=
y
x x y
x y
ω ω
ω
 (4) 
where 1n∈ ℜx  and 2n∈ ℜy  represent the first and second-stage decisions in n1 and n2 
dimensional space, respectively; ∈ω Ω  is a random vector from a probability space 
( , , )PΩ F  with set k⊆ ℜΩ , a σ-algebra ⊆ΩF , and a measure P on ( , )Ω F  such that 
( ) 1P =Ω ; ,( )Q x ω , called the second-stage value function, is the optimal value of the 
second-stage problem, given a first stage decision x and random parameter realization.  
As evident from Eq. (3), the ultimate goal is to find the optimal first stage decision 
that minimizes the total expected cost, which is formulated as the summation of the first 
stage objective f(x) and the expected penalty of correcting this first stage decision. It is 
important to realize that the optimal first stage decision is not an ideal solution under 
all possible outcomes of the random variable(s), but rather a decision that is well hedged 
against the risk of excessive corrections.  
In most real-world engineering problems, analytical integration of the optimal value 
of the second-stage function ( , )Q x ω is impossible. In such a case, the expectation must be 
estimated through numerical integration. Numerical integration by assessing all possible 
 65 
combinations of the random variable can be prohibitive, since the number of 
combinations exponentially grows as the dimension increases. Continuous random 
variables (N) can take an infinite number of combinations and even with discretization 
(d) with reasonable accuracy still produces dN combinations.  
The Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) method relieves the issue of dimensionality by 
using random numbers. Essentially, MCS is about numerical integration with random 
numbers. Some more advanced Monte Carlo methods were introduced in the past, such 
as Quasi-Monte Carlo methods [100] and Sample Average Approximation (SAA) [97, 
101]. These methods are known to improve the convergence rate under certain conditions.  
In addition, two random sampling techniques—Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) 
and Simple Random Sampling (SRS)—are widely adopted, and their convergence 
properties have been studied in the past. According to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)’s Guiding Principle for Monte Carlo Analysis [102],  
Latin hypercube sampling may be viewed as a stratified sampling scheme designed 
to ensure that the upper or lower ends of the distributions used in the analysis are 
well represented. Latin hypercube sampling is considered to be more efficient than 
simple random sampling, that is, it requires fewer simulations to produce the same 
level of precision. Latin hypercube sampling is generally recommended over simple 
random sampling when the model is complex or when time and resource 
constraints are an issue. 
Some other literature [103, 104] also supports that LHS converges faster than SRS in 
general. However, as past studies indicate, the performance of specific sampling methods 
depends on the problem at hand. The convergence rate depends on the type of random 
variables and the characteristics of the output. LHS is known to have advantage over 
SRS when the random variables are uniform and the output is an additive interaction 
between the inputs rather than multiplicative interactions. [105, 106] Therefore, the EPA 
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guide recommends the risk assessor investigate the stability and repeatability through 
repeated experiments before using Monte Carlo methods. 
4.1.2 Value of Perfect Information and Stochastic Solution 
In the setting of two-stage stochastic programming, two interesting quantities can be 
calculated to answer: 
1. How much would one be willing to pay for the perfect forecast on the random 
variables? 
2. How much is it worth to solve a stochastic problem rather than a deterministic 
problem?  
 
4.1.2.1 Value of Perfect Information 
The first question is answered by calculating the expected value of perfect information 
(EVPI), originally developed by Raiffa and Schlaifer [107]. Birge and Louveaux [94] state 
that, “the expected value of perfect information measures the maximum amount a 
decision maker would be ready to pay in return for complete (and accurate) information 
about the future.” In the context of aircraft design, this value can be interpreted as the 
amount of money an aircraft manufacturer would be willing to pay to obtain the 
concrete future requirement by, for example, acquiring a future contract in advance.  
To calculate EVPI, it is assumed that one can always predict the value of the 
random variable with certainty. For all possible realizations of the random variable—i.e. 
scenarios—the total cost of the two-stage problem is calculated. The average of the total 
cost is the expected value of the optimal solution or the wait-and-see solution (WS) 
coined by Mandansky [108].  
 { })i ( , )m n (W QS f∈  =   +x x xω Ω ωE  (5) 
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The wait-and-see solution is compared to the so-called here-and-now (HN) solution. The 
here-and-now solution is the expected value of the stochastic solution x* that is obtained 
by solving Eq. (3)  
 * *( ) ( , )HN f Q∈
 = +   x xω Ω ωE  (6) 
Finally, EVPI is calculated as 
 EVPI HN WS= −  (7) 
4.1.2.2 Value of Stochastic Solution 
As discussed in the previous section, solving a stochastic problem is very expensive and 
time consuming. Thus, one might be interested in how much it is worth to pursue a 
stochastic problem rather than a deterministic problem.  
One of the attempting ways to solve a stochastic problem easily is to transform it 
into a deterministic problem by replacing the random variables with their expected 
values. This is called the expected value (EV) problem [94] that is reduced from Eq. (3).  
 { }min )( ) ( ,EV f Q+=
x
x x ω  (8) 
where ω is the expectation of .ω  
For the optimal first stage decision *x of the EV problem, the second-stage problem 
given in Eq. (4) is solved for all possible scenarios. This solution is called the expected 
result of using the EV solution, defined as 
 * *( ) ( , , )EEV f Q∈
 = +   x xω Ω ω ωE   (9) 
Finally, the value of stochastic solution (VSS) is defined as 
 VSS EEV HN= −  (10)  
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4.1.3 Adopting Stochastic Programming with Recourse to Aerospace Systems 
Design 
The recourse-based model makes a decision based on present first-stage and 
expected second-stage costs, i.e., based on the assumption that the decision-maker 
is risk-neutral.       
Nikolaos V. Sahinidis [109] 
 
The recourse-based stochastic approach has been widely used in the fields of finance 
[110, 111], logistics and inventory planning [112], scheduling [113], transportation 
planning in a disaster such as an earthquake [114], in which decisions must be made 
“here-and-now” under uncertainties but corrective actions can also be taken to 
compensate for any unfavorable effects caused by randomness. In the context of aircraft 
design, unsatisfactory performance, sub-optimality due to technology obsolescence, 
violation of physical constraints, etc. are just a few examples of such unfavorable 
consequences. The underlying philosophy of SPR appears to be intrinsically compatible 
with the time-phased nature of engineering design. Observation 5 formalizes this finding 
and immediately induces Research Question 6.  
 
Observation 5: The underlying philosophy of SPR is intrinsically compatible to the time-
phased decision making process of aircraft design. 
 
Research Question 6: Can the SPR formulation be seamlessly adopted to aircraft design? 
What are the limitations of SPR in the context of aerospace systems design? 
What are the technical and non-technical challenges?  
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Since its inception in 1955, stochastic programming has been extensively studied and 
the solution approach has been well established as found in Shapiro [97], Linderoth [115], 
and Kall and Wallace [116]. However, while engineering design often involves non-linear, 
relatively small-scale problems with highly time-consuming analyses, the main focus of a 
technical approach in the field of stochastic programming is to solve large-scale, Linear 
Programming (LP) problems. The application of the SPR formulation to solve 
engineering design problems in a time-phased decision-making framework has been 
elusive.  
As an attempt to address the concerns raised by Research Question 6, a two-stage 
cantilevered beam design problem was formulated and solved successfully in 2006, as 
presented in CHAPTER VI. The simple proof-of-concept study demonstrated the 
applicability of SPR in a two-stage engineering design problem setting. In 2008, Choi 
[117] applied SPR to a fuel cell based aircraft propulsion system design, considering the 
fact that the maturity of fuel cell technology far outpaces the aerospace systems 
development cycle, which, if implemented, renders the performance of the propulsion 
system highly uncertain. Choi showcased the applicability of the two-stage decision 
making setting of SPR by designing a propulsion system based on the currently known 
fuel cell performance at the first stage and redesigning it at the later phase of the aircraft 
development cycle, when more knowledge is gained about the particular technology.  
Both of these examples demonstrated the applicability of SPR in engineering design 
problems, but besides the technical challenges, the explicit assumptions behind SPR also 
raised concerns. As an attempt to answer Research Question 6, a list of concerns 
pertinent to aerospace systems design was complied in Observation 6 based on the 
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lessons from the case studies, the author’s experience, and comments and feedback from 
engineers, scholars, practitioners, and mangers from industry and government after 
presenting the idea of adopting SPR into aerospace systems design that was first 
published by Lim [118] in 2006. 
 
Observation 6: The following characteristics of aerospace systems design seem 
incompatible to the assumptions and limitations of stochastic programming with 
recourse: 
• While SPR assumes risk-neutral decision makers, those in the aerospace industry 
are often risk-averse. 
• While SPR finds the optimum solution that is best on average, in aerospace 
development the stakes are very high that a single failure can cause irreversible 
consequences.  
• While SPR requires a good definition of the random variables, the complex nature 
of aerospace development programs makes accurate predictions of the random 
variables (RV) very difficult. Even if the RVs can be predicted with accuracy, 
they could be wide in range and be highly correlated to each other, making 
integration of such RVs impractical. 
• SPR is inflexible in handling multi-objectives, while complex systems design 
problems are often solved based on multi-criteria decisions.  
• While SRP does not allow soft-constraints, non-optimal or even infeasible 
solutions are often permitted in aerospace programs for the sake of cost and 
schedule. 
• Solving stochastic optimization problems with both continuous and discrete design 
variables is very difficult, which makes it hard to evaluate the future design and 
future technology combinations concurrently. 
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First, the mathematical formulations of SPR, given in Eqs. (3) and (4), explicitly 
assume a risk-neutral decision maker. The optimum solution sought by solving the 
equations is not the ideal solution under every scenario. Rather, it is the best solution on 
average, which means that the optimum solution would incur the least amount of gross 
cost when the game is repeated many times under the same rules. It could be worse than 
some other decisions for a particular realization of random variables. Thus, if the stake 
of the game is so high and the participant can be eliminated from the game—for 
example, by filing bankruptcy or by being merged and acquired by the competitor—after 
playing the first game and losing too much, pursuing different strategies to avoid such 
an event would be necessary.    
In addition, the optimum solution found by solving the stochastic equations is only 
optimum when the PDFs are correct. Assumptions in defining random variables 
inevitably introduce biases. Therefore, being able to come up with a reasonable definition 
of the random variable is important and difficult. Often the random variables are 
correlated to each other and variation of one affects the other. The complex structure of 
the random variables may render solving stochastic problems impractical.  
SPR minimizes the sum of the first stage objective function and the penalty of 
making a corrective decision in the second stage, which requires that the objective 
function and the penalty be in a same unit, such as cost. The restriction on objective 
function in SPR may limit the extent of aerospace design problems, since most of them 
involve multi-attribute decision-making processes. 
SPR finds the optimum solution within the feasible design space. All the constraints 
are viewed as hard constraints, violations of which are not permitted. In reality, 
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aerospace systems design problems often accept less than satisfactory performance for 
the sake of cost and/or schedule savings.   
Finally, the use of SPR in aerospace design makes it very difficult to evaluate 
combinations of technologies. The exploration of a technology combinatorial space along 
with the optimization of continuous design variables is a very challenging problem in the 
realm of optimization and particularly difficult when random variables are involved. 
While stochastic integer programming formally deals with optimization with discrete 
variables, its application to a realistic aerospace systems design seems infeasible.  
These issues concerning the implementation of SPR to aerospace design problems 
induced the following research questions.  
 
Research Question 7: How can the aerospace systems design process incorporate the 
concept of risk into the design loop? How can aerospace systems be optimized 
taking risk-averse decision makers into consideration? 
 
Research Question 8: How can one integrate uncertainties into the decision-making 
process in the absence of accurate probability distributions? How can one draw 
meaningful observations when the random space is very large and complex? 
 
Research Question 9: How can one explore options of aircraft design evolution without 
restrictions imposed by pursuing the optimization track? 
 
As an attempt to answer Research Question 7 and Research Question 8, two fields of 
study are introduced in the subsequent sections.  
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4.2 Decision Making Under Risk 
To answer Research Question 7, the concept of risk and optimization strategies 
incorporating risk are reviewed in this section. The concept of risk aversion was first 
formulated by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 in Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sorti*, in 
which he introduced and solved St. Petersburg’s dilemma. The dilemma is about a man 
offered a game, the expected profit of which is infinite. When a choice was given to play 
the game or not, many people rejected it regardless of the infinite expectation because of 
the fear of losing money. A risk-averse decision maker may act irrationally and often 
choose the option with lower expected profit because he or she cannot tolerate the 
negative consequence of the other, supposedly more profitable option.  
The most intuitive way to avoid a risky decision would be to choose a decision with 
the minimum loss under the worst-case scenario. This classical min-max approach can be 
readily used with the scenario-based analysis that is introduced in the next section. For 
example, one can solve the optimization with all scenarios and choose the strategy that 
shows the minimum cost when the worst scenario is realized.  
In 1944, John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern co-authored The Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior [120], developing the expected utility theory to quantify 
risk in the setting of classical economic theory. Based on the assumption of a rational 
decision maker that maximizes their utility, the theory requires the creation of the utility 
function capturing risk. However, since a practical formulation of the decision maker’s 
utility function is almost impossible, the theory was not widely used in the domain of 
numerical optimization. 
                                                                                       
*Originally published in 1738; translated by Dr. Lousie Sommer in January, 1954 [119] 
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More recently, two classes of formulations have been investigated to address risk 
under the study of stochastic programming. One approach is to introduce risk as an 
additional constraint: 
 
max
( , )
s.
min
Probt. Z z
Z
α
∈
   
 ≥ ≤  
x
x
ω Ω
ωE
 (11) 
where Z is a measurable function, a smaller value of which is better; zmax is the limit or 
threshold value that Z should not exceed; [0,1]α∈  is the threshold probability that is 
determined by the decision maker. This class of approach falls into the realm of Chance-
Constraint Programming (CCP), which largely deals with optimization problems with 
probabilistic constraints. This branch of stochastic programming was conceived by 
Charnes and Cooper [121] in 1959 and has been widely adopted in engineering [122] and 
finance [123, 124]. The method is also known as Reliability Based Design Optimization 
(RBDO) in the structural engineering community and has been applied to structural 
optimization problems with probabilistic constraints [122, 125-128]. Recently, Nam [45, 
129] incorporated and implemented the method to aerospace systems design applications. 
The other class of formulations under the umbrella of stochastic programming 
combines the risk measure with the objective function so that the optimal decision 
minimizes the sum of objective function and the risk measure. Various risk measures 
have been investigated by several researchers. The classical risk measure proposed by 
Markowitz [130] in 1952 minimizes the sum  
 [ ] Var Zi ]mn [Z λ+ ⋅E  (12) 
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This mean-variance approach, also called robust stochastic programming, balances the 
minimum cost on average and its variability at the same time. The applications of 
robust stochastic programming are found in various engineering problems, such as power 
systems capacity expansion [131], chemical process planning [132], and 
telecommunications network design [133]. The use of variance as a dispersion measure 
has shortcomings, such as the mean and variance measure being realized in different 
units; variance penalizing the positive and negative deviation from the mean equally, and 
not preserving convexity of Z [101]. Various other forms of variability measures that are 
coherent, first-order stochastic dominance and convexity preserving have been proposed 
to overcome the shortcomings [134, 135].  
Another type of approach minimizes the threshold value. by which cost function 
violates this value with a predetermined probability [0,1]α∈  
 [ ] Va ]i Rn [m Z Z
α
λ+ ⋅E  (13) 
where VaR [ ] min{ : {Prob[ ] }Z Z
α
γ γ α≡ ≤ ≥  is called value-at-risk (VaR). The VaR 
approach and its variations have been one of the standard methods of evaluating risks in 
the financial industry for portfolio optimization [136, 137] and derivative evaluation [138] 
and in the insurance industry for credit risk evaluation [111, 139, 140]. Rigorous 
mathematical backgrounds and discussions of various risk measures are found in [134]. 
4.3 Scenario Planning 
Scenario planning, also known as scenario analysis, is one of the cornerstone methods in 
strategic decision-making along with sensitivity studies, contingency planning, time-series 
analysis, and so on. Scenario planning is widely used amongst high-level policy makers in 
 76 
military, business, and government sectors rather than academia in order to facilitate 
decision making under uncertainty. While some literature provides formal step-by-step 
processes in how to create scenarios [141, 142] and when to use and how to use them 
[143], it has been in the realm of art rather than science. Although it might lack rigorous 
scientific evidence, it has proven its usefulness in variety of cases, such as the success of 
Dutch-shell company [144], which used scenario planning since the 1970s to evaluate its 
strategic options. Also, the Swedish Defense Agency [145] uses a formalized scenario 
analysis to establish its long-term military strategies. Management-consulting firm A.T. 
Kearney utilizes the method under the name of Global Radar Scenario Planning [146, 
147]. Another management consulting company, the Futures Strategy Group, LLC., is 
one of the most active practitioners of scenario planning for a wide range of problems in 
the private and public sector [148, 149]. The Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO) used scenario planning to predict future demand for air travel and to plan for 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System [150, 151].  
In its essence, scenario analysis captures a handful of combinations of the random 
variables among the infinite combinations. Then, the alternative decisions, or strategies, 
are evaluated under these possible outcomes, called scenarios. Therefore, scenario 
analysis samples k outcomes from the scenarios space Ω, then solves k deterministic 
problems. The sampling of finite scenarios might include the extreme cases and average 
case. For example, the decision maker would want to evaluate the most extreme cases 
even though the probability of such an event is very low. Those possible outcomes, called 
scenarios, are the most plausible and/or meaningful representation of the entire 
probability space. 
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For example, consider an optimization problem with one random variable. The 
random variable is continuous and can take any value between the lower and upper 
limits. Within the ranges of the possible outcomes, one might consider only three—the 
minimum, average, and maximum values—and name them as worst, modest, and best 
cases scenarios. An optimization problem is then solved repeatedly to yield optimum 
solutions for the corresponding scenarios. Finally, patterns are observed within the 
optimum solutions and interpretations are made. The outcome of the scenario planning 
is a robust strategy(s) that will work across a range of plausible future outcomes.  
This rather simple process is claimed to be advantageous over other strategic 
decision making methods, such as contingency planning and sensitivity study [141]. 
Contingency planning is a “what if” study tool where a decision maker investigates 
exceptional cases from the baseline by varying one uncertainty at a time. A sensitivity 
study perturbates one random variable at a time by a small degree such that the 
perturbation does not affect the state of the other variables. Therefore, sensitivity 
analysis is useful to see the influence of the random variables to the response near 
equilibrium points, but it is invalid on a large scale. However, scenario analysis is useful 
in exploring wide ranges of uncertainty collectively. It captures correlations between the 
random variables, thus the variation is made to all random variables at the same time in 
the most plausible ways. Thus, scenario analysis allows the policy makers to be exposed 
to a wide range of extreme events without overwhelming them by providing too much 
information.  
The success of scenario planning largely depends on the creation of the scenarios. 
Many existing methods and techniques can be employed depending on the purpose of the 
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study and resource availability. The first questions that should be addressed are what is 
the scenario timeframe and what is the scenario scope [141]. Schoemaker [141] suggested 
a scenario creation method in ten steps as follows: 
1. Define the Scope 
2. Identify the Major Stakeholders 
3. Identify Basic Trends 
4. Identify Key Uncertainties 
5. Construct Initial Scenario Themes 
6. Check for Consistency and Plausibility 
7. Develop Learning Scenarios 
8. Identify Research Needs 
9. Develop Quantitative Models 
10. Evolve towards Decision Scenarios 
Detailed descriptions and case studies are referred to [141]. Schwartz also presents the 
six steps of scenario creation checklist [142], which are, largely, similar to Schoemaker’s. 
The methods of Schoemaker and Schwartz are intuitive and logical and have been 
successfully used in various business cases, but the methods lack the specific techniques 
to fulfill each of the steps.  
Essentially, all the system engineering tools that are useful in engineering design 
process reviewed in §2.2.1 are applicable in identifying the source of uncertainty, random 
variables, and scenarios. For example, the system engineering tools, such as QFD, 
brainstorming, expert polls, Pareto analysis, AHP, and MA can be utilized. In addition, 
a statistical approach of collecting and analyzing past information can be useful as in the 
case of the calculation of the volatility of stock prices or oil prices in option pricing. 
Recently, Eriksson and Ritchey [145] used MA to generate operational and tactical 
scenarios for the Swedish Military using a computer tool that automatically generates 
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scenarios. Thomas [152] used MA for scenario generation in the application of risk 
assessment associated with a commercial air transport development.  
4.4 Summary of the Chapter 
A scenario-based approach can provide useful insights to the stakeholders and is 
especially useful when it is very difficult to assume the distribution of the random 
variables. If one can reasonably assume the distributions of the random variables, the 
formulation of stochastic programming with recourse can provide not only the optimum 
decision that is made now under the presence of uncertainty but also the collection of 
optimal recourse actions after the realization of uncertainty. The philosophy of stochastic 
programming with recourse is intrinsically compatible with a multi-stage process of 
developing a baseline aircraft and then retrofitting or newly manufacturing a derivative 
aircraft later. To address the issue of risk-averse decision makers, the traditional 
stochastic programming formulation can be complemented with some sort of risk 
measure.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
To be able to evaluate various growth options of an aircraft under potential market, 
threat, and technology evolution scenarios, a new aircraft design approach is warranted. 
The key elements of the new approach and the underlying philosophy behind the 
formulation are encapsulated in the hypotheses. Then, this chapter incorporates the 
identified elements into an evolutionary aircraft design approach considering the lifetime 
evolvement of an aircraft concept from its inception.  
5.1 Hypotheses 
5.1.1 Two-Stage Aircraft Design (TAD) Optimization 
Hypothesis 1: An expansion of the conventional, single-stage design process into a two or 
multiple stage process facilitates the quantitative and simultaneous exploration of 
future requirement, technology, and design evolution. (Research Question 2) 
 
The current, single-stage formulation of aircraft design problem solves,  
 
) 
s.t. ( ) 0
min (
( 1,..., )
i
f
i lg =≤
x
x
x
 (14) 
where f is the objective function; n∈ ℜx is the design vector in n-dimensional space; and 
gi (i = 1,…,l) is constraints.  
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Hypothesis 1 proposes that the expansion of the current, single-stage problem 
setting into a two-stage problem setting would allow for the integration of the future 
problem into the current problem. Hypothesis 1 is mathematically represented as follows: 
 1
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1 1 1
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where 
1
( )Q x  is the optimal value of the second-stage problem defined as 
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Here, 1
1
n∈ ℜx  and 2
2
n∈ ℜx  represent the first- and second-stage decisions in n1 and n2 
dimensional space, respectively; f1 is the first-stage objective function and f2 is the 
second-stage objective function; g1i, 11, ,i l= …  is the i
th constraint of the first-stage 
problem and g2i, 21, ,i l= …  is the i
th constraint of the second-stage problem. 
1
( )Q x , 
called the second-stage value function, is the optimal value of the second-stage problem, 
given a first-stage decision 
1
x . To differentiate vectors from scalars, bold face was used 
on the vectors.  
In the context of aircraft design, the so-called first stage covers the time period of a 
new aircraft development program, while the subsequent stages encompass the follow-on 
derivative, upgrade, or retrofit programs. For the derivative design (second-stage) 
problem, the best modification strategy is sought by solving Eq. (6) in order to minimize 
the second-stage objective function (f2) for a given set of first-stage decision variables 
and second-stage design requirements. The second-stage value function is intended to 
capture the cost of future design modifications and is constructed based on the degree of 
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technical difficulty and the difference between the decision variable settings of the first 
stage and the second stage.  
The mathematical formulation proposed here enables Two-stage Aircraft Design 
(TAD) optimization and becomes the cornerstone of stochastic optimization, scenario-
based analysis, and the creation of a framework for decision-making support that is 
proposed in the subsequent sections.  
5.1.2 Adoption of Stochastic Programming with Recourse to TAD 
Hypothesis 2: When the probability density functions of future requirements are available, 
the best aircraft design that responds to future uncertainties and the set of 
aircraft modification schemes can be found by adopting stochastic programming 
with recourse formulation. (Research Question 4)   
 
The new formulation proposed in Hypothesis 1 lacks the means to account for 
uncertainty, which exists in dealing with future problems unless a firm contract between 
the two parties is committed from the beginning. Hypothesis 2 attempts to adopt the 
philosophy and mathematical formulations of the stochastic programming with recourse 
introduced in §4.1 as a means to incorporate uncertainty. Hypothesis 2 is mathematically 
represented as follows: 
 1
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1
,( )Q x ω  is the optimal value of the second-stage problem defined as 
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where 1
1
n∈ ℜx  and 2
2
n∈ ℜx  represent the first and second-stage decisions in n1 and n2 
dimensional space, respectively; ∈ω Ω  is a random vector from a probability space 
( , , )PΩ F  with set k⊆ ℜΩ , a σ-algebra ⊆ΩF , and a measure P on ( , )Ω F  such that 
( ) 1P Ω = ; 
1
,( )Q x ω , called the second-stage value function, is the optimal value of the 
second-stage problem, given a first-stage decision 1x  and random parameter realization 
ω . 
The inherent uncertainties in the requirements for the aircraft modification 
programs are modeled within the random parameter vector ∈ω Ω . Due to this presence 
of uncertainty, the design of a derivative is performed in a probabilistic manner, and the 
expected outcome is fed into the first-stage problem. 
5.1.3 Risk-Averse Strategy Selection 
Hypothesis 3: The quantification of risk associated with the random variables using 
Value-at-Risk for the evolution options would provide a risk-averse decision maker 
the option to choose a strategy with the lowest probability to exceed the cost limit. 
(Research Question 7) 
 
As mentioned in Observation 6, the conventional SPR formulation lacks the ability to 
account for risk-averse decision makers. As a remedy to this deficiency, Hypothesis 3 
proposes a means to quantify and mitigate the risk associated with the evolution 
strategies by adopting Risk-Averse Stochastic Programming introduced in §4.2. Detailed 
discussion on creation of evolution paths or strategies are found in §5.4.3. 
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While various risk measures were proposed by many researchers as reviewed in §4.2, 
the author proposes a formulation that uses the probability of the cost function Z 
exceeding a certain threshold τ  as a risk measure.  
 Prob{ }Z τ>  (19) 
This formation falls into the category of the Value-at-Risk approach and seems suitable 
to the acquisition of military systems, where it is often crucial to keep the cost under a 
certain limit. When risk measure is evaluated for all the first stage optimum solutions of 
the evolution strategies, the least-risky evolution strategy can be found by solving:   
 *
1 1
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p
f Q τ + >  x ω)  (20) 
where *
1
(( ) ,pQ x ω) is the optimal value of the second-stage problem for the given first-
stage optimal solution *
1
( )px  under strategy 1,...,p n=  defined as 
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This idea, named Risk-Averse Strategy Selection (RASS), finds the best strategy p 
among all the strategies. It should be noted that the first-stage optimal solutions 
*
1
( ) , 1, ,p
n
p p=x …
 
are still found by following the conventional SPR formulations.  
5.1.4 Deterministic Scenario-Based TAD Optimization 
Hypothesis 4: Scenario-based analysis along with two-stage aircraft design optimization 
would allow the decision makers to investigate a wide spectrum of uncertainties 
deterministically to gain insight while avoiding the biases from inaccurate 
probability distributions.  (Research Question 8) 
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In the cases where an accurate and reliable prediction of the random variable is 
infeasible or a large number of random variables with high volatility and complicated 
correlation structure make the nature of random space very complex, pursing the 
stochastic two-stage aircraft design approach as proposed by Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3 is not only difficult but also impractical.  
Even though the issue of acquiring reasonable definition of the random variable is 
put aside for a moment, the idea of investigating and incorporating all the random space 
as in the stochastic programming approach can be too time-consuming and can 
overwhelm the decision makers with too much information. For instance, while the 
stochastic approach yields the first-stage optimum solution as a point-solution, it also 
yields myriads of second-stage design upgrade schemes. A large number of second-stage 
solutions, when they are produced by randomly sampled scenarios, can be very difficult 
for a human decision maker to interpret and can be meaningless. Instead, scenario 
analysis with only a handful of well-organized scenarios can provide much more insight 
with less computational effort.  
In order to achieve the goal, first, the set of scenarios , 1, ,
u n
u u=ω … are identified. 
With each of the scenarios, the deterministic, two-stage aircraft design optimization are 
solved repeatedly.  
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where 
1
,( )Q x ω  is the optimal value of the second-stage problem defined as 
 86 
 2
1 1 2
1 2
2
2 2
( ) ( , )
s.t
, min ,
, ) 0 ( 1,..., ). ( ,
u u
j u
Q
jg l
f
≤ =
=
x
x x x
x x
ω ω
ω
 (23) 
Then, un first-stage optimum solutions are gained for each corresponding prediction 
scenario, *
1
( ) , 1, ,u
n
u u=x … . Then, on top of these un Here-and-Now (HN) solutions, the 
second-stage optimization is solved again for each of the realized scenarios. 
 2
*
2 1
1
2
*
2 2 2
ˆ( ,( ) )
ˆs.t. ( ,(
for , : min ,
, ) 0 ( 1,...,) )
u
s
u
j s
s u
j l
f
g
∀
≤ =
x
x
x
x
x
ω
ω
 (24) 
where ˆ , 1, ,
s n
s s=ω … is the realized scenario. The result is un × sn Wait-and-See (WS) 
solutions, *
2
ˆ( ) , 1, , , 1, ...,u
s n n
u u s s= =x … . If 5
n n
u s= = for example, five first-stage 
solutions and twenty-five second-stage solutions are obtained. Along with these 5 HN 
designs and 25 WS designs, the aircraft attribute, such as performance or cost, evaluated 
at the optimum points, i.e. 
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Making comparisons with this set of designs and vehicle attributes often reveals 
important inequalities and equalities among the designs and vehicle attributes. The 
design can be visualized in the form of bar graphs to reveal the patterns without 
overwhelming the decision maker. 
 87 
5.1.5 Framework for Two-Stage Design Space Exploration 
Hypothesis 5: A flexible and interactive tool built on the two-stage aircraft design 
formulation would allow the decision makers to effectively and concurrently 
explore the two-stage design space, evaluate evolution strategies, change 
assumptions, simulate scenarios, and thus make strategic decisions with a greater 
degree of freedom. (Research Question 9) 
 
The formulations proposed in Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 4 involve 
optimization loops. When the optimum solutions could be the most valuable information 
to the decision makers and engineers, they are simply point solutions that are only 
optimal under strict assumptions and scenarios. In the case in which uncertainty cannot 
be predicted reasonably, those point solutions can become meaningless when unexpected 
events occur. Another drawback of optimization is that all the constraints are treated as 
hard constraints and are strictly enforced. In reality, aerospace systems design problems 
often accept less than satisfactory performance for the sake of cost and/or schedule 
savings. More importantly, stochastic and deterministic optimizations solve a single 
objective rather than multiple objectives, lacking the capability of accounting for the 
possibility of conflicting interests between multiple stakeholders and entities. Finally, 
treating technology integration as a design variable can make optimization very difficult 
since technology combinations are inevitably discrete.  
To quantitatively evaluate the vehicle growth options free from the restrictions 
listed above, a non-optimization approach is warranted. The goal becomes the creation 
of tools with which stakeholders can change the assumptions, apply the scenarios, and 
trade-off various requirements and figures of merit. It is envisioned that this goal will be 
 88 
achieved by the use of an interactive, visual framework built based on the TAD 
environment. The framework(s) should be interactive—allowing almost instantaneous 
feedback to the decision-maker—and adequately visual for high-level decision makers to 
navigate various evolution scenarios and make strategic decisions. The framework should 
also allow every variable beyond the design variable x to be treated as an independent 
variable.  
5.2 Synthesis of a New Method 
Implementation of the proposed tasks into an actual aircraft design exercise requires 
recasting the aircraft design problem into the (f, g, x, ω) formulations. A comprehensive 
design methodology was formulated by adopting the elements that are found in the 
conventional engineering design process. The method, Evaluation of Lifelong Vehicle 
Evolution (EvoLVE), was initially constructed as a five-step process [118] in 2007 and 
has evolved into its current form. The EvoLVE method illustrated in Figure 21 consists 
of nine major steps. While the specifics of these steps are presented in the subsequent 
sections, they can be viewed as an expansion of the four-step engineering design process 
reviewed in §2.2.1. The first two steps are a two-stage problem definition, followed by a 
synthesis of solutions in the third and fourth steps. The fifth and sixth steps are 
modeling and simulation. The last three steps offer three different ways to explore the 
two-stage design space and make a decision. Steps 1, 3, and 5 are essentially identical to 
the first three steps of the conventional engineering design process by Suh and others in 
Figure 12. These three steps are shown in green outline to differentiate them from other 
steps created by the author.  
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Figure 21: Overview of the EvoLVE Method 
5.3 Present and Future Requirements: Steps 1-2  
The important thing [for a designer] to learn is that the ability to define the 
problem is the most important and difficult task in engineering.  
Nam P. Suh in Principle of Design [38] 
 
The goal of the first two steps of the method is to identify what the customer wants now 
and in the future. These two steps define the set of requirements that are further 
arranged as objective functions, constraints, and risk measures for both the first- and 
second-stage design optimization. The definition of these elements in the future time 
frame inevitably introduces uncertainty. Therefore, future requirements take the form of 
random variables, probability measures, and scenarios.  
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5.3.1 The First-Stage Requirement 
The first step of EvoLVE identifies the requirement for the current development 
program, or the first-stage requirement. The first-stage requirement defines what 
capability has to be built into the baseline system. The need for a new aircraft can be 
solicited in the form of a request for proposal (RFP) and made concrete in an 
operational requirement document (ORD). The requirements are often given as measures 
of effectiveness (MoE) and key performance parameters (KPPs), along with the mission 
profiles. Key performance parameters are defined below:  
Key performance parameters are capabilities or characteristics that the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council designates as so significant that failure to meet 
the threshold value can cause the concept or system selected to be reevaluated or 
the program to be reassessed or terminated [153]. 
The KPPs constitute the first-stage constraint vector, g1 by definition.  
MoEs provide a set of comprehensive goodness measures to evaluate a military 
system in terms of performance, cost, and program schedule. For a military system 
acquisition, MoEs are defined before the Milestone I review in order to provide 
justification to pursue a new military system. The Department of Defense defines MoEs 
as “a qualitative or quantitative measure of a system’s performance or a characteristic 
that indicates the degree to which it performs the task or meets a requirement under 
specified conditions [154].” To give an example, the F/A-18E/F program’s MoEs 
included: survivability/vulnerability, unit cost, strike mission radius, carrier suitability, 
fighter performance (such as turn rate, climb rate, and excess power), weapons system 
features, and armament flexibility [83]. Since the KPPs of the F/A-18E/F program 
included mission radius, carrier suitability, and fighter performance, the MoEs largely 
overlap with KPPs but are broader in scope.  
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In the absence of a concrete problem definition from the customer, the present or 
short-term need is identified by using system engineering methods, such as market 
analysis, QFD, operational analysis, etc. The QFD analysis introduced in §2.2.1 includes 
a proven method to translate the “voice of customers” to the “voice of engineers”, which 
includes the aircraft system level requirements and relative importance rating.  
Another question that must be answered in this step is “what does the customer 
want to avoid?” While customers have a clear goal to achieve, such as maximizing the 
net present value, maximizing the mission effectiveness, etc., they also have guidelines on 
what must be avoided in the worst-case scenario. The answer to this question would 
define the risk measure of the customer.  
The outcome of Step 1 constructs objective f1, constraints g1, and the risk measures 
that are used in later steps.  
5.3.2 Evolution of the First-Stage Requirement 
Step 2 solicits the long-term customer needs and translates them into the second-stage 
requirement. This step begins by taking the first-stage requirement and projecting it into 
the future time frame. It is important to define the scope in terms of time frame and 
degree of evolution of the requirement before such projection is made.  
5.3.2.1 Emerging Needs and Time Frame 
The time frame should be determined by asking when the variant or the derivative of 
the baseline aircraft is needed. For an acquisition program that follows the EA process, 
the customer is supposed to provide the timeline of the capability increments. Otherwise, 
the need for an upgrade is initiated by the events that affect what and how the baseline 
system should perform. For example, a new legislati
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greenhouse gases by 2020. The a fighter/attack aircraft is expected to extend its mission 
spectrum in 2015 to cover the Close-Air-Support (CAS) role after the scheduled 
retirement of the aircraft or rotorcraft that currently performs the mission. These two 
scenarios would give a clear timeline as to when the baseline has to be upgraded either 
to maintain its competitiveness or to expand its market share. The time frame can be as 
far as the customer wants to consider, but about twenty years down the road would be 
the furthest future in a practical sense. On the other hand, the time frame can be as near 
as zero years if the second-stage program is concurrent to the first-stage program as in 
the case of the development of the Marine and the Navy variants of the F-35.  
The scope of the problem is also bounded by determining what new capability, role, 
regulation, etc. are introduced on top of the first-stage requirement. For example, it is 
common that a military aircraft developed originally for an air-to-air role expands its 
capability to include air-to-ground, electronic warfare, etc., as the history of the F/A-18, 
F-16, and F-15 show. Commercial air transports are often customized as an extended-
range version, a special cargo version, an executive or Presidential version, etc. When 
such capability expansion is considered in this step, it is important to bind the problem 
to only include “evolutionary” upgrades and avoid “disruptive” changes. For example, 
converting a subsonic air transport into a supersonic air transport is not practical. A 
supersonic fighter is not likely to be upgraded to have the VTOL capability unless such 
provision was embedded from the beginning. 
Introduction of new missions brings in new elements to the baseline requirement set. 
For example, if a fighter developed for the Air Force is modified to have aircraft carrier 
capability, a series of carrier suitability requirements are added to form the new 
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requirement set. It is likely that the commercial jets in the future will be subject to 
stringent noise and emission regulations.  
5.3.2.2 Random Variables and Probability Measures 
Among the elements of the second-stage requirement, those that are likely to grow and 
those that are likely to remain constant at the current level are divided. Examination of 
the aircraft evolution trends of the class similar to the ones in CHAPTER III can 
provide insight into this process. For example, requirements on payload, range, and 
avionics weight are likely to increase. Especially, the modern trend is to constantly 
improve the electronic warfare suite, which in turn demands higher cooling and electrical 
power generation capacity. On the other hand, physical constraints, such as take-off field 
length, approach speed, and load factor are among the constraints that are not likely to 
change over time. Recent trends in fighter aircraft also show that the importance of 
stealthiness and radar power are increasing, while point performance requirements that 
were important during dog fighting decades ago, such as speed, turn rate, and excess 
power are becoming less critical to mission success.  
Among the requirements that are likely to change over time, only those judged to be 
important and hard to predict with certainty are identified as random variables. 
Importance is judged by the sensitivity of the system level vehicle attributes to the 
change of the requirement. In general, if a new requirement can be fulfilled without 
affecting the vehicles’ weight or drag, its impact to the system-level vehicle attribute 
would be minimal and thus unimportant.  
The second criterion is the predictability of the requirement growth. The designer 
knows the future requirement with certainty if the customer specifies the growth of a 
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requirement from the beginning. For example, the customer places an order of 100 
aircraft flying 1,000 nm at the cruise speed of Mach 0.8 carrying 200 passengers with a 
commitment of another 50 aircraft flying 1,200 nm at Mach 0.8 carrying 230 passengers, 
as an extended range variant. In another case, the same aircraft manufacturer gets an 
order of 100 aircraft flying 1,000 nm at Mach 0.8 with 200 passengers. This time the 
manufacturer does not have any other orders from other airlines, but it plans stretched 
version(s) in order to increase market capture. All three elements—range, speed, and 
number of passengers—significantly affect the attributes of the aircraft and are thus 
important. However, it is anticipated that the cruise speed would not increase, as the 
historical trend of commercial jets reveals. Then, the two remaining requirements—range 
and number of passengers—are random variables.  
As the next step, the identified random variables have their values defined in the 
form of probability density functions (PDFs) or probability mass functions (PMFs). The 
full definition of the future requirement in probability space can be obtained by soliciting 
the potential customers, e.g. airlines. Conducting a market analysis of the past years and 
projecting it to the future would also identify the need for a particular class of airplanes. 
The Boeing Company’s annual Current Market Outlook [155] forecasts the global 
commercial transport market up to 20 years from their study. Airbus also publishes 
Global Market Forecast [156] covering a 20-year time span. Alternatively, air vehicle 
level requirements may come from a System-of-Systems (SoS) level study involving all 
major aircraft manufacturers and airliners. A Monte Carlo study at the SoS level would 
provide probability distributions of air vehicle level attributes.  
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5.3.2.3 Scenario Development 
The final task of Step 2 is to capture the requirement uncertainty in the form of discrete 
scenarios. In the case where probability distributions are not available or the cost of 
pursuing a stochastic solution is prohibitive, the option of scenario-based analysis (Step 
7) can be selected. This option requires at least two or more scenarios that capture the 
probability space. The scenario generation starts from the higher hierarchical levels than 
the level the design exercise is played in. At the higher hierarchical level, the source of 
uncertainty is identified first. In the case of military aircraft, uncertainty comes from 
changes in threat, theater, competition, politics, technology, regulation/deregulation, and 
so forth. For each of the uncertainty sources, you may ask the relevant questions that 
affect the current aircraft development most within the interested time frame. For 
example,  
• Will the third world countries acquire air power that poses a threat to U.S. air 
power?  
• Will Lockheed Martin win the second phase contract? 
• Will the next administration cancel or truncate the program? 
• Will the Royal Navy buy the aircraft? How many?  
• If the Marine’s new attack helicopter program is approved, will they purchase 300 
units of the Marine variant of the attack aircraft as promised? 
• Will the current fighter program pass Milestone III and move on to FSD? 
• Will the economic growth of the U.S. and the defense budget be maintained? 
• Will a robot replace human pilots? 
• Will the delivery of the Navy variant of JSF be delayed? 
Each of the questions constitutes a macro-level scenario. Then, the scenarios are mapped 
into the set of aircraft system level parameters. For example, the question regarding the 
Royal Navy purchase will affect the production quantity, weapons payload, the WOD 
requirement, the bring back capability, etc. At the same time, the delay of JSF can 
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affect the production quantity as well as the mission coverage, which subsequently 
affects mission radius, radar range, etc. The scenario of emergent threats may require a 
Navy fighter with a better stand-off, which means a more powerful active radar, the 
Phoenix missile capability, etc. The mapping process can be done by a team of subject-
matter experts using techniques such as QFD, expert polls, and brainstorming.   
It is important to iterate the scenario generation process and only leave the 
important and meaningful ones. While no scientific rule prescribes how many scenarios 
are selected, at least three scenarios are recommended, for example, most probable, worst 
case, and best case. For example, the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) 
studied the next generation air transportation system under three scenarios: the baseline 
air traffic demand scenario by FAA, the FAA scenario plus two times the growth rate, 
and the scenario of a shift to smaller aircraft and smaller airports [157]. 
The outcome of Step 2 is the random variable vector ω  and its definitions in the 
form of either or both the PDFs and the scenarios. 
5.4 Baseline Platform, Technologies and Evolution 
Strategies: Steps 3-4 
Once the current and future problems are defined in Steps 1 and 2, the candidate 
solutions to respond to the needs are synthesized in Steps 3 and 4. Step 3 down-selects a 
baseline platform(s) that has the greatest potential to meet the first and second-stage 
requirements. Step 4 synthesizes the possible ways to respond to the evolving 
requirements. This step identifies the list of potential upgrade elements including 
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addition of new subsystems, features, and technologies. Another task in this step is to 
plan for the long-term development options or the evolution strategies.  
5.4.1 The Baseline Platform 
Step 3 synthesizes a large number of solution candidates and down-selects a baseline 
platform(s) with the greatest potential to meet the current and future requirements with 
the least cost for further evaluation. While engineering judgment is important to trim 
the alternative concept space and down select one or a few platforms as a baseline(s), the 
modern system engineering tools presented in §2.2.1 can be of use in this step. A 
particularly useful tool here is the morphological analysis [30], in which the required 
functions are decomposed, the alternative options for each said function are listed in the 
physical domain, and innovative concepts are identified through the recomposition 
process. Candidates for near-term technology substitution are also identified in this step.  
The identified fusion of concept and technology can be qualitatively and 
quantitatively assessed using decision-making tools, such as the Pugh matrix [22] and 
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) [158]. Also, 
recently formulated qualitative tools, such as the Interactive Reconfigurable Matrix of 
Alternatives (IRMA) [159] or Qualitative Interactive Evaluation Tool (QuIET) [160], 
could prove to be useful in this step, as both are comprehensive tools containing 
elements of QFD, Morphological Analysis, TOPSIS, TRL, etc. The evaluation criteria 
for the assessment are available from Step 1.  
The outcome of Step 3 is the baseline platform, design space, and the near-term 
technology. The design space is defined by the vector of the first-stage design variables 
x1, along with the lower limit 1
lx , and the upper limit 1
ux . The design space should be 
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large enough to enclose designs that meet both the first- and second-stage requirements 
and should be refined at later steps as the modeling and simulation environment is 
created.  
5.4.2 Upgrade Options and Long-Term Technology 
For the given baseline platform identified in Step 3, Step 4 synthesizes all the possible 
strategies brought about to effectively respond to the situations requirement evolution. 
Contemplation of the long-term solution would start by answering following two 
questions: what needs to be changed from the baseline aircraft and how can such a 
change be implemented? The first question is to identify the list of technical means to 
meet the second-stage requirement. The second question is to come up with managerial 
plans to implement capability upgrades, for example, either by retrofitting existing 
aircraft, producing variants, designing new airplanes, etc. The managerial alternatives in 
capability upgrade are called evolution strategies in this document and are further 
discussed in the next section.  
An answer to the first question would identify the specific elements of upgrade, 
including the addition of new subsystems, features, and technologies. For example, based 
on the first-stage design, one can increase wing area, insert fuselage plugs, install 
external fuel tanks, enlarge vertical or horizontal tails, upgrade high-lift-device, increase 
engine thrust, increase engine efficiency, etc. Here, long-term technology candidates 
depending on the given time frame, technology maturity, and risk tolerance are 
identified as well. NASA’s TRL is a technology maturity measure with a 1 to 9 scale 
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[161]. While Step 3 only considers the technologies with high TRLs * , Step 4 might 
include the technologies with lower TRLs.  
Mathematically, the outcome of Step 4 is the new design variable vector x2. 
Sometimes, insertion of new technology cannot be modeled by continuous perturbation 
of the design variables. In such a case, it is necessary to add discrete variables to the 
second-stage design variable set x2. A mix of both continuous and discrete variables 
makes design space exploration and optimization very difficult.  
5.4.3 Evolution Strategies 
Another important task of Step 4 is the managerial plan to effectively respond to the 
situations brought about by requirement evolution. Contemplation of the long-term 
strategy as to how design evolution will be implemented would start by answering 
following questions: 
1. Do I upgrade the first-stage design or start from scratch? 
2. (If upgrade,) Do I preplan for the future design from the beginning or solely 
focus on the first-stage requirement? 
3. (If preplan,) Do I integrate future requirements deterministically or 
stochastically? 
4. (If deterministically preplan,) Under which scenario do I preplan?  
Answering the first question divides the second-stage program into either a new 
aircraft development program or a derivative aircraft development program. Once the 
                                                                                       
*In the conceptual design phase, integration of technologies with technology readiness level 6 or higher is 
typically considered for a new aircraft, according to Mark Alber, Section Chief of Advanced Concept at 
Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford, Connecticut. [Interviewed on April 26, 2007, by the author] 
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path of modifying the existing design is chosen, the path is further divided depending on 
whether such an upgrade is considered from the beginning of the first stage or not. Then, 
the option of preplanning future improvements from the beginning can be done either 
deterministically or stochastically, depending on how uncertainty is modeled and 
incorporated. Finally, since the path of deterministic preplanning requires selection of 
one particular scenario in the beginning, the maximum number of possible options is 
equal to the number of scenarios generated in Step 2. For example, in the case of the 200 
passenger commercial transport example, up to three deterministic preplanning options 
can be generated by assigning the scenarios S1, S2, and S3 to each of the options. Figure 
22 shows a taxonomy of the vehicle evolution paths one can consider at the second stage, 
along with the criteria dividing the paths.   
For the strategies falling under the derivative aircraft development track, the vehicle 
platform for the second stage should be held constant with the first stage since it is 
unreasonable to perceive a cross-platform jump as an evolutionary progression. However, 
Under which scenario?
How to incorporate 
uncertainty?
Preplan such upgrade?
Upgrade current design?
Present problem Baseline Design
New Design Derivative Design
Ad-hoc 
Upgrade
Preplan 
Upgrade
Stochastic 
Preplan
Deterministic 
Preplan
Optimistic Moderate Pessimistic …
Requirement change renders
need for design change
 
Figure 22: Taxonomy of Evolution Path 
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the new aircraft design option is free from this restriction, and any other platforms to 
serve the second-stage requirements best can be considered. Along with the evolution 
paths, the set of technologies that are applicable to the baseline platform is identified in 
this step. The subsequent sections discuss the options in detail along with corresponding 
design structure matrices (DSMs) and mathematical representations.  
5.4.3.1 The New-Design Strategy 
The first path of developing a new aircraft in the second stage, named as the New-
Design (ND) strategy, sets up the first and second-stage problems completely 
independent to each other. In the first stage, an optimal design x1
* is sought by 
minimizing f1. 
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Then, later when changes in requirement call for a new design, a new optimization 
problem is solved.  
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Since the second-stage design is independent to the first-stage design, x1 does not affect 
the second stage. An example of pursuing this strategy would be using the F/A-18 for 
the first stage, then later purchasing the F-14, F-35, etc, instead of upgrading it. 
Figure 23 is the DSM of the ND strategy. The boxes labeled “Stage 1” and “Stage 
2” represent the contributing analyses that calculate f and g based on x for each 
strategy. Each stage is linked to an optimizer. The arrows between the boxes indicate 
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the direction of data flow. No arrows between the first- and second-stage problem shows 
that no data is exchanged between the two problems.  
In order to assess the computational cost of pursuing the ND strategy, assume that 
the number of function calls in solving the stage 1 and stage 2 are n1 and n2 respectively. 
Then, the total number of function evaluations solving the entire problem is simply n1 
plus n2. This number is compared to the computational cost of other strategies later. 
Inclusion of the ND strategy in the study provides a comparison point against which one 
of the worst derivative design strategies is compared to see to what extent introducing a 
derivative model would be cheaper than starting from scratch. 
5.4.3.2 The Ad-hoc Upgrade Strategy 
The option of introducing a derivative design in the second stage without preplanning 
was named the Ad-Hoc (AH) Strategy. As with the ND strategy, in the first stage, the 
design practice is to ensure the best design for the current, first-stage requirements by 
solving Eq. (25) with the AH strategy. No growth provision is considered or incorporated 
to the first-stage design x1. Compared to the ND strategy, however, after the second-
stage requirement is concretely defined, the AH strategy seeks the most effective way to 
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Figure 23: The New-Design Strategy 
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modify the first-stage design to meet the new requirement rather than starting from 
scratch in the second stage by solving:
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The objective function of the second-stage problem, f2, either implicitly or explicitly 
includes the cost of modifying the design from the original state with other cost 
measures. In the case of aircraft acquisition, the cost of modifying an existing design is 
implicitly included in the RDT&E cost.  
Figure 24 shows the difference of the AH strategy from the ND strategy, having a 
feed-forward loop from the stage 1 to stage 2 problem. Since the second-stage 
optimization is solved after the second-stage problem is defined, the total number of 
function evaluation is still in the order of n1 plus n2.  
5.4.3.3 Deterministic Preplanning Strategy 
Moving on to preplanning strategies, growth provisions are now considered in the first-
stage design in order to reduce the cost of design modification in the second stage. 
Therefore the preplanning strategies must deal with the uncertain future requirements 
from the beginning. Depending on the way uncertainty is modeled and incorporated, the 
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Figure 24: The Ad-Hoc Upgrade Strategy 
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preplanning strategies are classified into the Deterministic Preplanning (DetPP) strategy 
and the Stochastic Preplanning (StoPP) strategy. A DetPP solves a deterministic 
problem by selecting a future scenario among the discrete scenarios identified in Step 2. 
With a selected scenario 
u
ω , a DetPP performs the “what-if” study by solving a 
deterministic optimization given as 
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where 
1
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u
Q x ω  is the optimal value of the second-stage problem defined as 
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The difference from the non-preplanning strategies, i.e. ND and AH, is that the first-
stage optimization includes the cost function of the second stage so that it balances the 
cost of over-designing and upgrading. One important note is that since the second-stage 
optimization given in Eq (29) is based on the predicted second-stage requirement 
u
ω , 
after the actual second-stage requirement is revealed, the optimization must be resolved 
by solving:  
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where ˆ
s
ω is the realized scenario.  
The DSM of DetPP in Figure 25 has a feedback loop from the second stage to the 
first stage, making the two problems interdependent. The feedback loop informs the 
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minimum second-stage cost f2
* for a given first-stage design x1, and thus considerably 
increases the number of function evaluations to roughly in the order of n1 times n2. 
The two-level optimization structure apparent from the DSM suggests the potential 
of utilizing some of the bi- or multi-level multidisciplinary design optimization (MDO) 
techniques in order to improve the efficiency of the optimization process. The MDO 
techniques, such as All-At-Once (AAO), Bi-Level Integrated System Synthesis (BLISS) 
[162], and Collaborative Optimization (CO) [163, 164] have been introduced and used in 
the community of MDO recently and proved their usefulness in aerospace design [165-
168]. It seems that the problem structure of a deterministic preplanning strategy is 
compatible to all these methods. Therefore, it would be worth investigating such 
techniques in order to reduce the computational cost while maintaining efficiency.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Some bi-level MDO techniques are compatible to two-stage aircraft design 
optimization and potentially reduce the computational cost.  
 
5.4.3.4 Stochastic Preplanning Strategy 
The StoPP deals with uncertainty by considering all combinations of the random 
variable realization, rather than just one combination as the deterministic counterpart 
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Figure 25: The Deterministic Preplanning Strategy 
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does. With all possible outcomes, the second-stage optimization problem is solved, and 
the average second-stage cost or the expectation is added to the first-stage objective 
function.   
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where 
1
,( )Q x ω  is the optimal value of the second-stage problem defined as 
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Again, for the given first-stage optimal solution *
1
x  the second-stage problem is resolved 
after the realization of the random variables by solving 
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where ωˆ  is the realized scenario.  
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Figure 26: The Stochastic Preplanning Strategy 
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Comparison between the DSMs of deterministic and stochastic approaches (Figure 
26) shows that the only difference between the two approaches is whether the first-stage 
optimization minimizes f1 plus f2
* or f1 plus the expectation of f2
*. This seemingly simple 
change inflicts enormous computational burden. Indeed, the expectation operation 
increases the number of second-stage function evaluations exponentially, making the 
StoPP very expensive to pursue. For example, if the number of random variables is d 
and each of them takes K number of scenarios (assuming finite outcomes), the total 
number of scenarios is Kd. The total number of function evaluations required to solve 
Eqs. (10) and (11) significantly depends on which solution technique is used and the 
desired accuracy of the integration or expectation operation, but it is roughly in the 
order of n1 times n2 times K
d.  
5.5 Modeling and Simulation: Steps 5 and 6 
Modeling and simulation is a process to develop a computer model that repeatedly 
quantifies the objective f and constraints g as a function of the design parameters x. 
EvoLVE establishes the modeling and simulation in two following separate steps.  
5.5.1 Conventional Modeling and Simulation 
Step 5 is not different from the M&S process of conventional single-stage design 
processes. Therefore, this step involves collection, creation, and validation of physical 
relationships or analysis codes, by which the identified requirements are quantified in 
terms of the design variables and design parameters. The end product of Step 5 is a 
validated computer model that evaluates f1 and g1 for any design points in the design 
space 
1 1
[ , ]l ux x .  
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 1 1 1
Model andf→ →x g  (34) 
Since such a model is required to pursue the conventional single-stage design, the 
organization might have a model already in hand. Then, Step 5 can be skipped.    
5.5.2 Scaling Laws and Upgrade Cost 
While the model of the baseline vehicle established in Step 5 should be adequate for a 
conventional single-stage design, expansion of the problem into two stages in EvoLVE 
also requires expansion of the model accordingly. Step 6 prepares a model that maps the 
second-stage design variables to objectives and constraints. 
 1 2 2 2
 and Model' andf→ →x x g  (35) 
If the second-stage requirement calls for a new platform different from the first-stage 
vehicle, a new model is developed and validated as it was done in Step 5. Otherwise, the 
model developed in Step 5 can be reused in Step 6 with modifications.  
First of all, to be able to provide feasible solutions after incorporation of the second-
stage requirement, the first-stage design space 
1 1
[ , ]l ux x  needs to be expanded in terms of 
the number of design variables and the ranges of each design variable. This is not a 
trivial task because the functional relationship from x to g and f that was defined in Step 
5 may not be valid anymore. Incorporation of the second-stage requirement to the first-
stage problem may require inclusion of some more design variables. Consider, for 
instance, the original requirement for a bomber that specifies a subsonic cruise speed and 
then the second-stage requirement demands a cruise speed in a high transonic regime. 
The change in the cruise speed requirement would add the consideration of wave drag in 
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the second stage. Then, the feedback loop from the second stage to the first stage makes 
it necessary to include the new design variables to calculate and reduce wave drag.  
In traditional design practice, the design space is relatively small. Activities during 
design space exploration, such as sensitivity studies, trade-off studies, etc. involve a 
small perturbation of the design variables from the baseline within the range where the 
validated model remains valid. However, as the range of design change is much larger in 
EvoLVE than in a single-stage design practice, using the model validated at the baseline 
point can lead to erroneous results. Therefore, in Step 6, the scaling laws that capture 
the physical growth of the vehicle are developed and validated.  
Another central task of Step 6 is to develop a model that quantifies the cost of 
design modifications from one stage to the next. The cost of engine replacements, rating-
up transmissions, integrating new avionics suites, etc. must be available in the same 
currency as the first-stage objective. The cost model should include the cost of 
integrating the technologies identified in Step 4. 
5.5.3 Creation of a Two-Stage Aircraft Design Environment 
Once the first-stage model is expanded to cover second-stage designs, and the second-
stage model including the cost to change the first-stage design to the second-stage design 
is created and validated, the models are linked together to enable automatic execution. 
While the software architecture such an integrated M&S is built upon should not matter, 
it is required that the created M&S environment be also amenable to automatic 
execution and surrogate modeling, as the following steps are expected to require a 
significant computational overhead. The integrated modeling and simulation tool is 
named as the Two-stage Aircraft Design (TAD) environment in this text.  
 110
 1 2 1 1 2 2
and TAD , , , andf f→ →x x g g  (36) 
5.5.4 Surrogate Modeling and Challenges 
To facilitate rapid evaluation of a plethora of design alternatives the creation of 
surrogate models is often necessary. To what level and with which modeling method 
depend on the problem in hand. With a given problem, one must consider the balance 
between the level of accuracy and the computational time available. For example, if one 
chooses to pursue the stochastic preplanning strategy, one should pre-estimate the 
computational cost of pursuing such strategy before attempting to solve it. As shown in 
Figure 26, solving SPR requires second-stage optimization whenever the global optimizer 
calls the second stage. Moreover, each second-stage function call requires a Monte Carlo 
simulation within the second stage. Assuming each second-stage optimization takes one 
minute to get f2
*, ten thousand MCS runs are performed to calculate expectation *2( )fE , 
and a first-stage optimization requires one hundred second-stage function evaluations, 
then the total second-stage function call requires 107 minutes or about nineteen years. In 
such a case, it would be practical to fit a surrogate model of f2
*.  
Once the extent to which surrogate models would replace actual models is known, a 
proper sampling technique(s) and surrogate modeling technique(s) are selected. 
Surrogate modeling methods, such as response surface methods (RSM) and Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANNs) have already been successfully applied to many engineering 
problems, including aerospace systems designs [56, 169, 170]. In addition, depending on 
the behavior of the model and surrogate modeling technique selected, a proper sampling 
technique and sample size should be determined.  
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EvoLVE is anticipated to render challenges in creating surrogate models. Since 
EvoLVE considers the future growth of a design and its requirements in the first stage, 
the design space that is explored is generally larger than the one in which the future 
growth is ignored. Fitting surrogate models covering a large design space can be difficult 
for two reasons: analysis codes often crash when an infeasible design point is evaluated, 
and the behavior of design space may become highly non-linear. In addition, since the 
second-stage problem is a function of the first-stage design, the number of design 
variables that must be included in the second stage is quite large. For example, if the 
number of design variables is ten for the first stage, the number for design variables in 
the second stage can be twenty, at least. In general, the number of sampling points for 
surrogate modeling increases rapidly as the number of independent variables increases, 
causing high computational cost.  
5.5.5 Avoiding Pitfalls  
As identified through case studies and encapsulated in Observation 4, past aircraft 
modification programs often suffered unexpected technical problems, resulting in cost 
and schedule overrun. In order to avoid the pitfalls of underestimating technical 
difficulty of modifying design, a special emphasis should be placed on modeling key 
physical constraints that are of particular importance to the future modification of the 
given baseline platform. If readily available, the deliberations of an integrated product 
team (IPT) can be utilized to further qualify the importance of the design constraints.  
The sources for the most constraining factors of the derivative aircraft are different 
from one aircraft category to another—commercial/military, fixed wing/rotary wing, 
subsonic/supersonic, attacker/bomber/transport, etc. Therefore, case studies of similar 
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aircraft types would provide valuable insights as to which constraints are likely to be the 
most restrictive. For example, inadequate sonic boom mitigation has made the 
widespread emergence of commercial supersonic transport infeasible [53]. Supersonic 
fighters have very tight internal arrangements that do not allow much room for growth. 
Handling quality specifications is expected to be critical for the certification of derivative 
aircraft designs, if significant growth in vehicle weight, compared to that of the original, 
is forecasted. The issue of handling quality and safety degradation is further discussed in 
§8.2.7 as part of the future research opportunities. 
5.6 Design Space Exploration: Steps 7-9 
Once the environment for two-stage aircraft design (TAD) is established, the tool can be 
utilized in various ways. EvoLVE offers three distinctive options of using TAD in Steps 
7-9 to explore the two-stage design space simultaneously. Steps 7 and 8 seek optimum 
designs for each of the strategies defined in Step 4 under the scenarios defined in Step 2 
by solving two-stage optimization problems either deterministically or stochastically. The 
non-optimization track of Step 9 allows exploration of the design space with a greater 
degree of freedom. While these options do not have to be exercised in the given order 
due to the iterative nature of the design process, it is recommended to follow the steps as 
given to minimize the need for rework.  
5.6.1 A Deterministic Scenario-Based Approach to Two-Stage Aircraft Design 
Optimization 
Step 7 explores the design space with all the non-stochastic strategies that are defined in 
Step 4. The ND and AH strategies seek the optimum solution by solving Eqs. (25)-(27), 
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and the DetPPs solve Eqs. (28) and (30). Optimizations are conducted in two phases: 
before, and after the uncertainty is realized. First, under the presence of uncertainty, the 
optimal first-stage solutions for each of the strategies, *
1
( )px  and *
2
( )px , are found, where 
1, ,
n
p p= …  is the strategy number. Then, on top of these here-and-now (HN) solutions, 
all the discrete scenarios , 1, ,
s n
s s= …ω defined in Step 4 are applied to see how well each 
strategy responds to the unexpected future requirement in a posteriori manner. For all 
the combinations of strategies and realized scenarios, the second-stage optimization 
problems are solved to yield the set of wait-and-see (WS) solutions *
2
ˆ( ) , 1, ,p
s n
s s= …x  and 
1, ,
n
p p= … . The hat symbol ⋅ˆ  indicates that ⋅  is the state determined after the 
realization of the random variables.  
For the 200-passenger commercial transport example, five deterministic strategies 
and three discrete scenarios were defined. The scenario-based approach applies all three 
scenarios to the five strategies to see which strategies works better under which 
circumstances. For example, DetPP(S2) predicts that scenario 2 would specify the 
second-stage requirements and preplan accordingly, yielding the first- and second-stage 
optimum strategies 2DetPP(S )*
1 2
( )
u=x  and 
2DetPP(S )*
2 2
( )
u=x  where u is predicted scenario number. 
Then, after applying all three scenarios, a set of solutions 2DetPP(S )*
2
ˆ( ) , 1, , 3
s
s =x …  are 
found.  
The scenario-based approach provides a manageable number of optimal designs, i.e. 
*
1
( )px , *
2
( )px , and *
2
ˆ( )p
s
x , along with cost *
1
f , *
2
( )pf , and *
2
ˆ( )p
s
f , and constraints *
1
( )pg , 
*
2
( )pg , and *
2
ˆ( )p
s
g  for 1, ,
n
s s= … and 1, ,
n
p p= … . These states are compared in various 
different ways to yield meaningful observations and patterns. The patterns can provide 
general guidance and insights as to which strategies would outperform or underperform 
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in which situations. For example, comparisons between the first- and second-stage design 
can reveal how much growth potential is placed in what subsystem under what 
circumstances. The comparison between the design variables, e.g. wing area, engine 
thrust, landing gear, etc. can reveal which subsystem is more or less affected by which 
scenario. In addition, comparisons made between the constraints at the optimum points 
indicate the degree of growth potential imbedded in the optimal first-stage designs.  
For an efficient communication, two terms are coined as follows: 
A PfD (Perfect fit Design) is defined as an optimal first-stage design that is 
intended to minimize only first-stage cost function. Thus, it is the solution of the 
optimization problem, 
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( 1,..., )
i
g
f
i l=≤
x
x
x
 (37) 
A PfD, is the least expensive aircraft—and often smallest and lightest aircraft—among 
*
1
( )px  and is obtained by applying non-preplanning strategies. However, the preplanning 
strategies may find the PfD the best design, even considering second-stage requirements, 
if embedding growth potential in the original design does not provide any long-term 
benefit.  
A PoD (Perfect over-Design) is defined as an optimal first-stage design of a 
preplanning strategy that meets the predicted second-stage requirements without design 
modification. Since a PoD is over-designed from the beginning to meet the second-stage 
requirement, it does not have to be modified in the second stage if the actual scenario 
turns out be the predicted one. Therefore, * *
1 2
ˆ( ) ( )p p
u s
=x x  if u s=  where u is the 
anticipated scenario number and s is the realized scenario number. A PoD is the 
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opposite case of a PfD and is found when design change penalty dominates the cost of 
over-designing.  
5.6.2 A Stochastic Approach to Two-Stage Aircraft Design Optimization 
This step mainly focuses on pursuing the stochastic strategy defined in Step 4. The 
StoPP seeks an optimum first-stage design by solving Eqs. (31) and (32) using the 
continuous probability density functions of the random variables defined in Step 2. 
Before the stochastic optimization is attempted, it is required that a technique to 
evaluate *
2
( )fE , along with a proper sampling method and sample size be determined 
among the methods introduced in §4.1.1. In general, a minimum accuracy of 10-4 of the 
approximated *
2
( )fE  is required in order to use the approximation in numerical 
optimization [97]. For a given approximation and sampling technique, the accuracy of 
approximation generally increases as the sample size increases at the cost of 
computational time. Since the convergence rate is largely affected by the matching of 
sampling techniques, the types of PDFs, and the relationship between the approximated 
functions and input, EvoLVE recommends the risk assessor investigate the stability and 
repeatability of the selected method through repeated experiments before moving to the 
next task.  
After a proper approximation technique and sample size is selected, StoPP is solved 
in two phases: before, and after realization of the random variables. The first phase—
under the presence of uncertainty—searches for the optimal first-stage decision 
* StoPP
1
( )x
ω
that minimizes not only the first-stage objective but also the expected cost of 
corrective actions. The optimum solution under the stochastic strategy is compared to 
the optimum solutions of the deterministic strategies found in Step 7.  
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In the second phase, realizations of all the combinations of random variables are 
simulated on top of the already found * StoPP
1
( )x
ω
. This is done by running a Monte Carlo 
simulation on Eq. (33) with the observed scenarios ˆ ∈ω Ω . The result of MCS is the 
collection of the optimal second-stage designs * StoPP * StoPP
ˆ2 2
( ) ( )∈x X
ω Ω
, where * StoPP
2
( )X
Ω
 is the 
entire design set obtained from MCS. This process is repeated with all the optimal first-
stage designs of other strategies to yield * *
2 2
( ) ( ) , 1, , .p p
n
p p∈ =x X
ω Ω
…   
The second-stage designs can be visualized using both PDFs and CDFs. 
Juxtaposition of the PDFs and CDFs of all the strategies can enable comparisons 
between the strategies on the entire spectrum of the random variable space. For 
example, a complementary CDF (CCDF) of the total and second-stage cost can visualize 
how much a strategy is susceptible to risk. A CCDF is the probability a random variable 
X assumes a value greater than or equal to some value x. A true CCDF of a real-valued 
random variable X is calculated for every real number x as: 
 ( ) Prob( ) 1 ( )
x
C
F X X x f t dt
−∞
= > = − ∫  (38) 
where ( )f t  is a PDF of the random variable X. Since analytical integration of ( )f t  is 
impractical, an approximation of CCDF ( )
C
F X  is obtained by numerical integration.  
Joint probability distribution or multivariate probability distribution visualizes more 
than one random variable simultaneously. An example bivariate distribution of both 
development cost and time is illustrated in Figure 27. The figure compares the 
probability distributions of two different strategies. Here, by imposing limits on cost and 
time, one can quantify which strategy has higher chance to meet both or either the cost 
and schedule limits.  
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Figure 27: Risk Assessment using Joint Probability Distribution  
The set of corrective actions for each of the strategies *
2
( ) , 1, ,p
n
p p=X
Ω
… is further 
processed by solving Eqs. (20) and (21) for a spending limit [0, ]τ ∈ +∞ . Then, the 
strategies are ranked in terms of the probability to exceed the spending limit, yielding 
the ranking function : ( , ) [1,..., ]
n
RN p r pτ → ∈ , where r is the ranking, and pn is the 
total number of strategies. Depending on how risk is perceived by the decision makers, 
the ranking function can be obtained using other risk-measures, such as the probability 
of exceeding the second-stage spending limit, the amount of loss when the project is 
canceled, the opportunity cost of losing potential foreign customers, or the variability of 
the second-stage cost.  
In conclusion, the stochastic approach helps to identify the most risk-tolerant 
configuration against the modeled uncertainties, e.g., future changes in customer 
requirements, as a function of the decision-maker’s own perception of risk. 
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5.6.3 Framework for Interactive Decision Making Support 
The final step of the EvoLVE process is to create the framework for interactive decision-
making support. In Step 9, all the restrictions applied to pursue optimization—a single 
objective, hard constraints, continuity of the design variables, restriction on the number 
of design variables and random variables, etc.—are removed, and a framework for 
decision-making support is created as per Hypothesis 5. While interactive, visual 
representation of the design space can take many different forms. Two-stage contour 
plots and two-stage multivariate profilers are proposed in this study.  
Contour plots visualize the multi-dimensional design space in two-dimensions. One 
should select two design variables for each dimension, and then all the design constraints 
and system attributes are plotted in the space defined by the two design variables. The 
constraint analysis plot shown in Figure 4 is also a type of contour plot.  
A sample two-stage contour plot is depicted in Figure 28. The plot was prepared 
using the commercial statistical software package JMP®. The left side of the figure 
depicts the first-stage design space and the right side shows the second-stage design 
space. Each plot has three parts. The top portion lists the design variables, two of which 
are selected to assume the axes of the contour plot in the bottom. The middle section is 
devoted to the list of system attributes, such as performance and cost, along with slide 
bars and an option for setting threshold values. For each attribute, lower or upper 
threshold values can be set up to create a constraint. The contour plot in the bottom 
displays the contour lines of all the system attributes. The current design point is 
indicated by the intersection point of the vertical and horizontal lines, and one can 
readily move the design point. When the design point changes, the values of all system 
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attributes are updated instantly. If constraints are set up, the constraint lines are drawn, 
dividing the design space into regions. The subset of design space is defined as feasible 
space if a design point within the region meets all constraints. The sample plot selects 
wing area and engine thrust as two interesting independent variables. The first-stage 
design space shown on the left has a narrow band of feasible space in white around wing 
area of 400 ft2 and engine thrust of 18000 lb. The second-stage design space shows the 
feasible region around 500 ft2 of wing area and 22000 lb of engine thrust.  
Stage 1 
Constraint 
Analysis
Stage 2 
Constraint 
Analysis
Future Design 
(Upgrades/Variants)
Future PerformanceBaseline Performance 
Baseline
Design 
 
Figure 28: A Sample Two-Stage Contour Plot 
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While the first-stage constraint analysis alone allows various what-if studies for the 
current design problem, the second-stage constraint analysis expands the scope of 
investigation beyond the time frame of the first-stage problem. The two-stage constraint 
analysis tool allows various aircraft evolution studies including:  
• What is constraining the design and where is growth potential? 
• How does a change in future requirements affect aircraft performance? 
• How does infusion of new technology open up the design space, and how 
much will it cost? 
• How does the relaxation of less important constraints enable cost- and time-
saving design alternatives? 
Another potentially useful tool in this step is a multivariate profiler (MVP). A MVP 
gives the relationship between multiple variables shown at a time. Therefore, it allows 
simultaneous consideration of design variables and system attributes in all developing 
stages. While contour profilers display only two dimensions of multi-dimensional design 
space at a time, the multivariate plot presents the entire view of the design space 
interaction.   
Figure 29 depicts an example MVP that was created using JMP® for a notional 
fighter. In a MVP, all the variable names are listed in the diagonal boxes of the plot. 
Each of the boxes shows interactions between the two variables comprising the 
intersection. A point in a box is one particular design, which is linked to the database 
created through repetition of design analysis. The data samples can be generated in 
various different ways: i.e. any combinations of parametric variations of the first-stage 
design, requirements, technologies, and the second-stage design.  
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Figure 29 was created based on the optimum first-stage designs under five aircraft 
evolution strategies. Random variation on the requirement is applied on the five baseline 
designs to see how these five optimum designs react to the future requirement evolution. 
Here, the design itself remains unchanged in the second stage, but aircraft performance 
changes due to either a more stringent requirement or the introduction of new 
technology. The highlighted points indicate the original performance of the aircraft. All 
other points are the future deviations from the original points. The color code shown in 
the far right column differentiates the five strategies. In the lower left corner of Figure 
29 is a scenario filter, which filters the designs that do not meet a particular requirement 
scenario. For instance, one can impose a cost limit on the second stage and relax the 
turn rate constraint to see how more emphasis on affordability than fighter performance 
changes the fighter design.  
As a final note, once the all steps of EvoLVE are executed, it is necessary to revisit 
the previous steps as more information about the problem at hand is gained.  
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Figure 29: An Example Multivariate Profiler and Scenario Filter 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PROOF OF CONCEPT: A CANTILEVERED BEAM DESIGN 
 
As a proof-of-concept study to the new approach proposed in the previous chapter, a 
two-stage cantilevered beam design problem is formulated and solved in this chapter. 
Since the main purpose of this study is to test the applicability of SPR on an engineering 
design problem consisting of two development stages, some of the steps of EvoLVE are 
either skipped or combined with other steps. A five segment cantilevered beam under a 
point transverse load is adopted from a problem presented by Vanderplaats [37]. The 
problem is then expanded to a two-stage design problem by imposing an uncertain 
second-stage requirement. The objective of the optimization is to minimize the total 
program cost, including RDT&E, production, operation, and design modification. Four 
design evolution strategies—ad-hoc upgrade, deterministic preplanning, stochastic 
preplanning, and new-design strategy—are defined and compared under various scenarios. 
Once the problem is set up, three experiments are designed and executed to test 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4.  
6.1 Problem Setup 
6.1.1 The Original Beam Design Problem 
A cantilevered beam shown in Figure 30 consists of five segments. A point transverse 
load P is applied at the end of the beam structure. Design variables are the widths of 
each beam section bi, i = 1,…,5. The goal of design is to find the minimum volume 
structure satisfying both of the two types of constraints, deflection and stress. The 
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deflection of the right end of each segment is constrained to be lower than a prescribed 
value. The deflection yi at section i is calculated as follows: 
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where  
i
y ′   deflection of segment i 
 
i
y ′    derivative of y with respect to x 
 li    length of segment i 
 E   Young’s modulus (same for all segments) 
 P   applied load 
 Ii   moment of inertia of segment i 
 hi  height of segment i (twenty times the width of the segment) 
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Figure 30: A Five-Segment Cantilevered Beam [37] 
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In addition, the bending stress, which is largest at the left end of each segment, is 
also constrained. The bending stress (
i
σ ) at section i is calculated as: 
 
2
i i
i
i
M h
I
σ =  (40) 
where 
1
i
i i j
j
M P L l l
=
 
 = + − 
 
∑  is the bending moment at the left end of segment i; L is 
total length of the beam (500 cm); P is the applied load (50,000 N).  
The original beam design problem is formally formulated as a constrained 
optimization problem as follows: 
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 (41) 
where σ is the maximum allowable stress (14,000 N/cm2) and y is the maximum 
allowable deflection (2.5 cm).  
6.1.2 Expansion of the Problem 
The beam problem described in the previous section is adapted and redefined here. First, 
the beam design problem is expanded to a two-stage beam design problem, in which a 
beam is designed for the present applied load (P1) and modified later to meet the future 
applied load (P2) as illustrated in Figure 31. It is assumed that the future requirement is 
more demanding than the current one, thus the beam structure should become stronger 
to increase its load-carrying capability. The first-stage problem is the same as the 
original problem, i.e. same requirements and constraints, except for that the 
optimization routine minimizes overall program cost instead of the beam volume. The 
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overall program cost is the sum of the cost of the new beam development program (stage 
1) and the beam modification program (stage 2). The objective of the optimization is to 
find the best beam design for stage 1, which minimizes the overall program cost.  
In stage 2, the objective function to minimize is the program cost of beam 
modification program, including the penalty of design modification. The requirement of 
stage 2, i.e. the applied load, is a random variable ω . Because of the uncertainty 
associated with the applied load in the stage 2, the stage 2 cost cannot be evaluated 
deterministically but probabilistically. Thus, the expectation of stage 2 cost is calculated 
for all realizations of the random variable. The mathematical representation of the 
problem is now expressed as follows: 
In stage 1, 
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where  b1   stage1 beam width vector 
 f1   stage 1 objective 
 r   risk-free discount rate 
 t12  time span between stage 1 and 2 
Stage 1
1
2 3 4 5
l1
x
y
l2
l3
l4
l5
P1
Stage 2
1
2 3 4 5
l1
x
y
l2
l3
l4
l5
P2
 
Figure 31: Illustration of the Two-stage Cantilevered Beam Design Problem 
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 [*]E   expectation of * 
 Q   stage 2 objective 
 ω   random variable 
 g1i  stage 1 deflection and stress constraints  
  
In the second stage, for a given b1 and a realization of the random variable following 
optimization problem is solved as  
 
2
1 2 2 1 2
2 2
( , ) min ( , ) ( , , )
s.t. ( , ) 0, ( 1,...,10)
i
Q f H
g i
ω ω ω
ω
 = +  
< =
b
b b b b
b
 (43) 
where  b2   stage 2 beam width vector  
 f2   stage 2 cost  
 H   design modification penalty 
 g2i   stage 2 deflection and stress constraints 
 
In this experiment, the first-stage applied load P1 is fixed at 50,000 lb. The stage 2 
applied load P2 is identified as a random variable. For simplicity, it was assumed that 
the random variable takes a finite number of outcomes, and a probability mass function 
(PMF) was assigned to the random variable as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )PMF( ) 75, 000,  0.2 ,  100, 000,  0.5 ,  150, 000,  0.3ω =  (44) 
where the first values in the parentheses are the applied load P2, and the second values 
are the probabilities associated with them. These three possible outcomes of ω  
constitute three scenarios that are defined as Scenario 1, 2, and 3, under which P2 is 
75,000, 100,000, and 150,000 respectively. 
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6.1.3 Evolution Strategies 
Four different beam development strategies are formulated. They are new-design, ad-hoc 
upgrade, deterministic preplanning, and stochastic preplanning strategies. The new-
design and ad-hoc upgrade strategies are non-preplanning strategies. In the new-design 
strategy, a new beam design is introduced in stage 1. Then, another new design is 
prepared in the second stage as necessary. Thus, the stage 1 and stage 2 designs are 
completely independent each other. The new-design strategy is later compared to one of 
the best new-derivative strategies to see to what extent introducing a derivative model 
would be more beneficial than starting from scratch. With the ad-hoc upgrade strategy, 
no provision for the future is made. In the first stage, the design practice is to ensure the 
best design for only the current, given requirement. No growth provision is incorporated. 
Then, after the second-stage requirement is concretely defined, a derivative version of 
the stage 1 design is sought to meet the new requirement with minimal cost. The cost in 
the second-stage problem includes the cost of modifying the design from the original 
design as well as the cost of producing and operating the derivative.  
With the deterministic preplanning strategy, the second-stage requirement is known 
or predicted to take a certain value. Growth provisions are planned in the first-stage 
design in order to reduce the cost of design modification. Thus, the objective function of 
the first-stage problem is expanded from f1 to Q. A feedback from stage 2 to stage 1 
makes the stage 1 and 2 interdependent. Mathematically, the deterministic preplanning 
solves Eqs. (42) and (43) with the absence of uncertainties. Thus, a random variable 
becomes a deterministic variable, and the second-stage objective Q is evaluated 
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deterministically. Finally, the stochastic preplanning strategy solves Eqs. (42) and (43) 
with the random variable defined in Eq. (44).  
6.1.4 Cost Modeling 
A hypothetical cost model was created as a final step of problem set up. The elements of 
the stage 1 and 2 program cost (f1 and f2) are research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) cost, production cost, and operation and support (O&S) cost. The cost of 
changing the design in stage 2 is captured separately in P2. The RDT&E cost was 
assumed to be $70,000 for stage 1 and zero for stage 2. It was assumed that the stage 2 
RDT&E cost was included in the penalty function.  
Production and O&S cost for stage 1 and 2 are calculated based on the weight of 
the beam segment. Production cost at stage Θ ($ProductionΘ ) is simply ten times the 
total weight of the beam of the stage. The O&S cost ( $OSΘ ) is the sum of segment 
weight multiplied by a coefficient , 1, ,5.
i
iαΘ = …  Finally, design modification penalty is 
calculated based on the difference between the stage 1 and stage 2 design. For this 
problem, only the quadratic relationship between the differences of the design variable 
values to the cost was modeled. 
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where  [1,2]Θ∈ is index for stage, 1, , 5i = … is index for beam segment, $RDTE1 and 
$RDTE2 were fixed at $70,000 and $0, respectively, and ρ =0.00785 kg/cm3 is material 
density.  
The values for the coefficients α and β are determined by the following rules. For 
each of the beam segments, subjective ratings for O&S cost and design modification 
penalty are assigned as presented in Table 7. The rating scale is low, mid, or high. For 
example, the contribution of beam segment 1 to the O&S cost is assumed to be medium, 
where it is assumed to incur high penalty if its design is modified in the second stage. A 
rationale behind this is that beam segment 1 and 5 interface with the outer environment, 
so their modification would cause compatibility issues and thus incur high cost. For 
example, the first beam segment or B1 is clamped to the supporting wall, and redesigning 
the first beam segment is subject to additional constraints, such as interface and 
regulations. According to the rating, the numerical values of the O&S and penalty cost 
coefficients are assigned in Table 8 presented below.  
Table 7: The O&S and Penalty Cost Coefficient Schedule  
Beam Segment  O&S  Penalty  
1 mid High 
2 high Low 
3 mid Mid 
4 low Low 
5 high High 
 
Table 8: The Values of the O&S and Penalty Cost Coefficients 
Scale  
i
αΘ (O&S)  iβ (Penalty) 
Low 20 5,000 
Mid 80 10,000 
High 150 40,000 
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6.2 Experiment I: Comparison of the Four Strategies 
Once a hypothetical two-stage cantilevered beam problem is formulated, the problem is 
solved for the four development strategies. The new-design and ad-hoc upgrade strategies 
solve the first-stage problem independent to the second-stage problem. Then, the second-
stage problem is solved for after the second-stage requirement is known. The 
deterministic preplanning strategy predicts the second-stage applied load to be at 
100,000 lb and examines the possibility of having growth potential in the original design. 
The stochastic strategy sees all three scenarios and the probability of having such a 
scenario and seeks an optimum first-stage design that is supposed to work best on 
average. Once the optimum first-stage beam designs for each of the strategies are 
obtained, they are tested with the three scenarios by solving the second-stage 
optimization in a posteriori manner to see how well each strategy responds to each 
scenario.  
6.2.1 Total Program Cost Comparison 
Table 9 provides the total program cost of the four strategies under three different 
scenarios. Figure 32 graphically compares how much each strategy costs under a specific 
scenario. A comparison from the scenario point of view reveals that no strategy is best 
for the all scenarios. When the actual realization of the second-stage requirement turned 
out to be 75,000 lb (Scenario 1), ad-hoc strategy met the requirement with the smallest 
cost. For Scenario 2 and 3, however, both of the preplanning strategies cost less than the 
two non-planning strategies. Deterministic preplanning strategy cost the least under 
Scenario 2. The stochastic preplanning cost the least under Scenario 3.  
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It is easily seen from the figure that for the ad-hoc upgrade strategy, the total cost 
increases rapidly as the second-stage applied load increases. The ad-hoc strategy was the 
best under Scenario 1 but the worst under Scenario 3. The deterministic preplanning 
strategy, on the other hand, was the best among all four strategies when the predicted 
P2 was equal to the actual P2, as expected. The stochastic preplanning strategy 
performed the best under scenario 3, but more importantly, it cost the least on average 
as compared in the bottom row of the table.  
Table 9: Total Program Cost of the Four Strategies under the Three Scenarios 
Scenario Applied Load New-Design Ad-Hoc Det. Planning Stoc. Planning 
1 75,000 N 206,962 154,532 155,794 159,212 
2 100,000 N 215,772 181,245 166,345 167,101 
3 150,000 N 231,540 249,184 208,618 201,031 
Average n/a 218,740 196,284 176,917 175,702 
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Figure 32: Total Program Cost Comparison  
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6.2.2 Optimum Design Results under Different Strategies 
This section compares how each of the beam segments at each stage was sized under the 
four strategies. The second-stage design is only finalized after the actual second-stage 
requirement becomes realized. The study was conducted with the realized second-stage 
requirement P2 to be 100,000 lb; that is, Scenario 2 was realized. The results were non-
dimensionalized by dividing the value by the design value of the new-design strategy. 
Symbol 
i
bΘ represents the beam width of the i
th segement in stage under strategy p. 
Figure 33 shows the optimized values of b11 and b21 of the four strategies. Both the 
new-design and ad-hoc strategies sized the beam segment 1 to meet the given first-stage 
applied load and then increase the beam width in the second stage by about 20%. 
However, two preplanning strategies over-sized b11 to such an extent that it is close to 
b21. The oversizing tendency of b11 is attributed to the fact that the cost of changing b11 is 
very high and the cost incurred by oversizing it is relatively small. Thus, both 
deterministic and stochastic preplanning strategies identified that sizing b11 to meet the 
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Figure 33: Optimum Widths of the Beam Segment 1  
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second-stage requirement from the beginning was cheaper in the end.  
Figure 34 compares the widths of the beam segment 2. In contrast to the results of 
the beam segment 1, none of the four strategies overdesigned the beam segment 2 in the 
first stage. The result can be interpreted as the cost of overdesigning segment 2 
outweighs the cost of upgrading it later. 
Finally, the optimum widths of the tip section b15 and b25 are compared in Figure 35. 
Again, the non-preplanning strategies sized the beam segment to meet the given first-
stage applied load requirement. Then, the preplanning strategies oversized b15 but not as 
much as they oversized b11. The stochastic preplanning oversized more than the 
deterministic strategy because it accounted for the fact that there is a 30% probability of 
P2 being 150,000 lb. 
The comparison of the optimum solution from the design point of view reveals that 
the preplanning strategies allocate growth margin on each of the beam segments in a 
very different way. Beam segment 1 was overdesigned and segment 2 was not 
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Figure 34: Optimum Widths of the Beam Segment 2 
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overdesigned at all under the both the deterministic and stochastic preplanning 
strategies. The result shows that the new method can quantify the allocation of growth 
potential on the subsystems in a way that balances the cost of overdesigning and the 
cost of modifying the existing design later.  
6.3 Experiment II: Growth Limit 
The previous section showed that the new-design strategy cost more than other 
strategies cost, at least when P2 is between 75,000 and 150,000 lb. However, this may not 
be the case if P2 increases further. The question is when would it be beneficial to start 
from scratch rather than modify the existing design? What would be the absolute growth 
limit to a design? The query is answered by comparing the new-design strategy to the 
best derivative development strategy. The best derivative design strategy is the 
deterministic preplanning strategy with the complete knowledge of the second-stage 
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Figure 35: Optimum Widths of the Beam Segment 5 
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requirement from the beginning. The total problem costs of these two strategies were 
calculated for the increasing second-stage beam load and were compared in Figure 36.  
The total cost under the derivative development strategy based on the perfect 
prediction was less than the developing a new product strategy when the P2 was less 
than 32,500 lb. Then, because of a sharp increase in the modification cost, the rate of 
change of the total cost under the derivative development case was higher, making it 
more expensive than the new-design strategy when P2 was larger than 32,500 lb. This 
experiment shows that for this beam design problem, the absolute growth limit of the 
first-stage design is 32,500 lb. If P2 grows larger than 32,500 lb, no cost benefit exists in 
upgrading the existing design. Rather, it is cheaper to start from scratch. 
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6.4 Experiment III: Value of Perfect Information and 
Stochastic Solution 
In this experiment, two quantities that are valuable in the domain of stochastic 
programming with recourse—namely, value of perfect information (EVPI) and value of 
stochastic solution (VSS)—are calculated.  
6.4.1 Value of Perfect Information 
To calculate EVPI, it is assumed that one can always predicted the value of the random 
variable with certainty. For all possible realization of the random variable—i.e. 
scenarios—the total cost of the two-stage problem is calculated. Then, the average of the 
total cost is the expected value of the optimal solution or the wait-and-see solution (WS) 
as: 
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where Q2 is as given in Eq. (43). Since ω takes only three outcomes, Eq. (46) is solved by 
transforming it to three deterministic equivalents, and the results are summarized in 
Table 10. Each column of the table is the optimum solution and the total cost for each 
scenario. 
Table 10: The Wait-and-See Solution for Each Scenario 
Scenario P2 (N) Total Cost ($) 
1 75,000 154,872 
2 100,000 166,345 
3 150,000 193,404 
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Then, the expected cost is calculated as 
 ( ) ( )($) 0.2(154, 872) 0.5 166, 345 0.3 193, 404 172,168WS = + + =  (47) 
The wait-and-see solution is compared to the so-called here-and-now (HN) solution. The 
HN is the expected value of the stochastic solution b* calculated as: 
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where *
1
b  is the optimum first-stage beam design obtained in the previous section. HN is 
readily obtained using the results in Table 9 as  
 ( ) ( )($) 0.2(159,212) 0.5 167,101 0.3 201, 031 175, 702HN = + + =  (49) 
Finally, ($) 175, 702 172,168 3,534.EVPI HN WS= − = − =   
6.4.2 Value of Stochastic Solution 
Solving a stochastic programming problem is generally very expensive and time 
consuming. So, it is possible that one can ask himself if pursuing a stochastic approach is 
really worthy of the time and effort. One of the attempts to solve a stochastic problem 
easily is by simplifying it by replacing the random variables to their expected values. 
This is called the expected value (EV) problem [94]. In the beam example, this greatly 
simplifies Eq. (42) to 
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where ( ) 0.2(75, 000) 0.5(100, 000) 0.3(150, 000) 24, 500 [N]Eω ω= = + + = .  
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For the optimal first-stage design *
1
b  of the EV problem, the second-stage problem 
given in Eq. (43) is solved for all possible scenarios. This solution is called the expected 
result of using the EV solution (EVV), defined as 
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Again, Eq. (29) is solved by converting it to its deterministic equivalent. The 
optimization results for each scenario are in Table 11. 
Table 11: Result of Using the Expected Value Solution 
Scenario P2 (N) Total Cost ($) 
1 75,000 159,014 
2 100,000 167,323 
3 150,000 201,364 
 
Then, the expected value is calculated as 
 ($) 0.2(159, 014) 0.5(167, 323) 0.3(201, 364) 175, 874EVV = + + =  (52) 
Since HN is $175,702 from the previous section, ) 175, 874 175, 702($ 172.VSS = − =  
6.5 Hypothesis Test 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 were proved though three experiments with a two-stage 
cantilevered beam design problem. Experiment I, II, and III showed that by expanding a 
classical, one-stage design problem to a two-stage problem incorporating future 
requirements: (a) cost associated with the four beam design evolution options was 
evaluated with three requirement evolution scenarios; (b) the right amount of growth 
provisions to minimize the overall cost were quantified for each of the beam segments; 
and (c) the growth limit of a given design was identified. These three evidences 
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collectively prove Hypotheses 1 and 4. Presence of uncertainty imposes risk in designing 
for the future. Hypothesis 2 claims that the risk can be mitigated by assigning 
probabilities to the random variables and minimizing the expected cost. In experiment I, 
although the deterministic preplanning strategy found the optimal stage 1 and stage 2 
design solutions with minimal cost when the predicted and actual future requirements 
were close, the stochastic approach cost the least on average, which supports Hypothesis 
2. In addition, EVPI calculated in experiment III provided the value of knowing the 
accurate future requirement in advance, which provides the decision makers very 
valuable knowledge they can exploit through trading managerial options. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
APPLICATION TO A NOTIONAL MULTI-ROLE FIGHTER 
DESIGN 
 
EvoLVE was implemented on a notional multi-role fighter design based on F/A-18 
Hornet and Super Hornet. Based on the evolution history of F/A-18, a hypothetical 
requirement was created in order to test the efficacy of EvoLVE in aerospace systems 
design and prove the hypotheses. A scalable computer model of F/A-18 Hornet was 
created and validated using public domain data of the A, C, E versions. The modeling 
and validation process is extensively documented in §7.6 and §7.7.  
The study is not intended to recreate the evolution of F/A-18 but utilizes the 
historical example, especially the upgrade program from the C/D to E/F versions, in 
order to validate the computer models and create a test case as realistic as possible. 
Therefore, the study is based on a hypothetical time frame, background, and 
requirement, and thus the optimized vehicles at the end of the study are not new 
versions of the F/A-18 but are notional fighters that perform very similar missions. 
Although this study was primarily conducted in 2008, the clock was rewound by 
twenty years as if the notional multi-role fighter program started in 1988. This is when 
the F/A-18C/D was being developed and a plan for the E/F version was being 
formulated by McDonnell Douglas and the U.S. Navy [171]. This time frame has a 
significant meaning because it was when the Cold War between the Western World and 
the Soviet Union was at its culmination and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 was not anticipated.  
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This chapter starts with the rationale behind the selection of the test case as a 
notional multi-role fighter based on the F/A-18C among many other options. Then, the 
EvoLVE process Steps 1 to 9 are presented. Some of the finding are discusses at the end 
of the chapter.  
7.1 Selection of the Baseline Aircraft and Time frame 
First, military aircraft were preferred to commercial aircraft. Military aircraft design is 
driven by rather complicated, yet solid requirements. Design usually starts from well-
defined needs, the documentation of which is often available to the public. In opposition 
to common sense, requirements and aircraft performance data for military aircraft are 
easier to obtain from public sources than those of commercial aircraft, because military 
airplanes are funded by taxpayers. As a downside, modeling military aircraft is generally 
more challenging because they are usually designed to perform more than one mission. 
Each of the missions is associated with a mission profile(s) and internal/external storage 
configurations. The mission profiles may cover both super-sonic and sub-sonic regimes. 
Commercial transports fly rather simple missions. The key performance parameters are 
range and payload (or the number of passengers), and the design is mostly driven by one 
factor, economics. However, it is harder to obtain accurate and comprehensive data on 
commercial aircraft, for they are proprietary. 
Another criterion for model selection was time frame and availability of adequate 
evolution history. A modern time frame was preferred to enable a game-play in the 
context of modern doctrine. The ways fighters were operated in the battlefields in the 
early Cold War era and after the Cold War era were very different from each other. 
Time frame dictates the external environment that determines design requirements. 
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Time frame is also related to the richness of evolution history and data availability. 
While first and second generation jet fighters, such as F-86, F-4, and F-5 have 
interesting evolution histories, their design specifications are not well-documented 
digitally. The fourth generation fighters, such as F-22 and F-35 not only lack the 
evolution history but they are also classified. Performance and cost data of the fighters 
that were developed in the 1970s and 1980s are well-documented and less sensitive than 
the modern fighters, such as F-22 or F-35, and many of them have more than one 
derivative. 
Among many fighters, the F/A-18 and the F-16 met the above criteria, and the 
decision was made to pursue the F/A-18. The F/A-18 had a unique history that made it 
a perfect candidate for the validation of EvoLVE. As summarized in §3.1.1.3, the F/A-
18, as the first multi-role fighter in history, took two evolution steps: from the original 
version of A/B to C/D, and then from C/D to E/F. The C/D versions were retrofits of 
A/B, keeping most of the subsystem unchanged except the engines and avionics. 
However, the E/F versions were “resized” or photographically scaled up from C/D to 
provide for significantly more capability. Although the DoD designated the upgrade from 
C/D to E/F as a “major modification”, the E/F version has only 10% in common with 
the C/D version.  
This major capability upgrade provides for a very good example case, against which 
a scalable aircraft model can be validated. EvoLVE requires a vehicle model at the 
baseline requirement and a series of scaling laws to be able to quantitatively capture the 
impact of requirement growth in the future. Such scaling laws are calibrated using both 
physics and actual vehicle evolution data. Those scaling laws are considered more valid 
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within the range of the initial and a derivative aircraft design points, and extrapolation 
beyond the actual data might introduce the danger of not capturing important physics. 
While many other derivative aircraft possibly provide such data points, the F/A-18’s 
wide expansion of both vehicle geometry and capability through an evolutionary upgrade 
minimizes the need for extrapolation.  
In conclusion, the two derivative versions of the F/A-18 provide two vital and rare 
aircraft growth examples, which can be benchmarked to generate plausible growth 
strategies and scenarios.   
7.2 The First-Stage Requirement: Step 1  
The first-stage requirement is either given from the customer or formulated by the 
aircraft manufacturer using the conventional system engineering tools, such as market 
analysis, brainstorming, QFD, etc. In this application, it is assumed that the 
hypothetical first-stage requirement is given from the US Navy in the form of ORD 
issued in FY1988. ORD defines a specification of a fighter aircraft in terms of the KPPs 
with associated mission profiles. A summary of the hypothetical ORD is given as*: 
A new fighter aircraft performing both fleet air defense and attack role 
for the US Navy is being developed to replace F-4 on fighter missions and 
A-7 on attack missions. The vehicle shall reach IOC in 7 years (FY 
1995), and the goal is to minimize the acquisition cost while meeting or 
exceeding all imposed key performance parameters (KPPs). The KPPs 
shall be evaluated with the two given mission profiles. Production 
quantity of the vehicle is 627 units for the US Navy.  
                                                                                       
*The hypothetical mission and requirement is very close to those of F/A-18C/D and E/F that are 
summarized in APPENDIX B. 
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The KPPs and their thresholds are defined in Table 12. The conditions for the 
KPPs are the mission profiles given in the following section. These requirements and 
KPPs constitute the first-stage objective (f1) and constraints (g1).  
7.2.1 Mission Profiles 
The interdiction (hi-lo-lo-hi) and fighter escort with medium altitude combat are 
depicted in Figure 37 and Figure 38. The figures are attached with the tables of fuel 
usage, range, speed, altitude, and throttle setting conditions for each of the mission 
segments. These mission profiles are the standard mission profiles found in MIL-STD-
3031 [172].  
Interdiction mission profile includes fuel to warm-up, take-off, accelerate to climb 
speed, military power climb, cruise at best cruise altitude and Mach number, 50 nm 
penetration at 2000 ft before expending the air-to-ground bombs, cruise back, descent 
without distance credit, and reserve of 3500 lb of fuel.  
The fighter escort mission includes fuel to warm-up, take-off, accelerate to climb 
speed, military power climb, cruise at best cruise altitude and Mach number, combat at 
15000 ft expending half the missiles and ammunitions, return to the base, and reserve. 
The reserve mission includes 20 minute sea level loiter at best endurance speed, plus 5 
percent of the initial fuel.  These two mission profiles, interdiction and fighter escort, are 
used as the design missions of the notional fighter with the following external store 
conditions: 
Attack configuration: two AIM-9s, FLIR, NAVFLIR, four MK-83 bombs, and 
three external fuel tanks (see Figure 51 for the allocation of the hard points) 
Fighter configuration: two AIM-9s at the wing tips and two AIM-7s at the two 
fuselage stations (see Figure 52 for the allocation of the hard points) 
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 Segment Fuel Time Distance Speed Altitude Thrust Setting 
A Warm-up, 
Takeoff  
20 min @ ground idle + 30 sec @takeoff/maximum A/B + fuel to accelerate from obstacle clearance to climb 
speed @ IRT 
B Climb       Minimum time 
climb schedule 
Takeoff to optimum 
cruise 
Intermediate 
C Cruise      Optimum cruise Optimum cruise   
D Descent None None No credit   End cruise to 2000 ft 
press alt. 
  
E Penetration     50 nm 0.8 Mach 2000 ft press alt.   
F Combat One 2000ft energy exchange  
+ one 180 deg turn at Virt - 50 ktas, expend air-to-ground stores 
Max A/B 
G Withdrawal     50 nm 
including accel 
0.8 Mach 2000 ft press alt.   
H Climb       Minimum time 
climb schedule 
2000 ft press alt. 
to optimum cruise 
Intermediate 
I Cruise       Optimum cruise Optimum cruise   
J Descent None None No credit   End cruise to landing   
K Reserves 4000 lbs of fixed fuel        
Figure 37: Interdiction Mission Profile (Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi) 
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  Segment Fuel Time Distance Speed Altitude Thrust 
Setting 
A Warm-up, 
Takeoff 
20 min @ ground idle + 30 sec @takeoff/maximum A/B + fuel to accelerate from obstacle clearance to 
climb speed @ IRT 
B Climb       Minimum time 
climb schedule 
Takeoff to optimum cruise Intermediate 
C Cruise       Optimum cruise Optimum cruise   
D Descent None None No credit   End cruise to 15,000 ft 
press alt. 
  
E Combat One 360 deg turn @Mach 1.2 (max A/B)  
+ two 180 deg turn @ Mach 0.9 (max A/B), expend half of ammo and missiles. 
Max A/B 
F Climb       Minimum time 
climb schedule 
15,000 ft press alt. 
to optimum cruise 
Intermediate 
G Cruise       Optimum cruise Optimum cruise   
H Descent None None No credit   End cruise to landing   
I Reserves 20 min + 5% of 
initial fuel 
  No credit Maximum 
endurance 
Sea level   
Figure 38: Fighter Escort Mission Profile (Medium Altitude Fighter Sweep) 
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7.2.1.1 Key Performance Parameters 
The key performance parameters and their threshold values are listed in Table 12. The 
KPPs are classified in three categories: mission performance, carrier suitability, and 
fighter performance. Mission performance measures the one-way unrefueled range for the 
two design missions. For the fighter escort mission, mission radius is measured using 
internal fuel only without external fuel tanks. The aircraft will fly the fighter escort 
mission profile in Figure 38 with two AIM-9s and two AIM-7s. The interdiction radius is 
measured by flying the mission profile in Figure 37 in attack configuration, i.e. three 
external fuel tanks. The size of the external fuel tanks is a design variable and will be 
determined later. The carrier suitability is measured by four parameters: recovery 
payload, launch wind over deck (LWOD), recovery wind over deck (RWOD), and 
approach speed. The definitions, calculation procedures, and equations of these 
parameters are provided in §7.6.5.  
To measure the fighter’s point-performance, five parameters—combat ceiling, 
specific excess power, acceleration, turn rate, and usable load factor—are used. All these 
metrics shall be measured in the combat configuration: two AIM-9s, two AIM-7s, and 
60% of total internal fuel. In addition, all the fighter performance parameters are 
measured at maximum power with afterburners on. Specific excess power is measured 
during one-g level flight at Mach 0.9 at 10,000 ft. Acceleration from Mach 0.8 to 1.2 is 
conducted at 35,000 ft. Sustained turn rate is measured at 15,000 ft. Detailed definitions 
and calculation procedures are provided in §7.6.6.1. 
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Table 12: The Key Performance Parameters of the First Stage 
Category Key Performance Parameters Threshold Unit 
Mission 
Performance 
Fighter escort mission radius > 350 nm 
Interdiction mission radius > 360 nm 
Carrier 
Suitability 
Recovery payload > 6000 lb 
Launch wind over deck  < 30 knot 
Recovery wind over deck  < 15 knot 
Approach speed  < 150 knot 
Fighter 
Performance 
Combat ceiling > 50,000 ft 
Specific excess power at 0.9M/10,000 ft > 600 hp 
Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M at 35,000 ft  < 70 sec 
Turn rate at 15,000 ft > 11.5 rad/sec 
Usable load factor > 7.5 g 
 
7.3 Evolution of the Requirement—Random Variables and 
Scenarios: Step 2 
The main distinction between EvoLVE and conventional single-stage aircraft design 
processes is that EvoLVE expands the problem beyond the current (single-stage) 
problem in order to incorporate the future into the current design from the origin. 
Expansion of the conventional single-stage design process to the two-stage design process 
starts with identifying evolution paths of the requirements. 
In order to predict what will happen to the vehicle-level requirement in the future, it 
is natural to start from the operational environment where the vehicle is being utilized. 
This system-of-systems type study would be based on projections of both enemy and 
friendly force capability under plausible SoS level scenarios, such as theater-level conflict 
scenarios, and can provide the future requirement of the baseline vehicle in a 
deterministic or probabilistic manner. 
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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted a SoS level study involving F/A-
18 in 1987. The results plan Navy aircraft force projections into the 1990s and are 
introduced in §A.1. The study was conducted at the US Navy Air Wings level including 
F/A-18 in the European theater under the influence of Soviet Union bombers and 
fighters. The CBO study suggested how the requirements of F/A-18 should evolve 
towards the 1990s. 
While not available to the public, a system specific System Threat Assessment 
Report (STAR) of the F/A-18 was created by the Naval Maritime Intelligence Center 
(NAVMIC), including a detailed description of threat projections. Although such 
information was not completely available to the author, it is not difficult to reason that 
such studies led to the ORD of the F/A-18E/F, part of which is introduced in 
APPENDIX B.  
It is envisaged that such independent SoS level studies by CBO and NAVMIC could 
more systematically identify the random variables and the probability functions at the 
vehicle system level. The potential of concurrently applying EvoLVE at two different 
hierarchical levels is proposed in §8.2.4 as part of the future research opportunities.  
In the current study however, the random variables along with the associated 
Probabilities Density Functions (PDFs) were defined trying to follow the actual 
evolution of the F/A-18’s requirements as closely as possible. Among the requirements 
that changed from the F/A-18C/D to E/F, the most significant four parameters—fighter 
escort radius, interdiction mission radius, recovery payload, and avionics weight—were 
identified as the random variables. Then, triangular PDFs were assumed for all random 
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variables. Triangular PDFs are determined by three parameters: minimum (a), most-
likely (m), and maximum values (b) as follows: 
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 (53) 
The list of random variables and their assumed probabilities are in Table 13. The 
minimum and maximum values of the random variables are slightly higher than the 
F/A-18C/D’s and E/F’s requirements, respectively, so that most of the requirement 
space defined by the random variables is covered by the actual evolution history of the 
F/A-18C/D and E/F. The most likely values of the random variables are the average of 
the minimum and maximum values. Finally, it was also assumed that the random 
variables are independent of each other. The triangular PDFs of the four random 
variables are illustrated in Figure 39. 
 Table 13: Random Variables and Probability Density Functions 
 Stage 1 Stage 2   
 Baseline Min Most Likely Max Function Type Unit 
Fighter escort radius 350 350 420 490 PDF/Triangular nm 
Interdiction radius 410 410 460 510 PDF/Triangular nm 
Recovery payload 4,500 7,000 8,400 9,800 PDF/Triangular lb 
Avionics weight 1,289 1,300 1,400 1,500 PDF/Triangular lb 
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Figure 39: Triangular Probability Density Functions of the Random Variables 
Combinations of the realization of the random variables constitute scenarios, and 
those continuous random variables ∈ω Ω  in a probability space ( , , )F PΩ  with 4⊆ ℜΩ  
as defined in Table 13 can generate an infinite number of scenarios. In this section, 
however, only five scenarios , 1 , 5
s
s =ω …  were selected from the infinite set in Ω  and 
are provided in Table 14. The five scenarios were numbered in a way that each of the 
requirements gets more demanding as s increases, i.e. 1 2 3 4 5v v v v vω ω ω ω ω< < < <  where 
sv
ω is the vth element of the sth scenario vector 
s
ω defined as: 
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The first and last scenarios 1 5 and ω ω  are the minimum and maximum bounds of 
the PDFs of ω  as defined in Step 2. The third scenario 3ω  is the expected values of the 
PDFs, i.e. 
3
( )= ≡ω ω ωE . Two other scenarios are based on either the F/A-18E/F’s 
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requirements or actual performance. The forth scenario 4ω , named Block 10 plus 
scenario, is very close to the actual F/A-18E/F’s performance. The second scenario 2ω , 
named Block 10 requirement, is based on the F/A-18E/F’s threshold requirement given 
in Table 62. 
Table 14: The Five Discrete Scenarios for the Deterministic Study 
Scenario Number 
Scenario Name 
1
ω  
Minimum 
2
ω  
Block 10 
3
ω  
Average 
4
ω  
Block 10p 
5
ω  
Maximum 
Fighter escort radius, 1sω  
350 410 420 475 490 
Interdiction radius, 2sω  
410 430 460 504 510 
Recovery payload, 3sω  
7,000 8,000 8,400 9,700 9,800 
Avionics weight, 4sω  
1,300 1,350 1,400 1,411 1,500 
 
7.4 Baseline Design: Step 3 
Once the current requirement and its evolution paths in the future are defined, the next 
step is to find out how those requirements would be met. In this step, the candidate 
solutions to the corresponding functional requirements are synthesized in the physical 
domain and a baseline platform(s) is down-selected based on both qualitative and 
quantitative evaluations.  
In this study, since the baseline platform was selected as a notional multi-role 
fighter based on the F/A-18C, the geometrical characteristics of the F/A-18 are 
introduced first and a subset of the F/A-18’s geometric parameters are selected as design 
variables. All four variants of the Hornet (A, B, C, and D) are geometrically identical. 
The geometrical traits of the F/A-18 family, including the latest E/F versions, contain: a 
fixed oblique shock inlet; a moderate swept, low aspect ratio wing with NACA 65A 
airfoil and variable camber; area-ruled wing/body integration; large, highly-swept leading 
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edge extensions (LEXs); two low-bypass ratio, afterburning turbofans; and a twin tail. 
Dimensional data of the F/A-18 were obtained from NASA Technical Memorandum 
107601 [173] and summarized in Table 15. 
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Table 15: F/A-18 Hornet Dimensional Data [173]  
Total Airplane   Leading Edge Extension   
Net Wetted Area 2028 ft2 Planform Area 56 ft2 
Overall Length 56 ft Wetted Area 210 ft2 
Overall Height 15.3 ft Leading Edge Sweep 43 deg 
Fuselage   Incidence 6 deg 
Length 53 ft Horizontal Tails   
Maximum Width 7.6 ft Exposed Area 88.1 ft2 
Wetted Area 890 ft2 Wetted Area 176 ft2 
Wing   Aspect Ratio 2.4 
Area 400 ft2 Taper Ratio 0.46 
Wetted Area 562 ft2 Leading Edge Sweep 47.2 deg 
Span 37.42 ft c/4 Sweep 42.8 deg 
Aspect Ratio 3.5 Dihedral -2 deg 
Root Chord 15.86 ft Span 14.67 ft 
Tip Chord 5.52 ft Root Chord 8.23 ft 
Mean Aerodynamic Chord 11.52 ft Tip Chord 3.79 ft 
Leading Edge Sweep 26.7 deg Mean Aerodynamic Chord 6.28 ft 
c/4 Sweep 20 deg Airfoil NACA 65A 
Taper Ratio 0.35 Thickness at Root 6 % chord 
Dihedral -3 deg Thickness at Tip 2 % chord 
Twist 4 deg Vertical tails   
Incidence 0 deg Area 52 ft2 each 
Airfoil NACA 65A Wetted Area 104 ft2 each 
Thickness at   Aspect Ratio 1.2 
Wing Station 56.876 5 % chord Taper Ratio 0.4 
Wing Station 145.39 3.5 % chord Leading Edge Sweep 41.3 deg 
Tip Chord 3.5 % chord c/4 Sweep 35 
Leading Edge Flaps   Root Chord 9.42 ft 
Type Plain Tip Chord 3.75 ft 
Area 48.4 ft2 Mean Aerodynamic Chord 6.99 ft 
Span 13.8 ft Airfoil NACA 65A 
Trailing Edge Flaps   Thickness at Root 5 % chord 
Type Single Slotted Thickness at Tip 3 % chord 
Area 61.9 ft2 Rudders   
Span 8.72 Area 7.72 ft2 each 
Ailerons   Span 5.21 ft 
Type Single Percent Chord   
Area 24.4 ft2   
Span 5.68 ft   
Percent Wing Span 68.9 – 100 %   
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While almost all the geometrical parameters in the above table are used in Step 5 to 
create a F/A-18 model, only a small subset of such parameters are identified as design 
variables. The design parameters are fixed throughout the study at the value of the F/A-
18C while the design variables are varied to resize the vehicle photographically: the 
geometric traits of the F/A-18 family are preserved, and the size of subsystems, such as 
wing, tails, fuselage, engines, etc. are varied.  
The set of twelve design variables were finalized as listed in Table 16 after much 
iteration between Steps 4-6. The design variables are the minimum variables to 
sufficiently scale the vehicle and calculate g1 and f1. The first five variables (from x1 to x5) 
define the shape of the wing. Engine thrust, x6, is the maximum sea level static thrust of 
one engine, and the number of engines was fixed at two.  
Reference weight for design load factor (DLF), x7, is the reference gross weight by 
which the structural design of the vehicle is determined. Design load factor was fixed at 
7.5 g’s, which gives the ultimate load factor of 11.25 g’s after the typical 1.5 times 
margin. Therefore, the vehicle is design to withstand up to 11.25 g’s at x7. This weight 
should be equal to or greater than the actual combat weight, which is the gross weight in 
combat configuration with 60% of the internal fuel. 
Operational landing weight, x8, is the reference gross weight by which landing gears 
are designed. Therefore, x8 must be equal to or greater than the actual aircraft landing 
weight for safe landing. Landing weight also affects several carrier-suitability 
requirements, such as approach speed, bring back weight, and wind-over-deck speeds, 
which are calculated in §7.6.5.  
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Internal and external fuel weights, x9 and x10, are usable fuel weights that are carried 
internally or externally. JP-5 fuel at 6.8 US gallon/pound was assumed. Reference thrust 
for aft-body sizing, x10, is the reference engine thrust to size the aft-fuselage section 
where two turbofan engines and related subsystems including inlets and nozzles are 
mounted internally. The value of x10 should be equal to or greater than the engine thrust, 
x6. Finally, fuselage length, x12, was used to scale the forward and mid fuselage where 
avionics and equipments are placed. 
While the baseline values of the variables are not very meaningful, they are listed in 
the table defining the baseline aircraft x0. Note that the baseline design is slightly 
different from the F/A-18C. Justifications for the selection of the design variables and 
more detailed descriptions are provided in Steps 5 and 6 when appropriate.  
Table 16: Design Variables and the Baseline Notional Fighter  
Symbol Name Baseline Unit 
x1 Wing area 400 ft
2 
x2 Wing aspect ratio 3.5 n/a 
x3 Wing taper ratio 0.35 n/a 
x4 Wing t/c 0.042 n/a 
x5 Wing sweep angle 20 deg 
x6 Engine thrust 17,754 lb 
x7 Reference weight for DLF 32,000 lb 
x8 Operational landing weight 33,000 lb 
x9 Internal fuel weight 10,810 lb 
x10 External fuel weight 6,720 lb 
x11 Reference thrust for aft-body sizing 17,920 lb 
x12 Fuselage length  53 ft 
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7.5 Evolution Strategies: Step 4 
Step 4 identifies the alternatives to meet the future requirements defined in Step 2. 
While the baseline platform selected in Step 3 was to respond to the first-stage 
requirement identified in Step 1, Step 4 formulates the possible ways or strategies to 
meet the evolving (growing) requirement. In addition, the set of candidate technologies 
that will be considered in the second-stage design are also identified.  
7.5.1 Aircraft Evolution Strategies 
Six aircraft evolution strategies were defined, including a New-design (ND), the Ad-hoc 
(AH) upgrade strategy, three Deterministic preplanning strategies (DetPPs), and the 
Stochastic preplanning strategy (StoPP).  
The question, “what would be the best way to meet the long-term requirement?”, 
would be ideally answered by considering not only the new requirement but also the 
projection of the friendly force structure at the Navy Air Wing fleet level, such as a 
retirement schedule of the existing fleet and other planned naval aircraft development 
programs. The study expanded to the SoS level would identify multiple ND strategies. 
For example, the option of upgrading F/A-18C/D can be compared against purchasing 
F-14D, F-35, ATA, NATF, AFX etc. as the US government did (see §3.1.1.3) by 
assigning them to each of the ND strategies. However, inclusion of multiple platforms 
requires modeling and simulation of all included platforms, and thus is avoided. In this 
study, all the alternatives were limited to a version of the F-18-like notional fighter to 
bind the problem. Therefore, the ND strategy considered here is assumed as another 
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notional fighter design based on F-18 and is developed in isolation from the first-stage 
design so that no cost savings utilizing commonality from its predecessor is allowed.  
The DetPP requires that the designer choose only one particular realization of the 
random variables or a scenario. Typically, the designer chooses a handful of scenarios, 
such as the worst case, most likely, and the best case to cover the random space and 
compare the results. In this study, a scenario-based study was performed by selecting 
three scenarios 2 3 4,  , and ω ω ω and assigning them to three DetPP strategies. These 
three DetPP strategies were named DetPP(Block10), DetPP(Average), and 
DetPP(Block10p), following the scenarios names assigned to them.  
Finally, the StoPP is solely determined by preplanning for the future, incorporating 
all possible scenarios in the probability space ( , , )PΩ F  defined in Table 13. Table 17 
summarizes the six strategies evaluated in this study.  
Table 17: The Vehicle Evolution Strategies 
Strategies 
 
New 
Design 
Ad-Hoc 
Upgrade 
Moderate 
Det. Upgrade 
Average 
Det. Upgrade 
Aggressive 
Det. Upgrade 
Stochastic 
Upgrade 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted scenario - - 
2
ω  3ω  4ω  ∈ω Ω 
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7.5.2 Technological Opportunities 
Technological development over time often provides options to open up the design space 
or improve the existing system. A potential technology candidate that can be applied to 
the second-stage design is identified in this Step 4. In order to retain the similarity to 
the actual F/A-18 evolution history, the following four technologies were considered: 
• LEX upgrade for higher CLmax  
• Low RCS capability 
• Conformal fuel tank  
• New engine core 
All of these technologies were either applied or considered when the F/A-18C/D was 
upgraded to the E/F. The F/A-18E/F’s LEX was not only enlarged from that of the 
C/D but also redesigned to increase the maximum lift capability of the vehicle, which 
favorably impacted the vehicle’s takeoff, landing, and approach performance. Details of 
CLmax increase are found in §7.6.2.2. 
Another important upgrade from the C/D to the E/F versions was the reduction of 
the RCS to reduce observability and thus, increase survivability. The reduction of radar 
cross section (RCS) was not achieved by redesigning the fuselage, wings, and tails, but 
was accomplished by realigning the surface edges, filling the gaps between the panels and 
openings, and coating the navigation lights, canopy, and wind shields with metalized 
paint [174]. Figure 40 illustrates the RCS reduction treatments applied to the F/A-
18E/F. 
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Figure 40: RCS Reduction of the F/A-18E/F [175] 
Conformal fuel tank is a technology by which the fuel capacity of an aircraft can be 
augmented without severely degrading the aerodynamic efficiency of the vehicle. 
Compared to the conventional external fuel tanks that are mounted under the fuselage 
or wings using pylons, conformal fuel tanks add significantly less drag, which enables a 
better range increase per gallon of fuel added. However, they cannot be jettisoned during 
flight, unlike conventional external fuel tanks.  
The conformal fuel tank is a matured technology as it is found under the wing roots 
of the F-15 Strike Eagle as shown in Figure 41 or behind the cockpit of the F-16. The 
technology was also considered to improve the range capability of the F/A-18C/D by 
McDonnell Douglas [76] but has not been implemented so far. Despite the dismissal of 
the technology in the Super Hornet program, it was included in this work because the 
technology was necessary to create and calibrate the cost model. More details about all 
the listed technologies and the modeling process are provided in Step 6.  
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Figure 41: Conformal Fuel Tanks of the F-15 Strike Eagle [176] 
7.6 Modeling and Simulation I: Step 5 
In Step 5, a modeling and simulation environment of the baseline vehicle, defined in Step 
3, is created and validated. A computer simulation model of the F/A-18C was developed 
by the author to conduct this study. The model was validated using public domain data 
as exhaustively as possible. The modeling and simulation process was largely based on 
NASA's Flight Optimization System (FLOPS) [177]. However, computer codes were 
written to calculate some of the aircraft performance that FLOPS does not calculate. In 
the subsequent sections, the process of geometry, aerodynamics, weight, and propulsion 
modeling and validation are described. Then, an entire aircraft system is synthesized and 
validated against the actual F/A-18 data collected in APPENDIX B using various 
mission profiles. It is important to note that the F/A-18 model was created as a scalable 
model. Therefore, system weight, drag polar, and engine performance were not hard 
coded but calculated as a function of design parameters.  
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7.6.1 Limitation of the Model  
The entire modeling process was done using strictly publicly available information only. 
No classified or proprietary data were consulted or utilized during the modeling and 
calibration process. A complete data set of a specific F/A-18 version was not available. 
Instead, the public domain information was available piecewise. For example, the weight 
breakdown of the C version with a 404-GE-402 engine was available, whereas the F/A-18 
performance manual was available with the 404-GE-400 engines and the 414-GE-400 
engines only. Drag polars at some altitudes and Mach numbers were available on the 
A/B/C/D variants. Mission profiles that the fighters actually flew were not identified 
completely, thus those conditions had to be assumed to follow the standard military 
mission profile given in the MIL-STD-3031 [172]. 
7.6.2 Aerodynamics Modeling 
Aerodynamics modeling was conducted in three parts. The first part briefly introduces 
the aerodynamic characteristics that are unique to the F/A-18 family in relation to its 
geometric traits. Then, drag polar of the clean configuration is generated and calibrated. 
The second part discusses aerodynamics at a high angle-of-attack (AOA). The third part 
models drag increment due to external stores.  
7.6.2.1 Aerodynamic Characteristics and Drag Polar in Clean Configuration 
All of the F-18 Hornet family, from the YF-17 to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, uses the 
NACA 65A airfoil [173, 178]. The NACA 65A airfoil is an uncambered high-speed 
laminar flow airfoil with a maximum thickness of 50% [179]. The most distinctive 
geometric and aerodynamic feature of the F/A-18 is its variable camber wing and 
leading edge extension (LEX) [70].  The wing’s leading edge (LE) flaps and trailing edge 
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(TE) flaps are automatically deflected according to the Mach number and AOA to 
improve maneuverability by reducing drag-due-to-lift. Both leading and trailing edge flap 
deflection schedules are provided in Figure 42. LEX produces high-energy vortices, which 
increase the maximum lift and control system effectiveness at a high angle of attack [78]. 
When used with a variable cambered wing, the F/A-18’s highly cambered LEX 
synergistically increases subsonic maximum lift, reduces both subsonic and supersonic 
drag-due-to-lift, and improves lateral control effectiveness.  
The effect of variable camber and LEX on the F-18 was studied by Patierno [70]. 
Figure 43 compares drag-due-to-lift at Mach 0.8 of the basic F-18 wing, the basic wing 
with LEX, and the variable camber wing with LEX. The figure clearly shows that the 
synergistic effect of variable camber and LEX in solid line creates significantly less drag-
due-to-lift at all angles of attack tested than the same wings without variable camber or 
LEX. 
 
Figure 42: F/A-18 Flap Deflection Schedules [180] 
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The F/A-18’s drag polar was generated using the internal aerodynamics module of 
FLOPS. The aero module in FLOPS uses the Delta method, an empirical drag 
correlation technique developed from nineteen subsonic and supersonic military aircraft 
and fifteen advanced or supercritical airfoil configurations, according to NASA CR 
151971 [181]. Regarding the applicability and limitation of the method, NASA CR 
151971 states that: 
[t]he Delta Method may be used for estimating the clean wing drag polar for cruise 
and maneuver conditions up to buffet onset, and to approximately Mach 2.0. … 
The method is applicable to wind tunnel models as well as to full-scale 
configurations. … Results obtained using this method to predict known aircraft 
characteristics are good and agreement can be obtained within a degree of 
accuracy judged to be sufficient for the initial processes of preliminary design. 
Since the method lacks the capability to model those sophisticated effects of LEX 
and wing camber scheduling, the aero model created in FLOPS was calibrated using 
actual drag polar of the F/A-18. F/A-18 drag polar data were collected from several 
public domain sources. Among them are NASA TM 3414 [182], which shows F/A-18 
drag polar at Mach 0.9 in Figure 44 and zero-lift-drag coefficients (CDo) and maximum 
lift-to-drag-ratio (L/Dmax) at Mach 0.6, 0.9, and 1.3 in Figure 45.  Moreover, Siewert 
[180] provides trimmed lift coefficient versus drag-due-to-lift curves at Mach 0.6, 0.8, and 
 
Figure 43: Effect of LEX and Variable Camber [70] 
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0.9 with various LE and TE flap scheduling as shown in Figure 46, Figure 47, and 
Figure 48. The effect of optimal LE and TE flap deflection is to significantly reduce the 
lift-related drag in Mach 0.6 and 0.8 as observed in the figures. The external store 
configurations were not stated in the references, so it was assumed that the data are for 
the clean configuration—no external stores but the two AIM-9s at the tips.  
 
Figure 44: F/A-18 Drag Polar at Mach 0.9 [182] 
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Figure 45: F/A-18 Zero Lift Drag Coefficient and Maximum L/D [182] 
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Figure 46: F-18 Trimmed Drag-Due-to-Lift at Mach 0.6 [180] 
 
 
 
Figure 47: F-18 Trimmed Drag-Due-to-Lift at Mach 0.8 [180] 
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Figure 48: F-18 Trimmed Drag-Due-to-Lift at Mach 0.9 [180] 
FLOPS calculates zero-lift-drag based on wetted areas, form factors, and skin 
friction drag coefficients for each body part and sums them up. The skin friction drag 
coefficient is a function of Reynolds number, and thus varies with altitude. Zero-lift-drag 
data used for calibration was assumed to be at 36,000 ft, which is approximately the best 
cruise Mach number of the F/A-18 [183].  Wetted areas were calculated rather than hard 
coded so that parametric variation of the vehicle geometry updates the wetted area and 
zero-lift-drag.  To calculate the drag-due-to-lift of the F/A-18 while accounting for the 
effects of LEX and variable camber, a very low value of the induced drag correction 
factor in FLOPS was used to match the minimum drag envelopes in Figure 46, Figure 47, 
and Figure 48. The baseline drag polar generated using FLOPS is plotted in Figure 49 at 
Mach numbers from 0.2 to 1.8 in 0.3 increments. The general trend is that as the Mach 
number increases at low subsonic speed, CDo decreases slightly and starts to increase 
from Mach 0.6 to Mach 0.9. Then, CDo increases dramatically in the transonic regime and 
then decreases again. Also, the drag-due-to-lift coefficient (CDi) is constant through the 
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subsonic regime and decreases in the supersonic regime. These trends agree with the 
general trend of drag polars found in other fighters, such as the F-15 Eagle [184]. In 
addition, the drag polar matches the actual F/A-18’s drag polar at Mach 0.6, 0.8, and 
0.9. In the supersonic regime, zero-lift-drag at Mach 1.3 matches the actual data. 
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                    *36,000ft; No external stores but one AIM-9s at each wing tip 
Figure 49: F/A-18 Drag Polar Generated in FLOPS  
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7.6.2.2 High Angle of Attack Aerodynamics during Maneuver and Landing 
To check conformance to some of the point performance requirements, such as approach 
speed and maximum instantaneous turn rate, accurate estimation of high angle of attack 
aerodynamic coefficients are essential. The F/A-18 boasted unprecedented high angle-of-
attack flight capability enabled by high-energy vortex systems generated by the forebody 
and LEX. Due to the interaction of this vortex system with the vehicle body, 
aerodynamics at high angles of attack are highly unsteady and non-linear and, thus, very 
difficult to estimate [185]. 
Highly sophisticated computational fluid dynamics (CFD) techniques are often used 
to simulate such physical phenomenon, complemented by wind tunnel tests during and 
after preliminary design stages. At least four independent wind tunnel tests were 
conducted with four different scaled models (0.03-, 0.06-, and 0.16-scale) and a full-scale 
production model of the F/A-18. References [185-190] report some of the wind tunnel 
test data at a high angle of attack with/without various attachments, such as a nose 
boom and LEX fences. In particular, Hall [185] compared the three different F/A-18 
wind tunnel test data sets for the maximum lift coefficient CLmax at the maneuver 
configuration of the leading edge (LE) flap deflection at a maximum value of 
approximately 34° and the trailing edge (TE) flap deflection angle at 0° as shown in 
Figure 50. Hall stated that “the values for the numerical maximum of CL and the 
respective alpha at which it occurs are 1.79 at alpha = 38° for the (NASA Langley) 30- 
by 60-Foot Tunnel, 1.81 at alpha = 40° for the (NASA Langley) 7- by 10-Foot High 
Speed Tunnel, and 1.82 at alpha = 40° for the (NASA Ames) 80- by 120-Foot Wind 
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Tunnel.” In the modeling of the F/A-18, a CLmax of 1.82 was used for instantaneous turn 
rate calculation.  
7.6.2.3 Drag Increment Due to External Stores 
The external stores a military combat aircraft are required to carry may increase the 
drag of the vehicle and thus degrade the vehicle’s mission and point performance. 
Therefore, it is essential to accurately model the drag increment due to various external 
store combinations at all operating speeds.  
External store drag was obtained for the two primary missions—interdiction and 
fighter escort available from the F/A-18 NATOPS Flight Manual [183]. Figure 51 and 
Figure 52 show the external stores for the interdiction and the fighter escort mission. 
The figures also show the drag contribution of each store item. In addition to the drag of 
each item, depending on the relative locations of such items, interference drag is added. 
 
            *LE Flaps at 34° and TE Flaps at 0° 
 
Figure 50: F/A-18 Lift Coefficient from Three Wind Tunnel Tests [185] 
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Interference drag increases with Mach number, and a comprehensive interference drag 
schedule is provided in the flight manual.  
 
Figure 51: External Stores for the Interdiction Mission [183] 
 
AIM-9 AIM-9
0.00.0
AIM-7AIM-7
4.04.0
 
Figure 52: External Stores for the Fighter Escort Mission [183] 
 174
Total store drag for the interdiction and fighter escort configurations is given in 
Table 18. The total store drag of the interdiction mission is about 150 counts and 
increases with Mach number. The fighter escort mission has only 8 counts of additional 
drag due to two AIM-7’s. During combat, the attack mission requires expending all four 
MK-83 bombs, and the fighter mission requires expending half the missiles and ammo. 
Two AIM-9 sidewinders are attached, one at each wing tip, as a default, and the absence 
of one reduces drag by 2.3 counts.  
Table 18: F/A-18 Store Drag in Counts 
Mission Interdiction Fighter Escort  
Mach before combat after combat before combat after combat 
0.6 142.5 128.5 8 1.7 
0.7 146.5 131.5 8 1.7 
0.8 152.5 136.5 8 1.7 
0.85 168.5 146.5 8 1.7 
 
7.6.3 Weight 
Empty and gross weights of the F/A-18 family are available in many sources with large 
discrepancies. Since the gross weight of the vehicle would depend on external stores, such 
as external fuel tanks, missiles, bombs, etc., it would be meaningless to compare gross 
weight without knowing the exact configuration. However, even operating empty weight 
differs as much as 2,000 lbs depending on the source, largely because of the fact that 
even within the same version an aircraft may come with different engines and 
equipments. In addition, non-unique definitions of “empty weight” seem to be used. In 
this document, all terms and definitions related to aircraft weight abide by MIL-STD-
3013 [172] as follows: 
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Weight Empty: Weight empty is defined as the weight of the air vehicle, complete 
by model design definitions, dry, clean, and empty, except for fluids in closed 
systems, such as the hydraulic system. Weight empty includes total structure 
group, propulsion group, flight controls group, avionics group, auxiliary power 
plant group, electrical group, etc. 
Basic Weight: Basic weight is defined as the weight empty adjusted for standard 
operational items, such as unusable fuel, engine oil, oxygen, and all fixed 
armament. 
Operating Weight: Operating weight is defined as the sum of basic weight plus 
such factors as crew, crew baggage, steward equipment, emergency equipment, 
special mission fixed equipment, pylons, racks, and other nonexpendable items not 
in basic weight. It is equivalent to takeoff gross weight less usable fuel, payload, 
and any items to be expended in flight. 
Payload: Payload is defined as any item which is being transported and is directly 
related to the purpose of the mission, as opposed to items necessary for the mission. 
Payload can include—but is not limited to—passengers, cargo, passenger baggage, 
ammunition, internal and external stores, and fuel which is to be delivered to 
another air vehicle or site. Payload may or may not be expended.  
Takeoff Gross Weight: Takeoff gross weight is defined as the sum of the operating 
weight, usable fuel weight, payload items required to perform a particular defined 
mission, and other items to be expended during flight.  
Following the definitions provided above, the weight breakdown of the F/A-18C was 
constructed based on published data. Table 19 shows a detailed breakdown of the F/A-
18C weight empty (We), operating weight, payload, fuel, and takeoff gross weight 
(TOGW) for both fighter escort mission and interdiction mission. While the F/A-18C’s 
weight empty could have increases over time, one fixed representative weight was used 
in this study due to lack of information on such continuous weight evolution. The F/A-
18C’s weight empty of 24,372 lb, found in a Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
document [191], is the weight of the LOT XVIII production model but is used here to 
represent all F/A-18Cs. The F/A-18C crew, unusable fuel, engine fluid, gun, ammo, and 
 176
chaff weight data are also from the same reference. Weights related to external stores, 
including missiles, pylons, launchers, pods, fuel tanks, and both internal and external 
usable fuel are from the NATOPS Flight Manual for the F/A-18A/B/C/D [183]. 
External stores condition and weight depend on whether the aircraft is in attack or 
fighter configuration. Among external store items, those that are not expendable during 
the mission were classified as operating weight. The F/A-18 in fighter configuration 
carries internal fuel of only 10,810 lb, while attack configuration carries 10,810 lb of 
internal and 6,720 lb of external fuel when all three 330-gallon tanks are attached. The 
fuel weight used throughout the study is based on JP-5 at a standard day density of 6.8 
lb per gallon. The sum of operating weight, payload, and usable fuel gives the takeoff 
gross weight of 34,966/47,783 lb (fighter/attack) for the F/A-18A and 37,508/50,325 lb 
(fighter/attack) for the F/A-18C.  
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Table 19: F/A-18C Weight Breakdown 
  Weight 
per Unit 
# in 
Attack 
# in 
Fighter 
Attack 
Weight 
Fighter 
Weight 
Weight Empty     24,372 24,372 
       
Crew     180 180 
Crew Equipment     59 59 
Unusable Fuel     207 207 
Engine Fluid     114 114 
Gun     204 204 
400 Rounds Ammo     100 100 
Chaff     52 52 
SUU-63 Wing Pylon 310 4 0 1,240 0 
SUU-62 Centerline Pylon 139 1 0 139 0 
ASS-38 Target FLIR 353 1 0 353 0 
ASQ-173 Laser Detector 165 1 0 165 0 
BRU-33/A Vertical Ejector 
Rack 
175 2 0 350 0 
Operating Weight     27,535 25,288 
       
FPU-8/A External Fuel Tank 290 3 0 870 0 
MK-83 1000 lb Bomb 1,000 4 0 4,000 0 
AIM-9 Sidewinder 195 2 2 390 390 
AIM-7 Sparrow 510 0 2 0 1,020 
Payload     5,260 1,410 
       
Internal Fuel     10,810 10,810 
External Fuel   2,240 3 0 6,720 0 
Usable Fuel     17,530 10,810 
       
Takeoff Gross Weight     50,325 37,508 
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Figure 53: F/A-18A/B/C/D Acceleration Limitations [183] 
FLOPS calculates aircraft weight based on designed structural limit and aircraft 
weight at the limit. Structural limit is defined by two criteria: how many g’s an aircraft 
can pull in symmetric maneuvers at specific loading and weight conditions; and speed 
limit. Figure 53 shows the F/A-18A/B/C/D’s structural limits during symmetrical 
maneuvers in both clean and fighter configurations. The F/A-18 initially had a design 
load factor (DLF) of 7.5 g’s with up to 32,000 lb of gross weight.  
The F/A-18E/F was designed for the same load factor, but the weight was increased 
to 42,097 lb as shown in Figure 54 [175]. This reference weight was used as a design 
variable, named Design weight for DLF. Comparison of this variable to the combat 
weight can be a measure of a vehicle’s growth potential in terms of structural strength. 
For example, if Design weight for DLF is 45,000 lb while actual combat weight is 42,000 
lb, the vehicle’s combat weight can increase further (up to 3,000 lb) without 
compromising its maneuver capability. Speed limits for all F/A-18 models in basic 
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configuration were Mach 2.0 at or above 35,000 ft. Speed limits are reduced if the 
altitude is lower than 35,000 ft or if configuration changes on flaps, landing gear, 
external stores, etc. are made.  
FLOPS calculates landing gear weight based on the maximum landing weight and 
aircraft type, i.e., carrier based or land based. Carrier maximum landing weight for the 
F/A-18A/B/C/D was 33,000 lb until 1994 and was then raised to 34,000 lb [191]. To be 
able to clear for a 34,000 lb landing, restrictions are applied to arresting gear, 
asymmetric loading conditions, and recovery wind over deck [183]. The F/A-18E/F was 
designed to land at up to 44,000 lb. While landing gear weight is determined by the 
maximum landing weight, it can be inferred from the history that the original F/A-18’s 
landing gear was designed with some level of safety margin. In sizing landing gear, a 
safety margin of 5 percent was added to the maximum operational landing weight.  
As a final note, it was necessary to calculate the weight of the F/A-18A and the 
F/A-18E. The F/A-18A’s weight empty of 21,830 lb was found from Young [76]. Then, 
 
Figure 54: F/A-18E/F Acceleration Limitations [175] 
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it was assumed that only weight empty is different from the C version and all other 
weight elements are the same. A detailed discussion and weight breakdown of the F/A-
18E is provided in §7.7.4 and in Table 31. 
7.6.4 Propulsion System Modeling and Calibration 
F/A-18s are powered by two General Electric F404 or F414 turbofan engines, depending 
on the version. F/A-18A/Bs and early productions of C/Ds are powered by F404-GE-400 
engines, and more recent C/D versions are powered by the enhanced performance 
derivative of F404-GE-400, designated as F404-GE-402. F/A-18E/Fs are powered by two 
F414-GE-400 engines. F404-GE-400 is a derivative of the General Electric YJ101 
turbojet engine, developed to power the US Air Force’s YF-17 aircraft [192]. The F404 
turbofan engine is a two-shaft augmented low bypass ratio turbofan with three-stage 
axial fans, seven-stage axial HP compressors, a single piece annular combustion chamber, 
and a single-stage axial HP turbine. F404-GE-402 engines provide performance 
improvements made possible by applying the latest technology and materials to the 
turbine and afterburner sections of the engine [193]. According to the engine 
manufacturer, General Electric [194],  
The F404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance Engine (EPE) provides higher power, 
improved fuel efficiency and increased mission capability for the F/A-18C/D 
Hornet. The enhanced engine retains the proven design characteristics of the 
baseline F404, while achieving increased performance through improved 
thermodynamic cycle and increased temperature. 
The F414-GE-400 is “an evolutionary engine based on the F404 [4].” The F414 used 
the F412 core, a non-afterburning derivative of the F404 that was partially developed for 
the A-12 program [82]. The F414 provides about 20% thrust increase over the F404 
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while keeping the engine size the same. Basic configurations and performance metrics of 
the F404 and F414 are summarized in Table 20. 
Table 20: General Specifications for the F404-GE-400 [175, 183, 192, 194-196] 
 F404-GE-400 F404-GE-402 F414-GE-400 
Fan Three-stage axial Three-stage axial Three-stage axial 
Bypass Ratio 0.32* 0.29* 0.29 
Airflow (lb/sec) 142 142 not listed 
HP Compressor Seven-stage axial Seven-stage axial Seven-stage axial 
OPR 26* 26 27.2 
Turbine Inlet Temp. (°F)  2,459 2,534 2,757 
Combustion Chamber Single-piece annular Single-piece annular Single-piece annular 
HP Turbine Single-stage axial Single-stage axial Single-stage axial 
LP Turbine Single-stage axial Single-stage axial Single-stage axial 
Nozzle Convergent-divergent Convergent-divergent Convergent-divergent 
Length (in) 154* 154 154 
Max Diameter (in) 35 35 35 
Weight, dry (lb) 2,195* 2,282 2,445 
Military Thrust (lbf) 10,700 10,800 14,327 
Max Thrust (lbf) 16,000 17,754 22,000 
SFC, Mil Thrust (lb/lbf.h) 0.81 0.81 0.84 
SFC, Max A/B (lb/lbf.h) 1.85 1.74 not listed 
Application F/A-18A/B/C/D F/A-18C/D F/A-18E/F 
Low Rate Production 1979  1996 
Unit Cost ($K) not listed  not listed 3564 
(*found in multiple sources and discrepancies exist, manufactures’ official websites took priority) 
 
The F404-GE-400 was modeled with QNEP [197], an engine cycle and performance 
analysis program developed for the US Navy. QNEP is an upgraded version of 
NEPCOMP [198] and is now part of NASA Langley’s FLOPS for engine cycle analysis. 
With given engine architecture and parameters, QNEP performs both on-design and off-
design point engine cycle analysis and writes an engine deck, which gives installed thrust 
and fuel flow in various combinations of altitudes, Mach numbers, and engine throttle 
settings. 
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The F404-GE-400 was modeled with the known engine parameters, and its 
performance was compared to the published data. Engine performance data is extremely 
proprietary and is published only under very limited conditions. However, actual 
maximum sea level installed thrust at five different Mach numbers were found in one of 
the GAO reports [191] and duplicated in Table 21. Installed thrust calculated by QNEP 
was calibrated to match the actual data at the sea level condition.  
Table 21: F404-GE-400 Maximum Installed Thrust at Sea Level 
Mach Number Altitude Maximum Installed Thrust (lbf) 
0.8 Sea Level 17,182 
0.9 Sea Level 16,927 
1 Sea Level 16,488 
1.1 Sea Level 15,487 
1.2 Sea Level 14,500 
 
Calculated maximum thrust at various Mach numbers and altitudes by QNEP is 
plotted in Figure 55. The maximum thrust at sea level matches the published data. As 
altitude increases, thrust decreases. The variation trend with Mach number and altitude 
is similar to the trends found on the Rolls-Royce RB211-535E4 [199] turbofan and a 
30,000-lb notional turbofan engine in [6]. Validation of the maximum installed thrust at 
above sea level was achieved indirectly by comparing the actual and calculated F/A-18 
point performance data in §7.6.6. 
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Figure 55: F404-GE-400 Maximum Installed Thrust Calculated from QNEP 
Although the specific fuel consumption (SFC), a direct measure of the engine 
efficiency, of F404 was not available, fuel flow of the F/A-18 at various combinations of 
vehicle gross weight, altitude, Mach number, and store drag conditions is available from 
the NATOPS flight manual [183]. Engine efficiency of the F404 QNEP model was 
calibrated using these data. Table 22 shows comparisons of the calculated and actual fuel 
flow at various combinations of flight conditions that cover most of the flight envelope 
that are described by the interdiction and fighter escort mission profiles as given in 
Figure 37 and Figure 38. The comparison shows that the errors are reasonably small in 
both supersonic and subsonic flight regimes. 
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Table 22: Comparison of Calculated and Actual Fuel Flow of the F404-GE-400  
 
Drag Index 
(count) 
 
Weight 
(lb) 
 
Altitude 
(ft) 
 
Speed 
(Mach) 
Calculated 
Fuel Flow 
(lb/hr) 
Actual 
Fuel Flow 
(lb/hr) 
 
Error 
(%) 
DI=150 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
42000 0 0.8 17172 17351 -1.03 
42000 5000 0.8 14334 14444 -0.76 
38000 10000 0.8 11821 11740 0.69 
38000 15000 0.8 9557 9547 0.11 
38000 20000 0.8 7963 7927 0.45 
38000 25000 0.8 6697 6689 0.12 
42000 30000 0.8 5873 5968 -1.60 
46000 30000 0.8 6235 6237 -0.03 
50000 30000 0.8 6933 6594 1.37 
38000 35000 0.8 5033 5014 0.38 
42000 35000 0.8 5505 5364 2.63 
30000 40000 0.8 4011 4025 -0.36 
34000 40000 0.8 4490 4391 2.25 
DI=0 
  
  
  
  
34000 35000 0.85 3479 3577 -2.75 
38000 35000 0.85 3787 3829 -1.09 
30000 40000 0.85 3037 3085 -1.57 
34000 40000 0.85 3416 3390 0.76 
38000 40000 0.85 3861 3779 2.17 
DI=8 
  
34000 35000 1.5 33988 34596 -1.76 
34000 15000 1.15 49680 49683 -0.01 
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7.6.5 Carrier Suitability  
Key performance parameters for carrier suitability are approach speed, launch and 
recovery wind over deck (WOD), and carrier recovery payload. These metrics are 
calculated for the F/A-18 in attack configuration. The minimum WOD required is the 
minimum ship speed required to ensure safe launch and recovery of carrier-based air 
vehicles. Thus, a small minimum WOD requirement is desired to allow for flexible ship 
operation.  
7.6.5.1 Approach Speed 
Historically, different organizations have used different methods to estimate approach 
speed, often basing estimates on the stall speed multiplied by a safety factor Sf.  
 
,app f stall landing
V S V= ⋅  (55) 
where Vstall,landing is the stall speed of an aircraft at landing configuration.  
 ,
max,
2
landing
stall landing
L landing
W
V
S Cρ
⋅
=
⋅ ⋅
 (56) 
where Wlanding is aircraft gross weight at landing, S is wing area, ρ is air density, and 
CLmax,landing is the maximum lift coefficient of the aircraft at landing configuration. 
Since 1953, for a military aircraft, a safety factor of 1.2 was required by MIL-A-8629 
[200] based on the power-off stall speed for landing, but industries started using a 
criteria based on power-on stall speed for landing. [201] Updated modern military 
standards provides more complicated means to estimate approach speed, as in MIL-STD-
3013 [172], considering not only aerodynamic capability but also longitudinal 
acceleration, pilot field of view (FOV), stability and control requirements per MIL-
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HDBK-1797 [202], and control system limits. Safety margin based on the stall speed is 
defined as follows [172]: 
For land-based aircraft: a speed that corresponds to 120-percent (120%) of the out-
of-ground effect power-off stall speed in the approach configuration, gear down 
For carrier-based aircraft (with the air vehicle in the landing configuration and on 
a 4º glide slope on a 89.8ºF day, zero wind): one-hundred-ten-percent (110%) of 
the power-on stall speed using the thrust (power) required for level flight (Vspa) at 
115-percent (115%) of Vsl, the power-off stall speed  
It is not clear whether the F/A-18’s specification was prepared following MIL-STD-
3013. Even if it were, the coupling of thrust and lift would have made parametric 
estimation of the F/A-18’s approach speed, which updates as vehicle parameters change, 
quite difficult. Therefore, a rather simple, fixed safety factor multiplication method as in 
Eqs. (55) and (56) was used to obtain such factors from actual F/A-18 stall and 
approach speed data.  
Table 23: F/A-18 Stall and Approach Speeds 
  A/B C/D E/F Units 
Stall Speed 112 114 114 knots 
Approach Speed 139 141 140 knots 
Wing Area 400 400 500 ft2 
Landing Weight 33,000 34,000 44,000 lb 
CLmax,landing 2.058 2.046 2.119  
Safety factor (Sf) 1.241 1.237 1.228  
*values in italics are estimations 
 
Actual stall and approach speeds of all three versions of the F/A-18 were found 
from [201] as summarized in Table 23. Using the tropical day air density of 0.00224 
slugs/ft3, CLmax,landing and the safety factors for each of the versions were calculated. It is 
important to note that CLmax,landing is different from CLmax discussed in §7.6.2.2. During 
approach for landing, all landing gear is lowered and LE and TE flaps are deflected fully 
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at 34° and 45° respectively, while CLmax was calculated with LE flaps at 34° and TE flaps 
at 0°. Estimated CLmax,landing and Sf are different from version to version. Apparently, the 
F/A-18E/F shows higher CLmax,landing than other versions due to its improved LEX design. 
7.6.5.2 Launch Wind Over Deck 
According to MIL-STD-3013, minimum launch wind over deck (VLWOD,min) is defined as 
catapult minimum end airspeed (Vc) minus catapult endspeed (VA). Operational launch 
WOD (VLWOD,op) uses catapult operational end airspeed (Vop), which is VA plus 15 knots 
as a safety margin.  
 
,
,
=
LWOD min c A
LWOD op op A
V V V
V V V
−
= −
 (57) 
where Vop = Vc + 15 knots. 
Catapult end speed (VA) is the speed to which a vehicle can accelerate with the aid 
of a catapult and its own thrust and is determined by catapult performance, vehicle 
weight, thrust, and drag. VA can be calculated using the following equation: 
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where 
Sc  = catapult power stroke, ft (302 ft for C13-2 catapult) 
Fn  = net thrust, lb 
D   = aerodynamic drag, lb 
W  = air vehicle weight, lb 
CEW  = catapult equivalent weight, lb (6680 lb for C13-2 catapult) 
Wsys  = system weight, lb = W + CEW 
VDL  = deadload velocity, knots (Catapult endspeed without thrust) 
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In addition, thrust and drag are to be evaluated at 0.7 VDL; primary mission is used 
for drag calculation, and minimum engine is used for thrust calculation. Deadload 
velocity (VDL) is solely determined by the catapult performance and the weight that is 
accelerated by the catapult. The relationship between VDL and aircraft gross weight for 
three types of catapults—C7, C11-1, and C13—is shown in Figure 56.  For the C13 
catapult, the limit on weight is 100,000 lb and the absolute speed limit is 150 knots.  
Catapult minimum end airspeed (Vc) is the minimum air speed required at the end 
of the catapult at which a vehicle can safely fly away and is primarily a function of the 
vehicle’s maximum lift capability and wing loading. For conceptual design of a carrier-
based aircraft, Vc is estimated based on “the speed represented by 90-percent of the 
maximum lift coefficient, power-off, out-of-ground effect,” according to MIL-STD-3013 
[172]. 
Using the equations presented above, F/A-18’s launch wind over deck (LWOD) was 
calculated. Launch configuration was assumed to be the attack configuration as 
 
Figure 56: Effect of Takeoff Weight on Catapult End Speed [7] 
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illustrated in Figure 51 with all landing gear down and LE and TE flaps approximately 
half deflected. The drag increment due to external stores, landing gear, and high lift 
devices was assumed to be 300 counts from the clean configuration. According to NASA 
TM-107601 [173], F/A-18 LE and TE flaps are deflected by 12 and 30 degrees during 
launch and 34 and 45 degrees during landing. The maximum lift coefficient during 
maneuvering with only LE flaps fully defected at 34 deg is 1.82 as described in §7.6.2.2, 
and CLmax,landing is 2.05 as estimated in §7.6.5.1. Here, the maximum takeoff lift coefficient 
(CLmax,takeoff) of 1.9 is assumed, considering that it should be larger than 1.82 and smaller 
than 2.05. Finally, the maximum afterburner thrust of one engine was used for thrust 
calculation. The F/A-18E/F is launched and recovered using a C13-2 catapult and MK7-
Mod3 arresting gear [203], and launching and recovery performance calculations for all 
F/A-18 versions were based on these systems. 
Table 24: F/A-18 Launch WOD Calculation 
  A/B C/D E/F Units 
Gross Weight 47,783 50,375 63,331 lb 
Wing Area 400 400 500 ft2 
Sc 302 302 302 ft 
Fn 16,000 17,754 22,000 lbf 
CDo at takeoff 0.055 0.055 0.055   
 ρ (tropical day) 0.00224 0.00224 0.002244 slug/ft3 
VDL 143.6 141.9 134.3 knot 
Wsys 54,463 57,055 70,011 lb 
VA 147.0 145.6 138.2 knot 
CLmax,takeoff (assumed) 1.9 1.9 1.9   
Vc 147.8 151.8 256.9 knot 
Vop 162.8 166.8 152.2 knot 
Launch WOD, op 15.9 21.2 29.0 knot 
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Based on the assumptions listed above, the F/A-18’s LWOD was calculated on a sea 
level tropical day. For validation purposes, calculated WOD was compared against the 
actual F/A-18 data, which was only known for E/F. As shown in Table 24, the 
calculated operational LWOD of E/F is 29 knots when the maximum takeoff lift 
coefficient of 1.9 is assumed, which is close to the actual value of 28 knots. 
Figure 57 illustrates the relationship between aircraft weight and various launch 
related speeds for the F/A-18A/B/C/D. Minimum launch WOD, determined by the 
difference between catapult operational end airspeed (Vop) and catapult endspeed (VA), is 
zero when the aircraft gross weight is about 41,000 lb and increases to 30 knots when the 
aircraft gross weight reaches 54,300 lb.  
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Figure 57: The F/A-18A/B Launch Airspeed/Catapult End Speed Envelope 
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7.6.5.3 Recovery Wind Over Deck 
Speeds related to approach and recovery of the US Navy aircraft are defined by MIL-
STD-3013 [172] as follows:  
• Recovery Wind Over Deck (RWOD): Recovery wind-over-deck is defined as the 
difference between touchdown speed and shipboard engaging speed. 
• Touchdown Speed (Vtd): For design purposes, touchdown speed is defined as that 
speed equal to 105-percent (105%) of carrier approach speed (Vpa). For 
operational air vehicles, touchdown speed will be determined using fleet survey 
data. 
• Shipboard Engaging Speed (Ve): The shipboard engaging speed is defined as the 
arresting gear engaging speed measured relative to the ship. 
 
In other words, 
 
1.05
RWOD td e
td pa
V V V
V V
= −
=
 (59) 
These relationships are also graphically presented in Figure 58. As shown in the 
figure, while an aircraft is approaching a carrier, the carrier itself moves away from the 
aircraft. The touchdown speed is the true airspeed experienced by the aircraft, while the 
speed of the aircraft relative to the ship (shipboard engaging speed) is less by the 
amount of WOD. Therefore, minimum RWOD is determined by the maximum speed 
limit of the arresting gear and minimum safe airspeed of the aircraft. Low minimum 
RWOD and LWOD requirements are preferred, since high values limits the way the ship 
is operated.   
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Figure 58: Carrier Aircraft Recovery Speed Relationships [201] 
Shipboard engaging speed is determined by the arresting gear maximum 
performance. MK7-Mod3 arresting gear performance from NAEC-MISC-06900 [204] is 
depicted in Figure 59. The arresting gear has the speed limit of 145 knots regardless of 
aircraft weight and has the cylinder pressure limit of 10,000 Pascal. Due to the cylinder 
pressure limit, the maximum engage speed is lowered from 145 knots when the aircraft is 
more than 40,000 lb.  
 
Figure 59: MK 7 Mod 3 Arresting Gear Performance [204] 
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Since approach speeds for F/A-18s are already calculated in §7.6.5.1, recovery WOD 
is readily calculated using Eq. (59). Table 25 shows the calculated recovery WOD of the 
F/A-18. With a MK7-Mod3 arresting gear, required WOD was calculated to be less than 
10 knots for all versions. Calculated E/F WOD matched the actual WOD of 8 knots as 
in Table 62. 
Table 25: F/A-18 Recovery Wind Over Deck 
   A/B    C/D   E/F Units 
Landing Weight 33,000 34,000 44,000 lb 
Wing Area 400 400 500 ft2 
Approach Speed 139 141 140 knots 
Touchdown Speed 146 148 147 knots 
Engaging Speed 145 145 139 knots 
Recovery WOD 1 3 8 knots 
 
7.6.5.4 Carrier Recovery Payload 
MIL-STD-3013 [172] defines the carrier recovery payload (CRP), or bring back 
capability, of a carrier-based air vehicle as  
… the maximum combination of fuel and expendable payload an air vehicle can 
land with, and not exceed its maximum landing weight. This is the maximum 
carrier/arrested landing weight less the operating weight. 
The maximum carrier/arrested landing weight for the F/A-18A/B/C/D was 33,000 
lb until 1994 when it was raised to 34,000 lb with restrictions [191]. The F/A-18A’s 
carrier recovery payload with an operating weight of 24,993 lb was 8,007 lb initially. 
However, as the F/A-18 gained weight over time, the bring back weight decreased 
accordingly. The 27,535 lb operating weight of the F/A-18C allowed only 5,465 lb of fuel 
and payload to be brought back upon carrier landing. That was a serious concern to the 
Navy, especially when training missions were forced to expend expensive, unused 
 194
weapons in order not to exceed the maximum landing weight. Raising the maximum 
carrier landing weight from 33,000 lb to 34,000 lb in 1994 did not solve the problem and 
further increasing maximum carrier landing weight would have required strengthening of 
landing gear and airframe and the addition of a larger wing to keep the approach speed 
at the same level. This poor bring back capability of the F/A-18C/D was one of the 
main reasons why the US Navy had to pursue a new aircraft, the F/A-18E/F. For the 
F/A-18E/F design, a bring back weight of 9,000 lb was required, while the maximum 
landing weight was set at 44,000 lb [191]. The F/A-18E/F’s operating weight of 34,481* 
lb provides the bring back capability of 9,519 lb, exceeding the requirement. This 
calculated value is very close to the published value of 9,500 lb as in Table 62. 
7.6.6 Synthesis and Validation of the F/A-18 Model 
Geometry, aerodynamics, weight, and propulsion models of the F/A-18 have been 
developed in the previous sections. In addition, the KPPs related to carrier suitability 
were calculated and compared to the published data. In this section, those previously 
developed elements are synthesized, forming a complete aircraft model to calculate both 
the fighter’s mission and point performance. To confirm the validity of the F/A-18 
model, the calculated point and mission performance are compared to the published 
data. Fighter performance depends in part on the difference between thrust available and 
thrust required. Therefore, accurate fighter performance calculation requires an accurate 
engine model and drag model. Correct estimation of the mission radius is only achievable 
                                                                                       
*The definition of operating weight is different in the context of carrier recovery payload. Here, operating 
weight is landing weight less fuel and expendable payload such as missiles and bombs. See Table 31 for the 
F/A-18E weight breakdown. 
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when aerodynamics, engine efficiency, weight, external stores weight and drag, and, most 
importantly, the mission itself are all accurate. All the procedures, methods, and 
assumptions are documented to provide traceability of the work, and calculated vehicle 
performance is compared to the actual F/A-18 performance when such data are available. 
7.6.6.1 Fighter Performance 
Fighter performance metrics of interest are combat ceiling, specific excess power, 
acceleration, and turn rate. All of these metrics are calculated for the standard fighter 
configuration (two AIM-9s and two AIM-7s only) with 60 percent internal fuel, unless 
otherwise noted. These point performance metrics are essentially a function of engine 
thrust available and engine thrust required, which is equal to drag. For the F/A-18C, 
the engines are two F404-GE-402s at maximum afterburner thrust.  
Combat ceiling is defined as “the altitude at which the maximum steady-state rate-
of-climb potential is 500 ft per minute for a specified configuration, weight, speed, and 
thrust (power) setting”, in MIL-STD-3013. The F/A-18A/B combat ceiling is about 
53,600 ft, according to the NATOPS Flight Manual, and the calculation using FLOPS 
was 53,374 ft for the A version and 53,141 ft for the C version. 
MIL-STD-3013 also defines specific excess power (Ps) as  
… the time rate of change of specific energy and is a measure of the capability of 
the air vehicle to change energy levels for a specified configuration, altitude, speed, 
and thrust (power) setting. Specific excess power is usually expressed in feet per 
second, and is defined as follows: 
 
( )
1.6878 n tas
s
F D V
P
W
−
=  (60) 
where Fn is net thrust in pounds; D is aerodynamic drag in pounds; Vtas is true airspeed 
in knots; and W is air vehicle weight in pounds. 
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NAVAIR reports in a GAO document [191] some of the F/A-18C’s point 
performance measured at the combat weight of 33,325 lb with maximum afterburner 
thrust of two F404-GE-402 engines: Ps is 699 ft/sec at Mach 0.9, 10,000 ft; acceleration 
capability is to take 55.8 seconds from Mach 0.8 to 1.2 at 35,000 ft; and turn rate is 12.3 
degrees/sec at 15,000 ft.  
The FLOPS model calculated these three fighter performance measures at the same 
condition: Ps was 686.7 ft/sec; the acceleration time was 66.54 seconds; and the turn rate 
was 12.393 degrees/second. While calculations of the two measures were close to the 
actual values, the acceleration time was noticeably higher. It seems that the 
aerodynamics model overestimates the wave drag at around Mach 1.  
7.6.6.2 Mission Performance 
To confirm the validity of the F/A-18 computer model, the calculated mission 
performance is compared to the published mission performance. Mission performance was 
compared in terms of the mission radius rather than the fuel quantify burned to fly a 
designed range. Correct estimation of the mission radius is only achievable when 
aerodynamics, engine efficiency, weight, external stores weight and drag, and most 
importantly the mission itself are all correct.  
The F/A-18A/B/C/D NATOPS Flight Manual [183] provides the amount of fuel 
required for each of the mission segments, such as engine start, warm-up, takeoff, 
acceleration to climb speed, climb, cruise, and reserve, based on a series of flight tests in 
various combinations of flight conditions, such as weight, external stores, etc.  For 
example, the combinations of best cruise Mach number and altitude and climb speed 
schedule for minimum time-to-climb are databased under different weight and drag 
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conditions. All the mission segments that comprise the fighter and attack mission profiles 
were modeled in the F/A-18 FLOPS model and validated against the NATOPS Flight 
Manual. The segment-by-segment comparison of the fuel consumption confirmed 
accuracy of the FLOPS model. 
Then, as the next step, the F/A-18 model was flown for five different mission 
profiles. They are hi-lo-lo-hi interdiction as in Figure 37, hi-hi-hi interdiction, fighter 
escort as in Figure 38, ferry, and combat ferry missions. The standard hi-hi-hi 
interdiction mission profile from MIL-STD-3013 is shown in Figure 60. It is identical to 
the hi-lo-lo-hi interdiction described in §7.2.1 except that the 50 nm penetration and 
withdrawal is conducted at a fixed altitude, which is the end altitude of the cruise out 
segment. The ferry/combat ferry mission profile is depicted in Figure 61. A (combat) 
ferry mission is defined as “a range mission conducted without payload to depict the 
maximum range capability of the air vehicle [172].” The combat ferry mission is 
performed with internal fuel only while the ferry mission uses all external fuel tanks. For 
complete mission descriptions of these missions, see MIL-STD-3013.  
 
Figure 60: Interdiction (Hi-Hi-Hi) 
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Figure 61: Ferry Mission 
Mission analyses were performed for the five mission profiles for both the F/A-18A 
and C with various external store and reserve fuel conditions. For the fighter and ferry 
missions, land-based reserve mission fuel of 20 minutes loiter plus 5 percent of initial fuel 
was assumed among other standard reserve conditions. For the interdiction missions, 
either the land-based reserve fuel, fixed fuel between 3,500 lb to 4,000 lb, or 100 nm 
BINGO was assumed appropriately. Assumptions on external stores also had to be made 
for some cases, but the error in fuel consumption caused by an incorrect external store is 
insignificant as long as the number of external fuel tanks used is correct. 
Mission radius (range for the ferry missions) calculated from the mission analyses 
are compared to the actual data as shown in Table 26. For each comparison, actual or 
assumed external store conditions and reserve conditions are listed. The shaded entries in 
the table are assumptions. The calculated and actual mission radius match very closely 
for all ten different cases analyzed with the F/A-18C model, which approves the validity 
of the vehicle model created in this study. On the other hand, the calculated radius for 
the interdiction and ferry mission are significantly lower than the published numbers in 
the case of the F/A-18A model. Calculated ferry range was 1,763 nm and calculated 
interdiction (hi-lo-lo-hi) was about 500 nm, which are about 10% lower than the 
published 1,800+ or 2,000+ nm and 550 or 575 nm.  
This rather large difference seems to be attributed to two reasons: First, the 
published performance is based on the F/A-18A empty weight lower than the 21,830 lb 
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that was used in the analyses. The published mission radius could have been based on 
the weight of the very early production version of the F/A-18A or even the prototype 
version. The second explanation is that the published data are estimation rather than 
actual flight test data. This argument is supported by the fact that the 550 nm 
interdiction radius was initially mentioned by Lenox in 1976 [77], which was four years 
before the first delivery in 1980 and two years before the first test flight occurred on 
November 18, 1978. Thus, the author claims that the 10% difference between the 
published and calculated mission radius with the F/A-18A model does not undermine 
the validity of the vehicle models created in the study. 
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Table 26: Comparison of Calculated and Published Mission Performance 
Mission Type Version Published Calculation Fuel Tanks Stores Source/Year Reserve Type Reserve Condition Mission Profile 
Interdiction A 550 496 (3) 330 gallon Note 1. Lenox 1976/ Janes 81 Land-based 20 min + 5% of initial fuel 
As in Figure 37 
(Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi) C 290 294 (2) 330 gallon Note 1. Janes 1992-93 Carrier-based 4000 lb of fixed fuel 
  C 304 305 (2) 330 gallon Note 2. DoD 1996 Carrier-based 3800 lb of fixed fuel 
  C 325 320 (2) 330 gallon Note 1. Hornet 2000 Study1988 Carrier-based 3500 lb of fixed fuel 
  C 369 372 (3) 330 gallon Note 2. DoD 1996 Carrier-based 4000 lb of fixed fuel 
  C 415 412 (3) 330 gallon Note 1. CRS 2007 Carrier-based 3500 lb fixed 
Interdiction C 395 395 (2) 330 gallon Note 2. DoD 1996 Carrier-based 3800 lb of fixed fuel 
As in Figure 38 
(Hi-Hi-Hi) C 470 462 (3) 330 gallon Note 2. DoD 1996 Carrier-based 4000 lb of fixed fuel 
Fighter Escort A 400+ 401 None Note 3. Lenox 1976/ Jane80-87 Land-based 20 min + 5% of initial fuel 
As in Figure 60 
  C 366 360 None Note 3. CRS 2007 Land-based 20 min + 5% of initial fuel 
Ferry A 2000+ 1763 (3) 330 gallon (2) AIM-9 Janes 1980-91 Land-based 20 min + 5% of initial fuel 
As in Figure 61*   A 1800+ 1763 (3) 330 gallon (2) AIM-9 Janes 1992-3 Land-based 20 min + 5% of initial fuel 
  C 1546 1564 (3) 330 gallon (2) AIM-9 Navy 2008 Land-based 20 min + 5% of initial fuel 
Combat Ferry C 1089 1106 None (2) AIM-9 Navy 2008 Land-based 20 min + 5% of initial fuel As in Figure 61 
Note 1. (2) AIM-9, FLIR, Laser Spot Tracker Pod, (4) MK-83  
Note 2. (2) AIM-9, FLIR, NAVFLIR, (4) MK-83LDGP  
Note 3. (2) AIM-9, (2) AIM-7  
*2500 lb of combat fuel was assumed for the combat segment following Jane’s All the World Aircraft 1987-1988 
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7.6.7 Summary of Modeling and Simulation I 
In Step 5, a computer model of the F/A-18C was constructed using FLOPS. The 
validity of the model was confirmed by comparing the calculated aircraft performance to 
the published data at both the subsystems level and the systems level. As a summary, 
the mission performance, carrier suitability, and fighter performance as in the KPPs 
defined in Step 1 are compared in Table 27. The review of the actual F/A-18C data is 
provided in APPENDIX B. 
Table 27: F/A-18C Performance Comparison 
Category Key Performance Parameters Published Calculated Units 
Mission 
Performance 
Fighter escort radius 366 360.35 nm 
Interdiction mission radius 369 371.9 nm 
Carrier 
Suitability 
Recovery payload 5,623 5,465 lb 
Launch wind over deck  not listed 21.23 knots 
Recovery wind over deck  not listed 3 knots 
Approach speed  141 141 knots 
Fighter 
Performance 
Combat ceiling 53,141 52,339 ft 
Specific excess power at 0.9M/10,000 ft 699 686.7 ft/sec 
Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M at 35,000 ft  55.8 66.54 sec 
Turn rate at 15000K 12.3 12.039 deg/sec 
 
7.7 Modeling and Simulation II: Step 6 
As the future requirements are expected to grow in the future, the baseline vehicle is also 
expected to grow to meet or exceed the evolving requirements. To model physical growth 
of the vehicle, a set of scaling laws are established and validated in this step.  
FLOPS has the capability to capture the effects of parametric variations of vehicle 
characteristics to some degree. For example, FLOPS has some logics to evaluate changes 
in weight, aerodynamics, engine performance, etc. FLOPS was used as a primary means 
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to model the upgrades whenever possible. However, FLOPS is limited in handling the 
issue of volume requirement and availability of a fighter aircraft. Thus, a computer code 
to volumetrically size the F/A-18 baseline was written. In addition, scaling laws for aft-
body size, tail size, weight change, and external stores weight and drag changes were 
developed and calibrated. The scaling laws were validated by applying them to the F/A-
18C model created in Step 5 to model the F/A-18E and by comparing the performance 
of the F/A-18E model to published data.  
In addition to ensuring physical scalability of the model, it is essential to create a 
model to capture the cost of vehicle upgrade. The cost model of the notional fighter was 
created primarily through the use of Military Aircraft Life Cycle Cost Analysis 
(MALCCA) [205], a FORTRAN code developed by the Aerospace Systems Design 
Laboratory at Georgia Tech. The software was developed to work with FLOPS 
seamlessly and automatically reads the vehicle definitions from the FLOPS input file. 
Moreover, since MALCCA was developed based on supersonic fighters such as the F-18 
and the F-16, the code is quite suitable to model a notional fighter based on the F-18. 
While MALCCA has the functionality to model the cost of developing a derivative 
aircraft as well as a new aircraft, it requires a pre-process to provide the necessary inputs 
to calculate aircraft upgrade cost. A set of logics was established and written as a 
computer code to prepare inputs to MALCCA.   
7.7.1 Volumetric Sizing 
One of the aspects of aircraft sizing is balancing aircraft internal volume available and 
required. During the sizing process, those volumes available within the wings and 
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fuselage are calculated and the fuselage is sized to make sure that available volume is 
larger than required volume. This imposes a constraint in aircraft sizing as follows: 
 Internal volume required Internal volume available 0− ≤  (61) 
It is customary in aircraft design to allow some margin or growth potential in 
volume to allow for redesign or repackaging in the case of requirement growth and/or 
error in estimating either the volume required or available. However, for fighter aircraft 
that are required to fly supersonically, cross-sectional areas are minimized to reduce 
wave drag by packaging the internal area as tight as possible. Cases studies in Chapter 3 
showed that for fighter aircraft limited volume available inside the airframe had posed 
great challenges in modifying existing available versus the volume required is very likely 
an active constraint and, therefore, must be accounted for. This section discusses volume 
issues of the F/A-18 and how to calculate both required and available volume when 
design changes are made. 
7.7.1.1 Actual F/A-18 Internal Volume Available and Required 
The F/A-18 was originally designed with room for growth in terms of the volume, 
although the exact magnitude is unknown. Wood’s [206] indication of the F-18 A being 
designed with 15-20 years of growth potential gives a rough idea, but the allocation of 
such growth potential had to be assumed. Over time, a series of upgrade programs added 
more avionics, leaving very little room for growth eventually. By the time when the need 
for the E/F was established, the F/A-18C/D was expected to have only 0.2 ft3 of usable 
volume remaining when all the planned avionics upgrades had been executed through the 
mid-1990s [191]. The fact the C/D version would reach its growth potential in terms of 
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the volume availability was one of the major reasons why the E/F program was 
initiated. 
In the design of the F/A-18E/F, additional internal volume was needed over C/D’s 
internal volume to accommodate 573 gallons of additional internal fuel. In addition to 
the extra internal fuel, 17 ft3 extra room was required to provide volume for P3I avionics 
upgrades from the F/A-18C/D’s FY 1998 avionics package [191]. The required internal 
volume was appropriated from both the wings and the fuselage. The F/A-18E/F’s 25 
percent larger wing provided a 244 gallon fuel tank in each wing, which is a 187 percent 
increase from the 85 gallon fuel tank of the F/A-18A/B/C/D. In addition to a larger 
wing, a 34 inch fuselage plug was added to acquire more volume for fuel and equipment. 
Figure 62, taken from the F/A-18A/B/C/D and E/F NATOPS Flight Manuals [175, 
183], shows the internal fuel tanks of the F/A-18A/C (one seat version) at the top and 
the F/A-18E/F (both one seat and two seat versions) at the bottom. The bottom figure 
shows that the difference between the E and F versions is that the F version has a 
shorter fuselage tank (tank 1) with 138 gallons less capacity in order to accommodate 
the second pilot. It is clearly seen from the figure that E has larger wing fuel tanks and 
longer fuselage tanks. The fuel capacity of each tank is summarized in Table 28.  
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Figure 62: The F/A-18A/C (Top) and the E/F (Bottom) Fuel Tanks [175, 183] 
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Table 28: F/A-18 Internal Usable Fuel Volume in US Gallon [175, 183]  
Tank Number F/A-18A/C F/A-18E 
Tank 1 418 350 
Tank 2 263 383 
Tank 3 206 385 
Tank 4 532 555 
Total Fuselage 1,419 1,673 
Internal Wings 170 489 
Total Internal 1,589 2,162 
 
7.7.1.2 Calculation of Extra Internal Volume Available and Required 
Based on the F/A-18’s volumetric information, collected and summarized in the previous 
section, a set of rules to calculate volume required and available are developed in this 
section. The point of interest here is not the total volume available and required but the 
change of those volumes due to the change in the need for internal fuel capacity and 
avionics. As in the case of the F/A-18E/F, the extra volume needed is acquired by 
stretching the fuselage and/or enlarging the wing.  
First, extra volume available by stretching the fuselage (∆VA,fuse) was calculated as 
follows: 
 
, 4A fuse f
V Cd h l
κ
∆ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∆⋅  (62) 
where d is fuselage maximum width; h is fuselage maximum height; ∆l is length of the 
fuselage plug; κ is sectional shape factor, e.g. pi for a circle or an ellipse, 4 for a square; Cf 
is the fraction of usable volume out of total internal volume. 
It was assumed that for this particular fighter application, additional fuel and 
avionics were located using following rules: 
• Additional internal fuel is stored in the wing if any volume is available 
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• The rest of the additional fuel, if any, is stored in the fuselage  
• Avionics are only placed in the fuselage 
Then, volume available within the wing (Wfuel,wing) by increasing the wing area is all 
reserved for extra fuel and is calculated using a formulation in FLOPS. 
 
,fuel wing f f
W R P S∆ = + ⋅∆  (63) 
where Rf is reference fuel capacity in pounds (1,156 lb for F/A-18A/B/C/D); Pf is a 
factor to convert wing volume available to fuel capacity in pounds (21.692 for F/A-18); 
and ∆S is wing area change in ft2 (100 ft2 for F/A-18). 
All the additional avionics and required fuel less the extra fuel that went to the 
wing are placed in the fuselage. The fuselage volume required (VR,fuse) to house these 
items is calculated by 
 
, ,
1.05 ( )
R fuse fuel fuel fuel wing eq eq
V W W Wρ ρ∆ = ∆ −∆ +  (64) 
where ∆Wfuel is additional internal fuel capacity required in pounds; ρfuel is fuel density; 
∆Wequip is additional equipment in pounds; ρequip is average density of additional 
equipment. 
In order to apply the proposed formulations on the baseline F/A-18, the extra 
volume available using the fuselage plug was estimated first. Figure 63 shows the F/A-18 
Hornet’s planform view and cross-sectional geometry at various fuselage stations (FS). 
The fuselage starts with a circular cross-section at the nose (FS 68) and is stretched 
longitudinally to form an ellipse before the cockpit is attached. As it passes the cockpit, 
the shape becomes close to square. The cross-section at FS 357 covers a larger area than 
an ellipse but a smaller area than a square. In general, fuselage plugs are inserted in the 
middle of the vehicle section to minimize the longitudinal variation of the center of 
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gravity. Considering the CG location of the F/A-18 marked in the figure, it was assumed 
that the 34-inch fuselage plug that was inserted in the mid fuselage section uniformly 
follows the cross-sectional shape of the FS 357. The 34-inch fuselage plugq using FS 357 
sectional geometry, gives 55.257 ft3 of volume under the skin. Subtracting 5 percent of 
assumed unusable volume, 52.49 ft3 of usable fuselage volume was obtained.  
As for calculating required volume, it was assumed that all the fuel goes to the wing 
volume first and any remainder goes to the fuselage. Knowing the fuel weight that 
should go to the fuselage, the volume for fuel is calculated assuming JP-5 jet fuel at 
standard temperature density of 6.8 lb per gallon. In addition, the volumes required for 
avionics and equipment are calculated based on the weight of the system multiplied by 
 
Figure 63: F/A-18A/B/C/D Planform and Cross-Sectional Geometry [207] 
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the average density. The average density of avionics and equipment was assumed at 25 
lb per cubic foot, which is approximately the density of the F404-GE-400 engines.  
Finally, volume growth potential is calculated by subtracting required volume from 
available volume. Table 29 shows the calculated growth potential of the F/A-18A, C, 
and E with C avionics and E with its upgraded avionics. The avionics weights of the C 
and E versions are from [4]. The avionics weight of the F/A-18A was not available, and 
thus an assumption had to be made. With 1,089 lb of assumed avionics weight, it can be 
said that the F/A-18A was designed with 8.2 ft3 of volume growth potential. As avionics 
weight increased over time, the F/A-18C reached a point where remaining volume 
available was only 0.2 ft3. The F/A-18E’s growth potential—when equipped with the 
F/A-18C’s avionics package—was calculated to be 17.1 ft3, which is close to the 
published value of 17 ft3. Finally, the current F/A-18E growth potential after the P3I 
avionics upgrade was calculated to be 12.2 ft3. 
Table 29: F/A-18 Volume Growth Potential Calculation 
Version A C E  
(w/C avionics) 
E  Unit 
Wing area 400 400 500 500 ft2 
Wing fuel capacity 1,156 1,156 3,325 3,325 lb 
Fuselage plug length 0 0 2.83 2.83 ft 
Fuselage fuel capacity 1,419 1,419 1,673 1,673 lb 
Avionics weight 1,089* 1,289 1,289 1,411 lb 
Growth potential 8.2 0.2 17.1 12.2 ft3 
       *F/A-18A avionics weight was assumed.  
7.7.2 Aft-Body Sizing 
For a fighter aircraft with air breathing propulsion systems integrated into the airframe, 
the sizing of the structure that houses the engines, induces air flow into the engines, and 
discharges the air from the engine exit is one of the most important aspects of aircraft 
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sizing. History has shown that it is very likely that the engine thrust of a given aircraft 
would grow over time. Engine manufacturers usually provide a series of upgraded 
derivative engines by increasing the mass flow while keeping the core of the baseline 
engine. Engine upgrade might be easier if the engines are mounted in nacelles that are 
outside of the wing or fuselage, which are common cases for the commercial transports. 
However, upgrading propulsion systems could cause huge challenges if they start to 
interfere with other components. As shown in the case studies in §3.3, re-engining of the 
F-4K/M phantom for the Royal Navy required the entire redesign of aft-fuselage, inlets, 
and ducts. 
Considering the very high possibility of upgrading the engines later on, it is a 
common engineering practice to provide some extra room for growth provisions as 
Northrop did on the F-5G as introduced in §3.1.1.1. For the F/A-18, the original inlet 
and nacelle design seems to have some level of growth potential, considering the fact 
that engine enhancement from F404-GE-400 to F404-GE-402 was done without 
modifying airframe structures, while thrust increased by approximately 11 percent. Then, 
during the next round of upgrade program (the E/F program), nacelle length, measured 
from the tip of the inlet to the end of the nozzle, increased from 25.65 ft to 30.48 ft, 
while engine thrust increased from 17,754 lb to 22,000 lb.  
To properly size the aft-body structure related to engine mount and operation, it is 
necessary to define a way to scale those structures and measure their growth potentials. 
In this study, the entire structure including engine compartment, inlets, ducts, and 
nozzles are viewed as a nacelle assembly and sized together. The aft-body of the FA-18 is 
two nacelle assemblies attached side-by-side.  
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The dimension of nacelle assembly is represented by its diameter (dn) and length (ln). 
A scaling law to size a nacelle assembly is proposed and validated based on the F/A-18 
data. A nacelle assembly is scaled based on the engine thrust following the formulation: 
 
,
,
( / )
( / )
k
n n ref ref
k
n n ref ref
l l T T
d d T T
= ⋅
= ⋅
 (65) 
where ln and dn,ref are the length and diameter of the baseline nacelle assembly; T is 
engine thrust; Tref is baseline engine thrust; and k is the exponential factor to scale 
nacelle size. For the value of k, 0.5 is selected, considering that engine thrust is 
proportional to the mass flow rate if the core is the same and mass flow rate is 
proportional to the engine cross-sectional area, which is proportional to the engine 
diameter squared.  
To identify reference nacelle size and engine thrust, it was assumed that growth 
potential of 12 and 15 percent were embedded in the design of the F/A-18A/B’s and 
E/F’s aft-body, respectively. Finally, since actual F/A-18’s nacelle diameter was hard to 
measure, 48-inch diameter was assumed to give room for structure, installation, and 
maintenance of 36-inch diameter F404-GE-400/402 engines. Based on these assumptions, 
nacelle length and diameter were calculated as shown in Table 30 Calculated nacelle 
lengths matched actual nacelle assembly lengths of all F/A-18 versions.  
In summary, the notional fighter’s aft-body is scaled using two parameters, engine 
thrust and nacelle assembly growth potential. As those two parameters change, nacelle 
assembly length and diameter are calculated and inputted to FLOPS. Then, FLOPS 
estimate the weight and drag effect of the new aft-body size.  
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Table 30: F/A-18 Nacelle Assembly Size  
  A/B C/D E/F Unit 
Engine thrust 16,000 17,754 22,000 lb 
Ref. thrust for aft-body sizing 17,920 17,920 25,300 lb 
Nacelle growth potential 12 0.94 15 % 
Actual nacelle length 25.65 25.65 30.48 ft 
Calculated nacelle length 25.65 25.65 30.48 ft 
Calculated nacelle diameter 48 48 57 in 
      Note: Values in italics are assumptions. 
 
7.7.3 Horizontal and Vertical Tails 
Horizontal and vertical tail areas are determined considering stability and control 
aspects of the aircraft at all expected flight conditions. During conceptual design of 
aircraft, however, it is conventional to estimate required tail surface areas based on 
historical trend. By understanding that the function of horizontal and vertical tails is to 
counteract the movement about the center of gravity of the aircraft, mainly produced by 
the wing, a consistent trend between the wing geometry and required tail areas is 
observed. This trend is formulated into two non-dimensional parameters called tail 
volume coefficients [6]. 
In FLOPS, tail areas are either hard-coded or calculated based on the tail volume 
coefficients, wing area, aspect ratio, and fuselage length. Knowing those geometric 
variables of the F/A-18A/B/C/D (as in Table 15) and the F/A-18E/F including 
horizontal and vertical tail areas*, tail volume coefficients were calculated and inputted 
into FLOPS to model the C/D version. Then, the tail areas of a notional aircraft are 
calculated by FLOPS as wing area and other geometry varies. The volume coefficients 
                                                                                       
*“The E/F …  have a 25-percent larger wing, a 35-percent larger horizontal tail, a 15-percent larger vertical 
tail, and a 34-ince fuselage extension [75].” 
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were linearly interpolated with respect to the wing area from the settings of the C/D and 
E/F versions.  
7.7.4 Weight 
F/A-18E weight breakdown is also constructed as shown in Table 31. The empty weight 
of 30,564 lb from reference [153] was used, since the performance metrics listed in Table 
35 are based on that production model. Crew, unusable fuel, gun, chaff, etc. were 
assumed equal to those of the F/A-18C. External stores and usable fuel weight is from 
the F/A-18E/F NATOPS Flight Manual [175].  
Using the F/A-18C FLOPS model, the weight of the F/A-18E was calculated by 
setting the design parameters at the E’s values as listed in Table 34. Subsystem weight 
scaling factors that were used to calibrate the F/A-18C model remained unchanged. 
Table 32 compares the calculated and actual weights of the F/A-18E in attack 
configuration. Using the same calibration factors, FLOPS estimated the weight empty 
with less than one percent of error.  
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Table 31: F/A-18E Weight Breakdown 
  Weight 
per Unit 
# in 
Attack 
# in 
Fighter 
Attack 
Weight 
Fighter 
Weight 
       
Weight Empty     30,564 30,564 
       
Crew     180 180 
Crew Equipment     59 59 
Unusable Fuel     207 207 
Engine Fluid     114 114 
Gun     204 204 
400 Rounds Ammo     100 100 
Chaff     52 52 
SUU-80 w/BRU-32 LD Pylon 181 2 0 362 0 
SUU-80 w/ADU-773 LD Pylon 123 2 0 246 0 
SUU-79/A w/BRU-32 STD Pylon 310 2 0 620 0 
ARR-55 Nav. FLIR pod 214 1 0 214 0 
AAS-46 Target FLIR 370 1 0 370 0 
SUU-78/A w/BRU-32 Centerline Pylon 139 1 0 139 0 
Operating Weight     33,431 31,480 
       
480 GAL. Tank Wing Tank 350 2 0 700 0 
480 GAL. Tank Centerline Tank 350 1 0 350 0 
MK-83 1000 lb Bomb 1005 4 0 4,020 0 
AIM-9 Sidewinder 195 2 2 390 390 
AIM-120 AMRAAM 345 0 2 0 690 
Payload     5,460 1,080 
       
Internal Fuel     14,700 14,700 
External Fuel Wing Tank 3260 2 0 6,520 0 
 Centerline Tank 3220 1 0 3,220 0 
Usable Fuel     24,440 14,700 
       
       
Takeoff Gross Weight     63,331 47,260 
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Table 32: F/A-18E/F Weight in Attack Configuration 
 Actual Calculated 
Weight Empty 30,564 30,832 
Payload 7,411 7,411 
Usable Fuel 24,440 24,440 
Takeoff Gross Weight 63,331 63,599 
 
7.7.5 Weight and Drag of External Stores 
Geometric growth of a vehicle affects both weight and aerodynamic properties of the 
vehicle. For the major subsystems, FLOPS updates weight and aerodynamics 
parametrically as design changes. However, the weight and drag changes due to external 
stores must be pre-calculated and inputted to FLOPS.  
In the case of the F/A-18, externally carried payloads are missiles, bombs, pods, and 
fuel tanks. Drag contribution of pods is relatively small, since they are attached at the 
fuselage stations without pylons. Drag increment due to missiles and bombs and 
associated pylons can be calculated using the data in the flight manual. For example, 
drag contribution of two AIM-7s and two AIM-9s is 8 counts and increases to 24.8 
counts if two AIM-120s are installed instead of two AIM-7s.   
Among the externally carried items, drag contribution is dominated by external fuel 
tanks, and the contribution from bombs and missiles is relatively small. Drag 
contribution from an external fuel tank is significant enough to affect aircraft 
performance in a very meaningful way. Table 33 lists the drag and weight of fuel tanks 
and pylons for both the F/A-18C/D and E/F. As fuel capacity per tank increases from 
330 gallons to 480 gallons, drag increases more than a hundred percent. When all three 
external fuel tanks are carried, storage drag due to fuel tanks and pylons is 86.8 counts 
 216
for the 480-gallon tanks and 39.5 counts for the 330-gallon tanks. Total weight increases 
from 870 lb. to 1,050 lb. Using these actual C/D and E/F fuel tank data, weight and 
drag for a rubberized fuel tank were interpolated according to its fuel capacity and 
inputted to FLOPS for mission analysis.  
Table 33: Weight and Drag of F/A-18 External Fuel Tanks and Pylons  
Version Item Name Weight 
(lb) 
Drag 
(count) 
C/D 330 GAL Tank External Fuel Tank 290 10.5*/14.5† 
 SUU-63 Wing Pylon 310 7.5 
 SUU-62 Centerline Pylon 139 3 
E/F 480 GAL. Tank External Fuel Tank 350 25*/30.9† 
 SUU-79/A w/BRU-32 STD Pylon 310 9.4 
 SUU-78/A w/BRU-32 Centerline Pylon 139 1 
* When attached to the centerline pylon 
† When attached to the wing pylon 
 
7.7.6 Performance Validation 
The set of scaling laws presented in the sections above were written in a computer code 
and integrated with FLOPS. The integrated aircraft performance analysis tool was 
specifically prepared for a notional carrier-based multi-role fighter based on the F/A-18 
Hornet. To check the validity of the computer model’s scalability, an F/A-18E model 
was created by scaling up the C model developed in Step 5 and then compared against 
actual weight and performance data.  
Table 34 lists the design changes from F/A-18C to the E version in accordance with 
the design variables that were defined in Step 3. All the values for the vehicle system 
level design variables increased noticeably. It is important to note that the E model was 
not created independent to the C model, but it was a scaled-up version of the C model 
following the set of scaling laws proposed in this chapter.  
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Table 34: F/A-18 Changes from the C to E Versions 
Design Variables F/A-18C F/A-18E Units 
Wing area 400 500 ft2 
Thrust 17,754 22,000 lb 
Ref. weight for DLF of 7.5 g 32,000 42,097 lb 
Operational landing weight 33,000 44,000 lb 
Internal fuel capacity 10,810 14,700 lb 
External fuel capacity 6,720 9,740 lb 
Fuselage length  53 55.83 ft 
Avionics weight 1,289 1,411 lb 
 
The validity of the scaling laws is confirmed by comparing the performance analysis 
results of the created F/A-18E model and actual data. Actual F/A-18E performance 
data are based on the flight tests conducted by the US Navy in 1998 and are from 
references [153, 208]. Two important assumptions were made on the reserve conditions. 
For the fighter mission, reserve fuel for 20 minute loiter at sea level, plus 5% of initial 
fuel was assumed. For the attack mission, the fixed 3,500 lb of reserve fuel was assumed. 
Table 35 shows both actual and calculated mission and point performance of the F/A-
18E. Both fighter escort radius and interdiction mission radius with three 480-gallon fuel 
tanks using the hi-lo-lo-hi profile matched very closely. All other performance parameters 
were very close to the actual values. 
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Table 35: F/A-18E Key Performance Parameters  
Category Key Performance Parameters Actual Calculated Units 
Mission 
Performance 
Fighter escort radius 462 468.45 nm 
Interdiction mission radius 498 499.20 nm 
Carrier 
Suitability 
Recovery payload 9,125 9,251 lb 
Launch wind over deck  29.9 29.51 knot 
Recovery wind over deck  9 9.56 knot 
Approach speed  142 141.48 knot 
Fighter 
Performance 
Combat ceiling 52,300 52,992 ft 
Specific excess power at 0.9M/10,000 ft 648 674.80 ft/sec 
Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M at 35,000 ft  64.85 64.62 min 
Turn rate at 15,000K 11.6 11.90 deg/sec 
Others Volume growth potential 12.21 12.21 ft3 
 Usable load factor 7.5 7.52 g 
 
7.7.7 Development of the Cost Model 
The F/A-18 cost model was created using FLOPS, Military Aircraft Life Cycle Cost 
Analysis (MALCCA), and a code written by the author. MALCCA [205] is a weight- 
and process-based military cost analysis code with a capability to model derivative 
aircraft by specifying detailed input of design ancestors. To construct and validate the 
cost model, numerous public domain sources were consulted. Although the sources for 
the numbers used in this study are mentioned in the following sections as necessary, 
some of the sources found to be useful in studying military cost in general are introduced 
in §C.2 for future reference. Some of the definitions of military cost terms such as 
program acquisition cost, procurement cost, operation and support (O&S) cost, and life-
cycle cost are also referred to §C.1. The test and evaluation programs of the F/A-
18A/B/C/D and E/F are summarized in §C.4. 
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7.7.7.1 RDT&E Cost and Duration 
The focus of the cost model was accurate calculation of RDT&E and production cost. 
Since this study excluded retrofitting of existing aircraft, the production cost model is for 
new manufactures. Therefore, RDT&E cost is the only factor that differentiates a new 
design and a derivative design, and particular effort was made to develop an activity- 
and process-based RDT&E model.  
7.7.7.2 Flight Test and Wind Tunnel Test 
RDT&E cost is calculated utilizing MALCCA. MALCCA is integrated into FLOPS and 
reads the vehicle properties automatically. The research and development (R&D) cost is 
mainly calculated based on the engineering hours. Engineering hours are estimated for 
major aircraft subsystems based on weight-based empirical relationships and are summed 
up. Engineering hour estimation for a subsystem is strongly related to its own weight 
and to key design parameters that define such a subsystem. If the aircraft development 
is a follow-on program, a certain portion of the required engineering hours is saved, 
depending on the amount of design commonality to its predecessor.  
Then, test and evaluation (T&E) cost is mainly decided by the number of test 
vehicles, flight test hours, types of ground test, and wind tunnel test hours, which are all 
inputs to MALCCA. To determine these parameters, all the potential design change 
options are mapped to the list of test activities using a flight test matrix (FTM), a wind 
tunnel test matrix (WTM), and a ground test matrix (GTM). 
While the EvoLVE process identifies the aircraft design upgrade options and 
technologies in Step 4, this study compiled the list of the design change options by 
benchmarking the Hornet 2000 study introduced in §C.3 and the F/A-18E/F program. 
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The cost data from these sources are used to validate the RDT&E cost model later.  The 
list of the design changes are: 
1. Wing photographic scaling 
2. Wing design change 
3. LEX design change 
4. Engine upgrade 
5. Wing structural stiffening 
6. Design landing weight 
7. Inlet/nacelle (aft-body) 
8. External fuel tank redesign 
9. Fuselage plug 
10. Avionics upgrade 
11. New armament 
12. Conformal fuel tank 
13. Internal fuel capacity 
The review of the F/A-18A/B and E/F test programs is provided in §C.4. The F/A-
18A/B flight test program used eleven test articles logging 305 aircraft months. The 
C/D program used two flight test vehicles and the E/F program used seven flight test 
and three ground test articles [71, 209]. Figure 109 in §C.4 provides the list of test 
activities and the schedule of the F/A-18A/B’s full-scale development flight test program 
for each of the eleven flight test articles. These flight test activities or tasks were used to 
construct a FTM. 
Table 36 is the FTM created for the notional fighter. The flight test activities of the 
F/A-18A/B program are listed in the left column, and all the design change options are 
listed in the header row. Then, each cell of the matrix maps the degree of effort needed 
to perform the flight test activity for a specific design change.  The amount of effort 
required is measure in flight year for the FTM. The goal here is to calculate the total 
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flight year, which is obtained by activating the columns associated with the design 
changes and summing up all flight years that are in the active columns. For example, if 
engine and avionics upgrades are made, the fourth and tenth columns become active. If 
the new engine grows more than the capacity of aircraft aft-body assembly that houses 
the engine, the aft-body needs to be redesigned and the seventh column is activated, too. 
Then, all the elements in the active three columns are added to get the total flight year.  
The relationship between the flight test activities and design changes would be 
ideally mapped by the team of experienced experts from related disciplines. An 
integrated product team (IPT) consisting of test pilots, test engineers, managers, and 
design engineers would be able to estimate the types of tests required in order to 
upgrade a specific aircraft subsystem, such as avionics, external fuel tanks, landing gears, 
etc. In this study, however, the author’s own judgment was used to fill the FTM using 
the following rationales.  
When aircraft wing and/or LEX change, all the flight tests evaluating aerodynamic 
characteristics of the vehicle are triggered. The degree or intensity of test required varies 
if the change is a new LEX design, wing scaling, or a completely new wing design. 
Design landing weight is related to landing gears and the fuselage frame that landing 
gears are mounted to. A change in landing weight will require more capable landing 
gear, and the airframe structure needs to be changed too; the landing gear door size and 
structural strength should be increased. Thus, it will require carrier suitability, 
structural tests, and MEI. A performance flight test is required when the vehicle 
aerodynamics and/or engine/inlet changes. Weight increase does not require a 
performance flight test. So, any external geometry change would require a performance 
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test. Drag increase due to a new type of external stores also requires some level of 
performance test. Raising fuselage dorsal does not affect aircraft structure, as its impact 
is mostly on lift independent drag. Thus, it would not require high AOA tests or carrier 
suitability tests.   
The calculated flight test year is then converted into aircraft months by multiplying 
by twelve. Then, total aircraft months are used as the basis to calculate total flight test 
hours, the number of flight test vehicles required, and the flight test duration. In 
practice, how much time and how many aircraft a flight test program would need is 
estimated based on experience with aircraft of the class.  
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Table 36: The Flight Test/Wind Tunnel Test Matrix (FTM/WTM) 
Flight Test Name 
1  
Wing  
Scaling 
 
2  
Wing 
redesign 
 
3  
LEX 
redesign 
  
4  
Engine 
upgrade 
 
5  
Wing 
structural 
stiffening 
6  
Design 
landing 
weight 
7  
Inlet/ 
nacelle  
 
8  
External 
fuel tank 
redesign 
9  
Fuselage 
plug 
 
10  
Avionics 
upgrade 
 
11  
New 
armament 
 
12 
Conformal 
fuel tank 
 
Flying qualities, flutter 0.6 0.8 0.2     0.2    0.7 
Propulsion, performance    0.5   0.5      
Carrier suitability, ECS 0.6 0.7 0.2   0.1       
Structural 0.7 0.7   0.5 0.15   0.15    
Avionics          1   
High AOA 0.6 0.8 0.2          
Armament, systems           1  
Armament, avionics          1   
Performance, systems 0.5 0.5 0.2    0.2 0.15 0.15   0.7 
Engine accel. service test    1         
MEI/EMC      0.2 0.3  0.1 0.4   
Wind tunnel test required yes yes yes no no no yes yes yes no yes yes 
Wind tunnel test level 0.3 1 0.5 0 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 
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The key flight test program attributes—flight test aircraft required, total flight test 
hours, and FT duration—of a notional fighter are calculated using the statistics of the 
E/F test program data as given in §C.4. Total aircraft month, ACM, calculated from 
FTM is converted to total flight hours (tf), assuming 18.9 available test hours per month, 
which was the case of the F/A-18E/F flight test program.  
 
,
f
ref
f ref
ACM
t
ACM
t
=
     
 (66) 
The number of aircraft required (Nfv) is calculated as: 
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 (67) 
where the ratio between total aircraft month to the number of total aircraft is average 
aircraft month flown by a flight test aircraft, which is 30.5 for the F/A-18E/F program.  
Finally, the DT duration in month (tDT) is calculated as: 
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=
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 (68) 
The total DT duration from the first flight to the end of DT was 40 months for the F/A-
18A/B program and 40 months for the F/A-18E/F program, excluding the operational 
evaluation (OPEVAL) periods.  
A required wind tunnel test hour is calculated using the WTM, constructed as a 
sub-matrix of the FTM in Table 36. In constructing WTM, the relative or absolute level 
of wind tunnel test required is measured for each category of design change by a team of 
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experts. In the case of the WTM of a notional fighter, the level of wind tunnel test 
required to upgrade the wing design was set to one, and the relative effort of upgrading 
LEX, fuselage, etc. was assessed accordingly. For example, photographic scaling of the 
wing was assumed to take only 30 percent of the wind tunnel test effort compared to the 
effort the entirely new wing design would require. Some aircraft upgrades, such as wing 
structural stiffening, do not affect external geometry and thus do not require any wind 
tunnel test. The total effort is converted into wind tunnel test hours using the fact that 
the F/A-18E/F wind tunnel test program logged 4,500 hours [210].  
7.7.7.3 Ground Test 
MALCCA calculates the cost of ground tests based on the types of test defined by the 
user. A list of conventional ground test activities is shown in the left column of the 
ground test matrix (GTM), and the header row is the types of design change activities. 
The test requirements are mapped by filling out the matrix. This task would be done by 
an IPT of experienced engineers, technicians, and managers, who are knowledgeable 
about aircraft modifications. However, for this study, a GTM for the notional multi-role 
fighter shown in Table 37 was created by the author. The types of ground tests listed in 
the first column are actual inputs to MALCCA. A set of planned design changes 
activates the corresponding columns. Then, for each of the rows, all the numbers in the 
active cells are added. The total value for a row is fed into MALCCA for cost calculation.   
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Table 37: Ground Test Matrix (GTM) for the Notional Multi-role Fighter 
Ground Test Name 
1  
Wing  
Scaling 
 
2 
Wing 
design 
change 
3 
LEX 
design 
change 
4 
Engine 
upgrade 
 
5 
Wing 
structural 
stiffening 
6 
Design 
landing 
weight 
7 
Inlet/n
acelle 
  
8 
External 
fuel tank 
redesign 
9  
Fuselage 
plug 
 
10 
Avionics 
upgrade 
 
11  
New 
armament 
 
12 
Conformal 
fuel tanks 
 
13  
Internal 
fuel 
capacity 
Static Test Articles  0.7 1 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fatigue Test Articles  0.7 1 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iron Bird Test Articles  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Propulsion Test Articles  0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LG Test Articles  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fuel Rig Articles  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
Armament Test Rigs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Hardware/Software 
Integration Rigs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Subsystem Test Rigs 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
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7.7.7.4 Design Commonality  
In order to calculate the RDT&E cost of developing a derivative aircraft using 
MALCCA, the degree of design commonality of the derivative aircraft to its predecessor 
must be defined. MALCCA calculates the engineering hours during RDT&E for the 
subsystems using its weight-based, historical database. To account for savings in 
engineering hours by adopting previous designs, MALCCA subtracts the portion of the 
engineering hours already spent in the past development from the current engineering 
hours required. If a specific subsystem design is equal to an existing design, the 
engineering time in the development can be waived by utilizing the previous effort.  
Therefore, it is necessary to predetermine how much the current subsystems—for 
example wing, engine, avionics, etc.—are common to the previous subsystems. The 
degree of commonality is defined by using design commonality factors (DCFs). A DCF is 
a non-dimensional parameter that is equal to or less than one. DCF determines the 
percentage of engineering hours spent in the past that can be used to save the 
engineering hours of the current program.  
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 1eng eng dc engdev new new= − ⋅t t f t  (69) 
where (teng2)dev is a 1-by-m vector of engineering hours required for a derivative aircraft in 
stage 2; (teng2)new is the engineering hours required if it were a new aircraft program; fdc is 
the m-by-1 vector of DCFs; and (teng1)new is the engineering hours required of the new 
aircraft in the first stage.  
A DCF of one means that the design is the same as its ancestor, and zero means it 
is a completely new design. DCF was allowed to go below zero in order to simulate 
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instances in which the historical database is not able to capture factors such as new 
technology development. A negative DCF means that additional engineering hours or 
cost are needed to develop such subsystems. A DCF value of one does not always imply 
that the number of required engineering hours for the subsystem is zero: it could be still 
greater than zero if the second-stage subsystem is heavier than the first-stage subsystem. 
The rules to define DCFs that were created for the twelve subsystems are listed in 
Table 38. The degree of design commonality is determined by the difference between 
design variable settings of the first and second design stages. For example, fuselage 
design commonality decreases when design changes are made on design landing weight 
(landing gears), reference engine thrust for aft-body sizing, fuselage length, design load 
factor, and the reference weight for design load factor. The relationship between design 
commonality factors and design change is mapped using following equation:    
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where fdc is an 11-by-1 vector of DCFs as defined in Table 38; J12×11 is a 11-by-12 unity 
matrix; 2 1∆ = −x x x is the difference between the first-stage and second-stage design 
parameters as defined in Table 16; T3 is a switch for the use of new LEX technology is 
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one if the new LEX is used and zero if not; and ∆wav is avionics weight increase from the 
first to the second stage.  
Table 38: List of Subsystems  
Number Subsystem 
1 Wing 
2 Empennage 
3 Fuselage 
4 Landing gear 
5 Nacelle 
6 Engine 
7 Engine accessories 
8 Fuel system 
9 Control surfaces 
10 Hydraulics 
11 Avionics 
12 Armament 
 
7.7.7.5 RDT&E Duration 
The F/A-18E/F program was managed following the older versions of DoDI 5000.2. The 
process shown in Figure 64 is different from the current DoD’s acquisition process 
presented in Figure 108. The older process clearly divided the RDT&E phase into three 
sub-phases of concept exploration, demonstration and validation (Dem/Val), and the 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), which is different from current 
classification. While the first two sub-phases, concept exploration and Dem/Val, can be 
stretched to years of effort, the goal of RDT&E duration modeling was limited to only 
the EMD period.  
Figure 65 from Fox [13] shows both EMD durations of various US military aircraft 
programs. The black portion of the bars represents the time from the beginning of EMD 
to the start of DT/OT. The grey areas are from the start of DT/OT to the end of EMD. 
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It was assumed that the first period in EMD is roughly devoted to R&D and the second 
period to T&E. In the case of the F/A-18E/F, total EMD duration was 7 years, or 84 
months, from June 1992 to April 1999, excluding the OPEVAL from May 1999 to 
November 1999. The duration of DT/OT was 41 months and R&D was 43 months. 
Although the F/A-18E/F was a derivative aircraft, developing it took slightly more time 
than developing its ancestor, the F/A-18A/B.  
 
Figure 64: Old Version of DoD Acquisition Process [4] 
 
 
     * Program in progress as of the time of publication 
Figure 65: EMD Duration of US Military Aircraft [13] 
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MALCCA calculates engineering hours required based on the vehicle characteristics.  
The engineering hours calculated from MALCCA are converted to the R&D duration in 
months by assuming availability of the work forces. The availability of 6,000 workers on 
average and 1,920 average working hours per worker for a year were assumed. Then, the 
T&E duration calculated using Eq. (68) is added. Finally, a fixed OPEVAL duration of 
7 months was assumed and added.  
7.7.7.6 Synthesis and Validation of the Cost Model 
A computer code was prepared to calculate the key cost inputs to MALCCA. Then, the 
computer program was integrated into FLOPS/MALCCA. Since the second-stage 
RDT&E cost is dependent on the first-stage vehicle characteristics, first-stage aircraft 
performance analysis is a prerequisite of the second-stage analysis.  
Production cost was calculated using FLOPS/MALCCA. Production cost is largely 
dependent on the production quantity, learning curves, labor rate, etc., besides aircraft 
characteristics. A total of 1,479 F/A-18A/B/C/Ds were produced from 1980 to 1997, 
including 852 A/Bs  produced from 1979 to 1991 in 7 lots and 627 C/Ds produced from 
1986 to 1997 in 6 lots [88]. Since the F/A-18C/D is the basis of the first-stage notional 
fighter, the production quantity was set at 627 aircraft for the first-stage program. The 
total planned production quantity of the E/F version has been changed a couple of times 
from its initial plan of 1,000 aircraft to 493 as of December 2007, according to the SARs 
as summarized in Table 66. However, since the published production cost data that are 
used here for validation purposes are based on the assumption of 1,000 units, this study 
also assumed the production of 1,000 aircraft. In addition, since MALCCA can only 
handle up to 4 lots. It was assumed that all the units are produced in a single lot. Then, 
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annul production rate of 36 aircraft per year was assumed for all configurations. For the 
labor rates and learning curves, the default settings for MALCCA were used because no 
other information was available.  
Material composition of the airframe is also an important input determining 
production cost. Actual F/A-18A/B, C/D, and E/F are collected from Murden [73] and 
Younossi [211] as given in Table 39. The A/B versions used 55.4 percent of aluminum, 
8.4 percent of titanium, 10.3 percent of composites, and 14.1 percent of steel. The 
composition of aluminum decreased in the C/D and E/F versions. The C/D version used 
more titanium, and E/F used apparently more titanium and composites. For the F/A-
18A, C, and E cost calculated, the actual material composition as in Table 39 was 
modeled in FLOPS/MALCCA. For the cost calculations of the Hornet 2000 
configurations, the C/D’s material distribution was assumed.  
Table 39: F/A-18 Hornet Material Composition in Percentage of Structural Weight 
Materials/Version A/B C/D E/F 
Aluminum 55.4 49 31 
Titanium 8.4 13 21 
Composites 10.3 10 19 
Steel 14.1 15 14 
Other 11.8 13 15 
 
The fiscal year (FY) 1996 was selected as the base dollar year during all cost 
modeling processes. The inflation rate was determined using the US Navy inflation index 
[212]. The US Navy inflation index is available as a calculator that converts the dollar 
value between two different years for a selected cost category such as RDT&E, aircraft 
acquisition, operation and support, etc. FLOPS/MALCCA is based on 1988 economics 
and requires a fixed interest rate input. The average inflation rate of 3.32 percent 
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between 1988 and 1996 based on the Navy index on aircraft acquisition category was 
used. Actual F/A-18 cost data were also converted to 1996 dollar value using the 
appropriate rate category, i.e. RDT&E, production, etc.  
Validation of the cost model was conducted by modeling six different F/A-18 
variants including four configurations from the Hornet 2000 study, the F/A-18C, and the 
F/A-18E. §C.3 introduced the Hornet 2000 study in detail. Among seven configurations 
proposed in the Hornet 2000 study, Configuration I, II, IIIB, and IIIC were selected for 
the study. These four configurations are progressive upgrades to the F/A-18C. 
Configuration I is the F/A-18C with new armaments. Configuration II is Configuration I 
plus wing stiffening, F414 engines, upgraded avionics, and conformal fuel tanks by 
raising the dorsal. Configuration IIIB is Configuration II with a 500 ft2 wing. 
Configuration IIIC uses a fuselage plug to increase internal fuel capacity instead of a 
conformal fuel tank. This configuration became the basis for the F/A-18E. In modeling 
these four configurations, the values for the design variables were set based on actual 
F/A-18C or E values unless they were specified in the Hornet 2000 study. The major 
inputs and assumptions including vehicle definitions, technologies used, and test 
requirements are listed in Table 40.  
 234
Table 40: Inputs/Assumptions for the RDT&E and Production Cost 
 Configuration F/A-18E IIIC IIIB II I F-18C 
Design Wing area 500 500 500 400 400 400 
Variables Wing aspect ratio 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  Wing taper ratio 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
  Wing t/c 0.042 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 
  Wing sweep angle 20 20 20 20 20 20 
  Thrust 22000 22000 22000 22000 17754 17754 
  Ref. weight for DLF 42097 42097 42097 38000 32000 32000 
  Operational landing weight 46200 46200 46200 44100 34650 34650 
  Ref. thrust for aft-body 25300 25300 25300 25300 17920 17920 
  Internal fuel capacity 14700 13510 14510 13510 10810 10810 
  External fuel capacity 9740 6720 6720 6720 6720 6720 
  Fuselage length  55.833 55.292 53 53 53 53 
  Avionics weight 1411 1411 1411 1411 1289 1289 
  External stores weight 6361 6361 6361 6361 6361 6637 
Technologies LEX upgrade (CLmax factor) 1.0296 1 1 1 1 1 
 Conformal fuel tank 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 RCS reduction 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 New engine core 1 1 1 1 0 0 
RDT&E Number of flight test vehicles 7.99 6.74 7.58 5.79 2.79 2.42 
Inputs Wind tunnel test hours 4500 2250 2250 1688 563 0 
  Flight test hours 5797 4901 5511 4215 2029 1763 
  DT/OT duration (months) 40.8 34.5 38.8 29.7 14.3 12.4 
  Engine newness 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.055 0.055 
 Software newness 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.53 0.53 
 Percent Aluminum 31 55.4 55.4 55.4 55.4 49 
 Percent Titanium 14 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 13 
 Percent Composite 19 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10 
 Static test articles  1.2 0.7 0.7 0.2 0 0 
 Fatigue test articles  1.2 0.7 0.7 0.1 0 0 
 Iron bird test articles  1 1 1 0 0 0 
 Propulsion test articles  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 
 LG test articles  1 1 1 1 0 0 
 Fuel rig articles  1 0.5 1 1 0 0 
 Armament test rigs 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
 Hardware/Software Int. Rigs 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Subsystem Test Rigs 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.2 
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The RDT&E and unit production costs of the six models—F/A-18C, F/A-18E, and 
four Hornet 2000 configurations—were created using the code developed in the sections 
from §7.7.7.1 to §7.7.7.5 and FLOPS/MALCCA. Calculated costs of the six F/A-18 
variants are compared to the published numbers. The process of collecting and selecting 
a set of F/A-18 cost data is presented in §C.2. The comparisons between the published 
and calculated costs are shown in radargrams in Figure 66. The blue lines represent 
published data, and the calculated values are shown in red lines. The radargram on the 
left represents the production cost, and each of the six vertices are labeled with the 
corresponding vehicle. Production cost calculated for the six variants fell within 3.6% of 
error. The radargram for RDT&E cost on the right compared only five variants, since 
RDT&E cost of the F/A-18C was not available. The error of RDT&E cost calculation 
also fell under 1.6%. Actual data in 1996 million dollars are provided in Table 41. 
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Figure 66: Radargrams of Production Cost (Left) and RDT&E Cost (Right) 
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Table 41: The RDT&E and Unit Production Cost Comparison 
  F/A-18E IIIC IIIB II I F-18C 
Published 
Data 
Unit Production 48.7 1.39 1.4 1.3 1.14 27.2 
(See §C.3 and 
§C.4) 
RDT&E  5783 2.78 2.89 2.22 1 unknown 
Calculation Unit Production ($M) 49.8 33.8 34.3 31.8 27.5 28.2 
 ND Unit Production 2.06 1.398 1.418 1.268 1.140  
 RDT&E ($M) 5972.7 3932.6 4097.9 3252.7 1425.4 1224.2 
 ND RDT&E 4.19 2.76 2.87 2.28 1  
 
7.7.8 Creation of the Two-Stage Aircraft Design Environment 
The models developed in Step 6 were written as a computer code and linked to the 
performance and cost models created using FLOPS/MALCCA. It was also necessary to 
link the first-stage and second-stage designs, since the RDT&E cost calculation at the 
second stage requires first-stage vehicle characteristics, such as design parameters and 
subsystem weights. This step was a prerequisite of two-stage aircraft performance and 
cost analysis and design, and actually had been done before the performance model 
validation presented in §7.7.6 and the cost model validation presented in §7.7.7.6.  
The integration process was facilitated by using commercial software Model Center® 
of Phoenix Integration™. Figure 67 is the screen shot of the integrated two-stage aircraft 
design (TAD) environment within the Model Center® framework. The left hand of the 
figure shows input and output variables and their values. The main window of the 
programs shows DSM-like view of the boxes and lines. The boxes are contributing 
analyses that are either computer codes written by the author or the FLOPS/MALCCA 
suite. The links between the boxes indicates interdependencies between the contributing 
analyses. Each stage consists of an optimizer, a pre-processing module, an attack aircraft 
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performance module, a fighter performance module, a cost module, and a post-processing 
module. The pre-processing module contains the scaling-laws and prepares the inputs to 
the following modules. FLOPS is run twice for performance calculations with attack 
mission and fighter mission. Then, MALCCA is run for the cost calculation. The post-
processing modules collect the outputs from FLOPS/MALCCA and calculates some of 
the KPPs.  
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Figure 67: The Integrated Two-stage Aircraft Design (TAD) Environment 
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7.8 A Deterministic Scenario-Based Approach to Two-Stage 
Aircraft Design Optimization: Step 7 
Once the environment for two-stage aircraft design (TSAD) is setup, the environment 
can be used in three different ways in the Steps 7-9. In Step 7, two-stage aircraft design 
optimization is performed in the context of scenario-based study. Fundamentally, it is 
assumed that the random vector ω  can take only a finite number of outcomes, i.e. 
Θ ⊂ Ω  is a finite set, and , 1, ,
s
s k∈ Θ =ω … . Optimization is repeated for each of the 
scenarios 
s
ω . Here, all the non-stochastic strategies—ND, AH, and DetPPs—defined in 
Step 4 are evaluated. 
7.8.1 Optimization Problem Set-up 
Optimization problem settings, such as design variables and constraints, are defined first. 
Some of the design variables that were considered in Step 3 were treated as design 
parameters in order to limit the dimension of the design space to a manageable size. In 
order to keep the problem as realistic as possible those parameters that were hard coded 
were set to reflect the actual F/A-18 case. The first-stage design vector x1 and second-
stage design vector are defined as follows, and the meaning of each symbol is listed in 
Table 42. 
The objective function was acquisition cost for each stage. Acquisition cost is 
sensitive to production quantity. While production quantity could have been one of the 
biggest uncertainty sources, it was fixed at 492 for the first stage and 627 for the second 
stage, which are actual production quantities of the F/A-18C/D and E/F as of 
December 2007 according to SARs. Otherwise, inclusion of production quantity as a 
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random variable made it difficult to compare a design over a design optimized for 
different production quantity assumptions. In addition, since the optimum solution is 
sensitive to production quantity, it made the design space complicated and the creation 
of a surrogate model of optimum solutions very difficult. While the production quantities 
were fixed in the study, to investigate the extreme case of zero production quantities, 
EvoLVE Steps 7 and 8 were repeated with RDT&E cost as objective function in 
APPENDIX D.  
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Table 42: Design Variable Vectors (x1 and x2) 
Symbol Name Unit 
x11 and x21 Wing area ft
2 
x12 and x22 Engine thrust lb 
x13 and x23 Ref. weight for DLF lb 
x14 and x24 Operational landing weight lb 
x15 and x25 Internal fuel weight lb 
x16 and x26 External fuel weight lb 
x17 and x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body sizing lb 
x18 and x28 Fuselage length  ft
3 
 
Some other assumptions were made. For the second-stage problem, in order to make 
the deigns closest to F/A-18E, fixed amount of growth potentials on the aft fuselage and 
forward-mid fuselage were embedded in the designs. Therefore, design thrust nacelle x27 
sizes the aft fuselage based on the engine size and 15% of engine growth potential. 
Fuselage length is determined by x28 after balancing the vehicle’s internal volume 
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required and available and then by adding 12.2 ft3 of additional volume for growth 
potential.  
Combinations of technology options were not investigated through optimization 
study, since they introduce discrete variables to the optimization loop, which require 
more time-consuming optimization algorithms to solve. Rather, among the technologies 
identified in Step 4, low RCS, new LEX design, and new engine core were used on all 
second-stage designs. The assumptions are summarized in Table 43. 
Table 43: Second-Stage Design Assumptions 
Technologies or Requirements Value 
Aft fuselage growth potential 15% 
Internal volume growth potential 12.2 ft3 
Low RCS yes 
Conformal fuel tank no 
New LEX design for higher CLmax yes 
New engine core 
Production quantity 
yes 
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The key performance parameters identified in Step 1 as in Table 12 constitute the 
constraint vectors g1 and g2 during optimization except for the combat ceiling. The 
thresholds for the constraints were redefined in this step. Thresholds for the 
constraints—fighter escort radius, interdiction mission radius, and recovery payload—are 
from the requirements for the first stage and are random variables 
1 2 3
, , and ω ω ω in the 
second stage. All other constraint thresholds were setup as the calculated performance of 
the F/A-18E model as presented in Table 44. 
 241
Table 44: Constraint Vectors (g1 and g2) 
Symbol Constraint Name Stage 1/2 Type Unit 
g11 Fighter escort radius 350/ 1ω  
lower nm 
g12 Interdiction mission radius 410/ 2ω  
lower nm 
g13 Recovery payload 4,500/ 3ω  
lower lb 
g14 Launch wind over deck 28.657 upper knots 
15 Recovery wind over deck 9.5567 upper knots 
g16 Approach speed 141.48 upper knots 
g17 Specific excess power at 0.9M/10,00- ft 682.9 lower ft/sec 
g18 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M at 35,000 ft 63.6 upper min 
g19 Turn rate at 15,000 12.044 lower deg/sec 
g110 Usable load factor 7.6089 lower g 
 
7.8.2 MDO Techniques and Optimization Algorithms 
As the DSM shows Figure 25, solving the two-stage problem involves optimization loops 
at two levels; it seems naturally suitable for the multidisciplinary design optimization 
(MDO) techniques. Among them, the All-At-Once (AAO) method was utilized in this 
study to test the efficacy of MDO techniques as proposed in Hypothesis 6. The entire 
optimization structure was transformed using AAO. In the two-stage aircraft design 
formulation as in Eqs. (28) and (29), optimization is solved in two hierarchical levels. 
The use of AAO transforms the two-level optimization problem into a single-level 
problem. 
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 (71) 
The performance of AAO was compared to the original formulations in Eqs. (28) 
and (29), and the computational time to converge was reduced by the order of 
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magnitude from hours to about tens of minutes. Although the benefit of MDO versus 
traditional solution techniques to two-stage aircraft design was not thoroughly 
investigated, the limited comparisons demonstrated the compatibility and efficacy of 
AAO to two-stage aircraft design, and thus proved Hypothesis 6. 
Optimization in Step 7 was performed without using surrogate models, but the 
models created in Steps 5 and 6 were directly utilized. To confirm the global convergence, 
optimizations were attempted from multiple initial points, and the solution with lowest 
objective function value was chosen.  
As for the optimization algorithm, Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) and 
Method of Feasible Direction (MoFD) were used along with the central finite different 
method for gradient calculation. The relative constraint violation criteria was one 
thousandth of the constraint value so that designs with any constraint values 0.1 % 
larger than the threshold would be considered as infeasible designs. In general, SQP 
converged much faster than MoFD and was used as the primary algorithm. MoFD was 
used as an auxiliary algorithm when SQP failed to find optimum solutions. SQP makes 
second order approximation of the objective function and first order approximations of 
the constraints, and sometimes it fails to capture the valley around the optimum point. 
MoFD more directly deals with constraints, and makes first order approximation of the 
objective function. Since it is cheaper to create first order approximations than second 
order approximations, MoFD tends to update the model more often. SQP builds the 
Hessian matrix gradually as it gains more knowledge about the objective function. 
Therefore, if the starting point is close to the optimum point, SQP makes a large first 
step and goes out of the valley, because of the incompletely constructed Hessian matrix.  
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7.8.3 Under Presence of Uncertainty: The Here-and-Now Solutions 
The results of TSAD optimizations are the optimal first-stage decision vector for each 
strategy *1( )
px , where 1, ,5p = …  is the strategy number, and a set of second-stage 
decision vectors *2( ) ,  1, ,5 and 1, ,5
p
s
s p= =x … … . The first-stage optimization results are 
summarized in Table 45. The table includes the first-stage optimal design *1( )
px , 
constraints *1( )
pg , and the objective function *
1
( ) , 1, , 5pf p = … . Also, aircraft empty 
weights and gross weights in both fighter and attack configurations were included. 
Among the five strategies, the first two—Ad-hoc and New design—are non-preplanning 
strategies, and those two columns were shaded to differentiate them from the other three 
preplanning strategies. 
Several interesting observations are made from the first-stage optimum results. First 
of all, the two non-preplanning strategies (Ad-hoc and New-design) yielded the same 
design such that * 1 * 21 1( ) ( )=x x  since both of them minimize only f1 in the first-stage 
optimization, which is the acquisition cost. This design is the optimal solution meeting 
all currently imposed constraints if the goal is to minimize the first-stage acquisition cost. 
Therefore these designs are Perfect-fit Designs (PfDs).  When compared to New-design 
and Ad-hoc, all DetPP strategies show larger design variable settings in general. Among 
DetPPs the Block10p yielded the largest, heaviest, and most expensive aircraft, followed 
by Block10. All first-stage designs under DetPPs are Perfect over-Design (PoDs) as 
discussed in the subsequent sections along with second-stage optimization results.  
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Table 45: Optimization Results for the Five Deterministic Strategies 
 Strategies New 
Design 
Ad-Hoc DetPP 
(Block10) 
DetPP 
(Avg.) 
DetPP 
(Block10p) 
Unit 
x11 Wing area 396.6 396.6 449.4 464.0 498.5 ft
2 
x12 Thrust 18355 18355 20441 20855 21947 lb 
x13 Ref. weight for DLF 34131 34131 38251 39170 41816 lb 
x14 Landing weight 33248 33248 39539 40830 43839 lb 
x15 Internal fuel 10827 10827 12777 13190 14692 lb 
x16 External fuel 6724 6724 6691 7920 9608 lb 
x17 Ref. thrust for aft-body 18355 18355 23508 23982 25238 lb 
x18 Fuselage length 53.08 53.08 54.68 54.79 55.60 ft 
g11 Fighter escort radius 350.1 350.1 409.6 423.5 478.8 nm 
g12 Interdiction mission radius 410.9 410.9 431.4 461.4 505.8 nm 
g13 Recovery payload 4508 4508 7910 8547 9846 lb 
g14 Launch wind over deck 22.06 22.06 22.29 24.47 28.14 knots 
g15 Recovery wind over deck  -0.01 -0.01 3.55 4.80 9.27 knots 
g16 Approach speed  138.1 138.1 141.5 141.5 141.4 knots 
g17 Specific excess power 708.7 708.7 699.2 696.2 685.9 ft/sec 
g18 Accel. from 0.8 to 1.2M 63.66 63.66 63.60 63.54 63.42 sec 
g19 Turn rate 12.042 12.042 12.066 12.112 12.093 deg/sec 
g110 Usable load factor 7.609 7.609 7.609 7.610 7.609 g 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 25738 25738 28628 29282 30992 lb 
Attack TOGW 50520 50520 55325 57699 62697 lb 
Fighter TOGW 37975 37975 42815 43882 47095 lb 
RDTE 4639 4639 4904 4963 5116 $m 
RDTE year 8.58 8.58 8.82 8.87 9.01 year 
Production 20172 20172 21595 21897 22701 $m 
f1 24811 24811 26499 26859 27817 $m 
 
It is interesting to see how each strategy places growth potential to the first-stage 
designs. Growth potential is essentially the difference between what is required and what 
is available. Growth potential can be measured from two different perspectives: degree of 
over-design and margins on the constraints. Figure 68 compares the growth potential in 
terms of degree of over-design beyond the Perfect-fit Design (PfD). Among the DetPP 
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strategies, the DetPP(Block10) strategy placed the most growth potential. Wing area 
was 498.5 ft2, more than 100 ft2 larger than PfD value of 396.6 ft2, and the empty weight 
was about 30,992 lb., about 5,000 lb heavier than the PfD. It has the largest values on 
all design parameters, followed by DetPP(Block10) and DetPP(Average) such that 
 * 5 * 4 * 3 * 1 * 21 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )> > > =x x x x x  (72) 
The inequality holds for the weight and cost metrics, too. An exception was external fuel 
capacity x16, which is discussed in detail in the next section. The cause of this pattern is 
discussed again in the next section when the second-stage results are presented. 
An important observation from the above results is not the fact that 
DetPP(Block10p) over-designed the most among other strategies, but the fact that all 
design variables followed the pattern as in Eq. (72) with only one exception. This 
observation has a significant meaning because it can be induced that if a designer wants 
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Figure 68: Growth Potential Measured by Margins on the Design Variables 
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to embed growth potential on a subsystem such as wing or engine, he or she has to 
oversize all other subsystems. The nature of aerospace systems is that the performance 
and cost are very sensitive to weight. Therefore, it is impossible to improve one 
dimension of the design without affecting other dimensions, because the impact of weight 
increase propagates throughout the system. If the baseline design was optimal and thus 
was close to or on the constraints, the design becomes quickly infeasible if one variable 
deviates from the baseline value. Thus, if overdesigning of a subsystem such as engines 
or wings is desired, all the variables must move together to make the design feasible.  
 
Observation 7: For aerospace systems of which subsystems are tightly coupled, one 
variable cannot deviate from a feasible and optimal solution without hurting the 
feasibility and optimality. Therefore, overdesigning effort must be coordinated in 
such a way that all design variables move together towards a new feasible and 
optimal solution. 
 
The vehicles’ growth potential is discussed by comparing how far the performance of 
first-stage aircraft is from the threshold performance. Since * 11( )x and 
* 2
1
( )x
 
inherently do 
not account for future events, they have little or no growth potential, so that 
* 1 * 2
1 1
( ) ( )= ≈g g 0 . Growth margin on aircraft performance is compared among the DetPP 
strategies in Figure 69. The bar graphs shown in Figure 69 exhibit different patterns 
from the patterns observed in Figure 68. The first observation is that growth potential 
was not equally allocated to the performance parameters for a given evolution strategy. 
All three DetPPs placed large margins on the carrier suitability performance metrics (g13-
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g15), moderated degree of margins on the mission performance parameters (g11 and g12), 
and virtually no growth potential on the fighter point performance measures (g17-g110).  
A more interesting observation is the inconsistency in the degree of growth potential 
among the DetPPs. The color patterns of the bar graphs show that DetPP(Block10p) in 
red placed the largest growth potential in the first three performance measures (g11-g13) 
followed by the DetPP(Average) and DetPP(Block10). This order is completely reversed 
for the fourth and fifth constraints so that the DetPP(Block10) in blue shows the largest 
growth potential on these constraints. Especially, the bar graph patterns of the recovery 
payload (g13) and RWOD (g16) requirements are distinctively contrasted, revealing a 
strong negative correlation between the two. The large growth margin on the recovery 
payload degraded the RWOD performance. These observations are formalized as follows: 
 
5 4 3 1 2
13 13 13 13 13
3 4 5 1 2
14 14 14 14 14
3 4 5 1 2
15 15 15 15 15
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  for recovery payload
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  for LWOD
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  for RWOD
g g g g g
g g g g g
g g g g g
> > > =
> > > =
> > > =
 (73) 
 
Observation 8: The scenario-based study revealed the correlations between the growth 
potential in terms of margins on performance parameters. The negative 
correlations showed that growth potential in one performance parameter could 
inadvertently hurt the performance in other dimensions. System level integration 
of growth margins would prevent the performance degradation results in design 
infeasibilities.
 248
Constraints
G
ro
w
th
 
Po
te
nt
ia
l (%
)
 
 
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
DetPP(Block10)
DetPP(Average)
DetPP(Block10p)
 
Figure 69: Growth Potential Measured by Margins on the Constraints 
7.8.4 After Realization of Randomness: The Wait-and-See Solutions 
Finally, the optimal second-stage strategies after the realization of the randomness are 
studied. The five deterministic strategies respond in the second stage after the 
randomness is revealed in such a way that it minimizes the second-stage cost function f2 
by solving: 
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 (74) 
Since only five scenarios were assumed to exist and apply to the five deterministic 
strategies, a total of twenty-five optimization problems were solved, yielding twenty-five 
WS solutions *
2
ˆ( ) , 1, , 5, 1, , 5p
s
s p= =x … … . The optimization results are provided from 
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Table 46 to Table 50 in the following pages. Each of the tables includes the first-stage 
optimal solutions in the shaded column for easy comparison purposes. The results are 
analyzed from cost and design point-of-views in the subsequent sections. 
Table 46: TAD Optimization Results for the New-Design Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 396.6 426.5 453.0 465.0 500.0 530.1 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 18355 19691 20551 20920 22064 22933 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 34131 36345 38533 39416 42138 43876.8 lb 
x24 Landing weight 33248 37522 39865 40921 43990 45367.7 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 10827 11485 12846 13193 14731 15453.6 lb 
x26 External fuel 6723 7096 6669 7997 9692 10288 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 18355 22645 23634 24058 25374 26373 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 53.08 53.81 54.80 55.00 55.87 56.09 ft2 
g21 Fighter escort radius 349.7 350.2 410.1 420.0 475.9 493.9 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 410.3 410.0 430.1 460.2 504.2 510.0 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 6489 6999 8000 8400 9698 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 22.70 22.36 22.22 24.91 28.65 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  3.55 3.54 3.56 4.94 9.52 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  141.5 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.5 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 709.4 709.1 697.7 694.3 684.7 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.48 63.60 63.60 63.54 63.24 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.049 12.122 12.063 12.069 12.047 12.176 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.609 7.609 7.609 7.610 7.608 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 25738 27522 28864 29520 31290 32567 lb 
Attack TOGW 50520 53358 55607 58021 63122 65749 lb 
Fighter TOGW 37975 40417 43120 44123 47432 49430 lb 
RDTE 4639 6490 6635 6704 6887 7023 $m 
RDTE year 8.58 9.35 9.49 9.55 9.72 9.85 year 
Production 20172 27594 29238 29973 32126 33860 $m 
f1/f2 24811 34084 35874 36677 39012 40883 $m 
Total cost - 58894 60684 61488 63823 65693 $m 
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Table 47: TAD Optimization Results for the Ad-Hoc Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 396.6 426.5 453.4 465.0 499.8 530.1 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 18355 19699 20569 20920 21998 22933 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 34131 36348 38594 39416 42082 43877 lb 
x24 Landing weight 33248 37527 39899 40921 43955 45368 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 10827 11488 12851 13193 14708 15454 lb 
x26 External fuel 6724 7097 6694 7997 9610 10288 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 18355 22654 23655 24058 25298 26373 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 53.08 53.81 54.80 55.00 55.85 56.09 ft2 
g21 Fighter escort radius 350.1 350.2 410.0 420.0 475.7 493.9 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 410.9 410.1 430.5 460.2 503.2 510.0 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 4508 7001 8009 8400 9703 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 22.06 22.37 22.26 24.91 28.43 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  -0.01 3.55 3.55 4.94 9.44 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  138.1 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.4 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 708.7 709.4 697.8 694.3 683.1 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.66 63.60 63.60 63.54 63.60 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.042 12.123 12.065 12.069 12.044 12.176 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.609 7.609 7.615 7.610 7.608 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 25738 27525 28890 29520 31251 32567 lb 
Attack TOGW 50520 53365 55664 58021 62973 65749 lb 
Fighter TOGW 37975 40423 43151 44123 47368 49430 lb 
RDTE 4639 2830 3724 4018 4609 5101 $m 
RDTE year 8.58 4.87 6.36 6.75 7.32 7.79 year 
Production 20172 27099 28768 29499 31738 33597 $m 
f1/ f2 24811 29929 32492 33517 36347 38697 $m 
Total cost - 54744 57306 58332 61161 63512 $m 
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Table 48: TAD Optimization Results for the DetPP(Block10) Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 449.4 426.4 453.5 465.0 499.8 530.1 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 20441 19694 20569 20923 21998 22933 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 38251 36341 38594 39423 42082 43877 lb 
x24 Landing weight 39539 37522 39899 40920 43955 45368 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 12777 11487 12851 13199 14708 15454 lb 
x26 External fuel 6691 7094 6694 7987 9610 10288 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 23508 22648 23655 24061 25298 26373 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 54.68 53.82 54.80 55.01 55.85 56.09 ft2 
g21 Fighter escort radius 409.6 350.3 410.0 420.3 475.7 493.9 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 431.4 410.0 430.5 460.2 503.2 510.0 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 7910 6999 8009 8397 9703 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 22.29 22.37 22.26 24.91 28.43 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  3.55 3.55 3.55 4.93 9.44 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  141.5 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.4 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 699.2 709.2 697.8 694.2 683.1 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.60 63.60 63.60 63.54 63.60 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.066 12.122 12.065 12.067 12.044 12.176 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.609 7.608 7.615 7.610 7.608 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 28628 27521 28890 29522 31251 32567 lb 
Attack TOGW 55325 53358 55664 58019 62973 65750 lb 
Fighter TOGW 42815 40419 43151 44131 47368 49431 lb 
RDTE 4904 2273 1341 2961 3583 4041 $m 
RDTE year 8.82 4.37 2.26 5.67 6.35 6.77 year 
Production 21595 26934 28820 29151 31354 33201 $m 
f1/ f2 26499 29206 30161 32112 34936 37242 $m 
Total cost - 55705 56660 58611 61435 63740 $m 
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Table 49: TAD Optimization Results for the DetPP(Average) Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 464.0 426.6 461.1 465.0 499.8 530.1 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 20855 19703 20814 20920 21998 22933 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 39170 36365 39189 39416 42082 43877 lb 
x24 Landing weight 40830 37532 40572 40921 43955 45368 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 13190 11491 13168 13193 14708 15454 lb 
x26 External fuel 7920 7093 7901 7997 9610 10288 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 23982 22659 23936 24058 25298 26373 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 54.79 53.82 54.97 55.00 55.85 56.09 ft2 
g21 Fighter escort radius 423.5 350.3 421.6 420.0 475.7 493.9 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 461.4 410.0 460.7 460.2 503.2 510.0 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 8547 7000 8264 8400 9703 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 24.47 22.36 24.92 24.91 28.43 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  4.80 3.55 4.41 4.94 9.44 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  141.5 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.4 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 696.2 709.4 695.0 694.3 683.1 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.54 63.54 63.60 63.54 63.60 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.112 12.123 12.053 12.069 12.044 12.176 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.610 7.611 7.611 7.610 7.608 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 29282 27531 29306 29520 31251 32567 lb 
Attack TOGW 57699 53370 57681 58021 62973 65750 lb 
Fighter TOGW 43882 40432 43885 44123 47368 49431 lb 
RDTE 4963 2300 1306 1355 3401 3854 $m 
RDTE year 8.87 4.40 2.23 2.27 6.18 6.59 year 
Production 21897 26964 29256 29511 31285 33131 $m 
f1/ f2 26859 29265 30562 30866 34686 36986 $m 
Total cost - 56124 57421 57725 61546 63845 $m 
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Table 50: TAD Optimization Results for the DetPP(Block10p) Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 498.5 426.5 453.1 465.0 499.8 530.1 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 21947 19699 20557 20920 21998 22933 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 41816 36348 38535 39416 42082 43877 lb 
x24 Landing weight 43839 37526 39867 40921 43955 45368 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 14692 11488 12847 13193 14708 15454 lb 
x26 External fuel 9608 7092 6665 7997 9610 10288 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 25238 22654 23641 24058 25298 26373 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 55.60 53.82 54.80 55.00 55.85 56.09 ft 
g21 Fighter escort radius 478.8 350.2 410.1 420.0 475.7 493.9 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 505.8 409.9 430.0 460.2 503.2 510.0 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 9846 7000 8000 8400 9703 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 28.14 22.36 22.21 24.91 28.43 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  9.27 3.55 3.55 4.94 9.44 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  141.4 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.4 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 685.9 709.4 697.9 694.3 683.1 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.42 63.54 63.60 63.54 63.60 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.093 12.123 12.064 12.069 12.044 12.176 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.609 7.609 7.609 7.610 7.608 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 30992 27525 28866 29520 31251 32567 lb 
Attack TOGW 62697 53360 55606 58021 62973 65750 lb 
Fighter TOGW 47095 40423 43124 44123 47368 49431 lb 
RDTE 5116 2381 2863 2899 1389 3303 $m 
RDTE year 9.01 4.49 5.71 5.74 2.30 5.98 year 
Production 22701 27009 28426 29113 31593 32970 $m 
f1/ f2 27817 29390 31289 32012 32983 36273 $m 
Total cost - 57206 59105 59829 60799 64090 $m 
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7.8.4.1 Discussions from the Cost Point of View 
Figure 70 shows the total program cost, i.e. the sum of first-stage acquisition cost 
($Acq1) and second-stage acquisition cost ($Acq2), in 1996 billion dollars. Five different 
colors represent the five scenarios. The general trend is that the New-design strategy 
costs the most regardless of scenarios but the difference is not very large. The difference 
is mainly due to the savings in RDT&E cost in the second stage when modifications to 
existing design are pursued rather than a completely new design. Within each strategy, 
cost increases as the scenario number increases—and thus the second-stage requirement 
gets more challenging—regardless of the strategies. However, it is not clear to see which 
strategy cost the least in general or for a specific scenario in this figure.  
To facilitate further observations, the same bar graph was plotted with respect to 
the scenarios instead of the strategies as shown in Figure 71. Now, the total costs are 
grouped with respect to the scenarios, and five colors represent the five strategies. 
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Figure 70: Total Program Cost Comparison w.r.t. the Strategies 
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Obviously again, the New-design strategy incurred the largest cost regardless of the 
scenarios. For the scenarios 2, 3, and 4, the best strategies were DetPP(Block10), 
DetPP(Average), and DetPP(Block10p) respectively. This result implies that a 
deterministic preplanning strategy works the best when the predicted scenario 
u
ω  
matches the realized scenario ˆ
s
ω . On the other hand, when the predicted scenario was 
different from the actual scenario, Ad-hoc strategy was the best. For scenarios 1 and 5, 
Ad-hoc strategy incurred the least cost among five strategies because no DetPP 
predicted those scenarios, and for scenarios 2, 3, and 4, it was the second best choice. 
These patterns are expresses with the following inequalities: 
 
* * * * * *
1 2 1 2 1 2
* * * * * *
1 2 1 2 1 2
ˆ , ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ , ( ) ( ) ( )
DetPP Ad hoc ND
u s s s s
Ad hoc DetPP ND
u s s s s
if f f f f f f
if f f f f f f
−
−
= + < + < +
≠ + < + < +
ω ω
ω ω
 (75) 
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Figure 71: Total Program Cost Comparison w.r.t. the Scenarios 
In reality, it is almost impossible to predict the future requirement with certainty 
unless it is determined from the beginning. Thus, this study suggests that under the 
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presence of uncertain future requirements, it is the best strategy to pursue the Ad-hoc 
strategy, and thus the first-stage design is a PfD. However, if the second-stage 
requirement is known, it is best to incorporate that from the beginning. The conclusion 
about how much growth potential would be necessary is discussed later. This pattern is 
true and might be only true when the objective function is acquisition cost and all 
second-stage aircraft are new manufactures. Therefore, hasty generalizations should be 
avoided. The conclusion is formally stated as follows: 
 
Observation 9: When acquisition cost is the objective function, incorporating growth 
potential into the first-stage design was not beneficial unless one could predict the 
future requirement with certainty or unless the future requirement was given from 
the beginning. Under presence of uncertainty, the least costly way to meet both 
the first and second requirements is to design only for the current requirement in 
the first stage, and then modify the design later after the second-stage requirement 
is revealed.  
 
To provide more explanations to the above observation, the first- and second-stage 
cost were plotted separately as shown in Figure 72. The wide, gray bar is $Acq1, and 
narrow bars are $Acq2 for the corresponding scenarios. Gray bars show that DetPPs 
incurred more cost than New-design and Ad-hoc in the first stage. Among the DetPPs, 
the Block10p spent the most, followed by the Average. In the second stage, the New-
design cost the most as expected, and DetPPs cost less than New-design and Ad-hoc. By 
comparing the DetPPs, one can conclude that the pattern in Eq. (75) was achieved 
because the saving on $RDTE2 was greater than the penalty of over-designing when the 
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growth potential was adequately embedded in the original design. For example, the 
Block10p spent more than any other strategies in the first stage, but it cost the least in 
the second stage as well as overall under Scenario 4.  
7.8.4.2 Discussions from the Design Point of View 
In order to gain insight as to how different strategies decided the optimal first and 
second designs, the patterns among the design variables are investigated here. All the 
bar graphs in this section separately show the first-stage design in wide, grey bars, and 
the second-stage design in narrow bars of five different colors. The definition of color 
codes are provided in the legends of the graphs.  
Figure 73 compares the wing area in the first stage *
11
( )p
s
x  and the second stage 
*
21
ˆ( )p
s
x , where 1, , 5s = …  is the scenario number and 1, , 5p = …  is the strategy number. 
The New-design and Ad-hoc strategies had the same wing areas for a same scenario such 
that * 1 * 2
11 11
( ) ( )
s s
x x=  and * 1 * 2
21 21
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
s s
x x=  for s∀ . The three DetPPs overdesigned the wing 
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Figure 72: Stage 1 and Stage 2 Acquisition Cost Comparison 
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in the first stage to the extent that they match the second-stage wing area under the 
predicted scenarios 
u
ω .  
 { } { }* *11 21ˆif , ( ) ( ) for 2, 3, 4 , 2, 3, 4DetPP DetPPu su s x x u s= = ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  (76) 
where u is the predicted scenario number and s represents the realized scenario number. 
Eq. (76) implies that the DetPPs overdesigned the wing area to meet the second-stage 
requirement so that it did not have to be resized in the second stage. Figure 74 compares 
engine thrust in the first and second stage and is qualitatively identical to the wing area 
graphs. Essentially, when the same types of bar graphs as in Figure 74 are generated 
with other design variables, all the graphs are qualitatively identical to those in Figure 
74 with the exception of external fuel tank capacity. Indeed, Eq. (76) holds for all design 
variables and is generalized as: 
 
{ } { }* *1 2
for 3, ,5 if ,
ˆthen ( ) ( ) for 2, 3, 4 , 2, 3, 4p p
u s
p u s
u s
= … =
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈x x
 (77) 
Eq. (77) implies that all three first-stage designs under DetPP can meet the second-stage 
requirement without modification, and therefore they are PoDs.  
Between the second-stage wing areas in Figure 73, a common inequality is that the 
wing area monotonously increases as the scenario number increases under a certain 
strategy.  
 * * * * *21 1 21 2 21 3 21 4 21 5ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p p p p px x x x x< < < <  (78) 
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Figure 73: Wing Area Comparison 
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Figure 74: Engine Thrust Comparison 
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More importantly, all strategies had the same wing areas for a given scenario except for 
only * 4
21 2
ˆ( )x . The wing area for DetPP(Average) under scenario 2 was equal to all wing 
areas under scenario 3. These patterns are true for all other design variables and are 
generalized as 
 
* 1 * 2 * 3 * 4 * 5
2 2 2 2 2
for a given 1,..., 5
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s s s s s
s =
= = = =x x x x x
 (79) 
with an exception of, 
 * 1 * 2 * 3 * 5 * 4 *
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , 1,..., 5p p= = = ≠ = =x x x x x x  (80) 
reminding that the second-stage optimization problem is the same for all strategies 
except that they might have different starting points *
1
( )px . The result shows that, if 
only one exception is excluded, the optimizer decided to have the same *
2
( )p
s
x  regardless 
of the previous design *
1
( )px  for a given scenario.  
Essentially, if the second-stage requirement is more stringent than the one predicted 
initially or u s< , the design is inevitably infeasible without modification. Thus, it is no 
option to keep the first-stage design unchanged. However, in the opposite situation 
where u s> , *
1
( )p
u
x  could be still feasible in the second-stage. Therefore, *
1
( )p
u
x  can either 
be retained to save RDT&E cost or be reduced to save production cost. It is the role of 
the optimizer to find the balanced solution which minimizes the sum of RDT&E and 
production cost. Out of the six cases where u s> , five cases decided to change *
1
( )p
u
x  
despite the RDT&E cost, because savings from production cost was larger. Only the 
DetPP(Average) decided to keep the first-stage design unchanged under scenario 2 such 
that * 4 * 4
1 2 2
( ) ( ) , 1, , 5
u
u= =x x … .  
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Figure 75 was prepared for the external fuel capacity *
26
ˆ( )p
s
x . A clear difference from 
previous graphs is that the smallest value occurs under Scenario 2 not Scenario 1, thus it 
does not follow the inequality as in Eq. (78). Intuitively, this result looks erroneous since 
Scenario 2 demands more attack radius than Scenario 1 does. Indeed, Scenario 2 required 
19,545 lb of total fuel while Scenario 1 required 18,585 lb. This somewhat confusing 
result was caused by the fact that total fuel requirement is divided into internal and 
external fuel tanks under the following rules. External fuel tank capacity is determined 
by the total fuel required under the attack mission less the internal fuel capacity. 
Internal fuel capacity is mainly determined by the fighter mission radius, simultaneously 
considering wing area, fuselage length, and avionics weight. This unexpected result 
demonstrates the difficulty of intuitively preparing growth provisions even in a 
qualitative manner for a complex system such as a fighter aircraft. 
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Figure 75: External Fuel Amount Comparison 
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Finally, aircraft empty weight (OEW) and takeoff gross weight (TOGW) in attack 
configurations were compared in Figure 76 and Figure 77, respectively. These two charts 
also are qualitatively identical to those plotted with the design variables. Therefore, all 
the equalities and inequalities identified in Eqs. (76)-(80) are valid for these weights. 
This result indicates strong, positive correlations not only between the input variables 
but also between input and output variables.  
 
Observation 10: The patterns among the optimal designs under various strategies and 
scenarios revealed that the second-stage design mostly dictated the realized 
scenario such that most first-stage design was modified to meet the second-stage 
requirement best, because the production cost reduction was larger than the 
RDT&E cost incurred.  
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Figure 76: Empty Weight Comparison 
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Figure 77: Takeoff Gross Weight Comparison 
7.9 A Stochastic Approach Two-Stage Aircraft Design 
Optimization: Step 8 
Step 8 incorporates the uncertainty in the second-stage requirement by directly solving 
two-stage aircraft design optimization for the random variables defined as PDFs. The 
stochastic preplanning strategy is solved to find the HN solution before realization of 
uncertainty. Since the StoPP minimizes *
1 2
( )f f+ E , and evaluation of true *2( )fE is 
impractical, estimation is made through the use of both surrogate models and numerical 
integration using the Monte Carlo technique. Once the approximation process is 
established with reasonable accuracy, the two-stage stochastic optimization is solved and 
discussed. Then, the WS solutions are sought for not only the StoPP but also all other 
strategies solved in the previous step. 
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7.9.1 Surrogate Modeling 
Two Artificial Neural Network (ANN) models were created—the optimum second-stage 
objective f2
* under derivative aircraft strategies and New-design strategy. Under 
derivative strategies, the second-stage objective function f2 is dependent on the first-stage 
design x1 and the random variables ω . Table 51 lists parameters and their ranges within 
which the ANNs are created. The bounds were carefully set through iterations to ensure 
they are large enough to include the design space necessary and they are not too large 
unnecessarily. The bounds for the random variables are the minimum and maximum 
limits of the PDFs. The lower bound of x1 is slightly smaller than the smallest optimal 
first-stage design * 11( )x , and the upper bound is slightly larger than the largest optimal 
first-stage design * 51( )x . When, the New-design strategy is pursued, the second-stage 
objective function f2 is independent to the first-stage design x1. Therefore, only the 
random variables were used in creating the ANN of f2
*. 
Table 51: List of Parameters and Bounds for Surrogate Modeling 
Parameters Lower Bound Upper Bound 
x11 390 510 
x12 18300 22200 
x13 34000 42500 
x14 33000 44500 
x15 10000 15000 
x16 6600 10000 
x17 18250 25750 
x18 53 56 
1
ω  360 490 
2
ω  410 510 
3
ω  7000 9800 
4
ω  1300 1500 
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For the sampling techniques, the LHS technique was used. Two separate sets of LHS 
samples were created to combine 1,000 sampling points. The first set of 750 samples was 
used to train the model, and the remaining 250 samples were used to validate the model.  
For each of the sampling points, the second-stage optimization problem as defined in 
Eq. (32) was solved for a given sample of x1 and ω . To ensure local optimality, 
optimization results were automatically checked to see whether they satisfied all 
convergence, constraint, and side constraint violation criteria.  For each of the sampling 
points, the optimization problem was solved from two different initial points, and the 
better answer was selected to increase the change of finding the global optimum.  
ANN models were trained with various training options, and the best models were 
selected. As far as the architecture of the ANN is concerned, the single-layer ANN was 
used for both cases. The training algorithm was the Levenberg-Marquardt with Bayesian 
Regularization algorithm. The number of hidden nodes determines the complexity of the 
NN architecture. In general, more complicated functions require more hidden nodes. 
Final training results are summarized in Table 52, including basic statistics such as R-
squares and the mean and standard deviation of model fit error (MFE) and model 
representation error (MRE). The numbers of hidden nodes were eight and five for each 
of the models, respectively.  
The statistics are graphically represented in Figure 78 and Figure 79, showing 
histograms of error distributions, actual by predicted, and residual by predicted plots. 
The histograms are close to normal distribution with reasonably small mean and 
standard deviation values. The actual by predicted plots show tight fit around the 
perfect fit line without any sign of patterned behavior. The residual by predicted plots 
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shows random scatter of residuals without noticeable patterns. All the residuals fall 
below 2% of the actual response value.  
Table 52: Neural Network Training Statistics of f2
*  
Second-Stage Development Type Derivative 
Design 
New 
Design 
Number of hidden nodes 8 5 
R-square of Training Set 0.980528  
R-square of Validation Set 0.970675  
Model Fit Error (Mean) 0.003758  
Model Fit Error (Standard Deviation) 0.607262  
Model Representation Error (Mean) 0.016637  
Model Representation Error (Standard Deviation) 0.746351  
 
 
Figure 78: Neural Network of f2
* for the Derivative Design Strategies 
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Figure 79: Neural Network of f2
* for the New-Design Strategy 
7.9.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Since the random variables are continuous, the number of possible combinations are 
infinite. The expectation of the optimum second-stage cost *
2
( )fE  is approximated using 
the Monte Carlo (MC) technique. Two sampling techniques—Latin Hypercube Sampling 
(LHS) and Simple Random Sampling (SRS)—were compared with various sample sizes 
in order to investigate their convergence properties. The commercial software package 
Crystal Ball® was utilized as the framework for MCS and sampling methods. Random 
samples of the four random variables—fighter escort radius, interdiction radius, recovery 
payload, and avionics weight—were generated using LHS and SRS following the PDFs 
defined in Step 2.  
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For the experiment, the first-stage design was fixed at * 11( )x . Then, Monte Carlo 
simulation was repeatedly performed to calculate *
2
( )fE  with the sample size increasing 
from 1,000 to 500,000 using LHS and SRS. Since true value of *
2
( )fE  is not known, it 
was assumed that the estimated *
2
( )fE  would be closest to the true value when the 
sample size is the largest. Then, error was defined as the difference from the *
2
( )fE , 
calculated using 500,000 samples.  
Experiment results are provided in Table 53. It was concluded that *
2
( )fE  converged 
faster with the LHS technique than it did with SRS. With only 1,000 samples, the error 
with LHS was less than 10-5, and it was close to 10-6 with 5,000 samples. SRS showed 
considerably larger errors than LHS with the equal number of samples or converged to a 
similar degree of errors with considerably larger samples than LHS did. This study is 
limited to only a point in the first-stage design space, however it was concluded that 
LHS would work better than SRS in terms of approximating *
2
( )fE , and the sample size 
of 5,000 was used in solving stochastic optimizations in the next step. 
Table 53: *
2
( )fE  Convergence Comparison with LHS and SRS Sampling Methods  
 LHS SRS 
N (f2
*) Error (f2
*) Error 
1,000 32,516.29 0.0000504 32,596.81 0.002522 
5,000 32,514.23 -0.0000128 32,529.98 0.000466 
10,000 32,513.70 -0.0000291 32,530.60 0.000485 
100,000 32,515.30 0.0000199 32,517.41 0.000080 
500,000 32,514.65 not applicable 32,514.82 not applicable 
 
Finally, the PDF of f2
* was plotted with both 5,000 and 100,000 scenarios for 
comparison. PDF with 100,000 samples as shown in the bottom of Figure 80 is a quite 
smooth distribution that is close to a normal distribution slightly skewed to the left. It 
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does not show any irregularity from normal distribution except for the skewness, and 
even both tails are well represented. On the other hand, the PDF created using only 
5,000 samples in the top of the figure is not smooth, while the overall trend agrees to the 
higher fidelity counterpart. Especially, if the point of interest were at the tails of the 
distribution, the PDF with 5,000 samples would be a poor representation of the true 
behavior. Comparison of these two PDFs shows that although 5,000 samples would be 
sufficient in estimating the average of the distribution, it does not guarantee the same 
level of accuracy with other types of statistics, and further investigation is warranted if 
the point of interest is something other than the average value. 
 
Figure 80: PDFs of f2
* using 5,000 (Top) and 100,000 Scenarios (Bottom) 
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7.9.3 Before Realization of the Random Variables: The Here-and-Now Solutions 
The results of SPR are a single first-stage optimal solution and a group of second-
stage recourse decisions that match a specific realization of random variables. The first-
stage optimal decision under StoPP 
* 6
1
( )x  constraints and some of the design outputs 
evaluated at 
* 6
1
( )x  are presented in Table 54. Deterministic optimization results that are 
in Table 45 are repeated in the shaded columns for easier comparison. It is observed that 
under stochastic strategy, the optimizer decided to overdesign more than the Ad-hoc and 
New-design strategies did, but not as much as any DetPPs did. Eq. (72) is expended to 
 * 1 * 2 * 6 * 3 * 4 * 5
1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= < < < <x x x x x x  (81) 
with an exception of external fuel capacity. This inequality also holds for the weight and 
cost outputs.  
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Table 54: First-Stage Optimum Design under the Stochastic Strategy 
 Strategies Stochastic ND Ad-hoc Block10 EV Block10p Unit 
x11 Wing area 413.4 396.6 396.6 449.4 449.4 498.5 ft
2 
x12 Thrust 19230 18355 18355 20441 20441 21947 lb 
x13 Ref. weight for DLF 35566 34131 34131.3 38251 38251 41816 lb 
x14 Landing weight 36375 33248 33247.7 39539 39539 43839 lb 
x15 Internal fuel 11270 10827 10826.5 12777 12777 14692 lb 
x16 External fuel 6951 6724 6723 6691 6691 9608 lb 
x17 Ref. thrust for aft-body 21384 18355 18355 23508 23508 25238 lb 
x18 Fuselage length 53.50 53.08 53.08 54.68 54.68 55.60 ft 
g11 Fighter escort radius 349.7 350.1 350.1 409.6 409.6 478.8 nm 
g12 Interdiction mission radius 410.3 410.9 410.9 431.4 431.4 505.8 nm 
g13 Recovery payload 6489 4508 4508 7910 7910 9846 lb 
g14 Launch wind over deck 22.70 22.06 22.06 22.29 22.29 28.14 knots 
g15 Recovery wind over deck  3.55 -0.01 -0.01 3.55 3.55 9.27 knots 
g16 Approach speed  141.5 138.1 138.1 141.5 141.5 141.4 knots 
g17 Specific excess power 709.4 708.7 708.7 699.2 699.2 685.9 ft/sec 
g18 Accel. from 0.8 to 1.2M 63.48 63.66 63.66 63.60 63.60 63.42 sec 
g19 Turn rate 12.049 12.042 12.042 12.066 12.066 12.093 deg/sec 
g110 Usable load factor 7.609 7.609 7.609 7.609 7.609 7.609 g 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
OEW 26885 25738 25738 28628 28628 30992 lb 
Attack TOGW 52353 50520 50520 55325 55325 62697 lb 
Fighter TOGW 39566 37975 37975 42815 42815 47095 lb 
RDTE 4744 4639 4639 4904 4904 5116 $m 
RDTE year 8.68 8.58 8.58 8.82 8.82 9.01 year 
Production 20728 20172 20172 21595 21595 22701 $m 
f1 25472 24811 24811 26499 26499 27817 $m 
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7.9.4 The Wait-and-See Solutions and Evaluation of the Strategies from the 
Risk Point-of-View  
When the random variables are defined as PDFs, an infinite number of optimal second 
stages exist for every corresponding realization of random variables. Here, realizations of 
all the combinations of random variables are simulated on top of the already found 
optimal first-stage decisions *
1
( ) , 1, , 6p p =x
ω
… . The realization of random variables were 
approximated by running Monte Carlo simulation with 5,000 randomly sampled 
scenarios. Due to a large volume of information, PDFs and CDFs are used for 
visualization and interpretation rather than for the bar graphs. In addition, statistics of 
the distributions, such as mean and variance are discussed here. With the CDFs and the 
statistics, the strategies can be ranked in terms of various criteria that the decision 
maker would choose as a risk-measure. In this study, the strategies were ranked with the 
following risk-measures: probability to exceed total cost limit, the probability to exceed 
second-stage cost limit, average total cost, and average second-stage cost.  
7.9.4.1 Probability of Exceeding Total Spending Limit 
The PDFs of total program cost under the six different strategies are prepared in Figure 
81. The PDFs are histograms of the total program costs after the realization of all 5,000 
scenarios that were generated using the LHS technique. The figure shows the location of 
the peak points from the right, namely, the ND strategy followed by the 
DetPP(Block10p), DetPP(Average), DetPP(Block10), AH, and StoPP strategies. The 
location of the peak point suggests that the StoPP strategy costs least in general under 
the realization of all future scenarios. The shapes of the PDFs are different. In terms of 
the degree dispersion, The Ad-hoc shows a wider distribution than any other does, 
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indicating the largest variability. These observations are discussed again later with the 
statistics.  
By numerically integrating the PDFs in Figure 81, the complimentary CDFs of total 
program cost were obtained as shown in Figure 82. Superimposed with a spending limit, 
the CDFs can show the probability of exceeding the cost limit. For example, the 
probability of spending more than 59 billion dollars for the acquisition of the notional 
fighter can be read by superimposing a vertical line through the $59 on the horizontal 
axis then reading the values on the vertical axis where the line intersects with the CDFs. 
Then, the probabilities are 31.42% with StoPP, 36.78% with AH, 40.4% with 
DetPP(Block10), 46.04% with DetPP(Average), 72.48% with DetPP(Block10p), and 
100% with ND. In general, all five strategies except for the New-design spent more than 
$56 billion and less than $62 billion with 100% probability. The total spending of New-
design strategy fell between about $60 and $64 billion.  
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Figure 81: PDFs of Total Program Cost 
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Figure 82: CDFs of Total Program Cost   
If the probability of exceeding the spending limit is repeated with varying spending 
limits from $56 to $64 billion, one can see that the StoPP strategy in the purple line has 
the lowest probability of exceeding the spending limit than any other strategy in most of 
the region. In fact, a closer look at the CDFs reveals that the Ad-hoc could be the best 
in specific ranges, and the top three ranked strategies are provided in Table 55. When 
the cost limit is less than 55.9 or more than 62 billion dollars, all strategies violate or 
meet the constraint with one hundred percent probabilities. Then, when the spending 
limit is lower than 55.7 billion, the Ad-hoc strategy is safer than any other. For a limit 
of more than 55.7 billion dollars, the Stochastic can be selected as the best strategy.  
Then, if the decision-maker is risk-averse and spending more than a certain amount 
is perceived as risky, then the provided rankings can give the decision-makers a handle 
to evaluate and select the best strategy among six of them accounting for risk. As the 
rankings show, it could be the StoPP strategy or the AH strategy or any other strategy, 
depending on the spending limit.  
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Another notable observation from Table 55 is that the rank of the Ad-hoc strategy 
gradually goes down as the spending limit increases. It is easier to see the trend in the 
graphical representation of the rankings as given in Figure 83. The ranking of the Ad-
hoc strategy in the blue line steps down as the total cost limit increases from left to 
right. On the other hand, the DetPPs follow the opposite trend. These trends imply that 
if the spending limit is high, it is better to pursue a strategy that overdesigns the first-
stage vehicle, and if the spending limit is low, it is safer not to overdesign in the first 
stage.  
 
Observation 11: The graphical representation of strategy rankings with respect to the 
probability of exceeding the total program cost limit revealed that no preplanning 
for growth was better when the cost limit was low, and more growth potential was 
better as cost limit increased.  
 
Table 55: Top Three Picks 
 Ranking 
Spending Limit 1st  2nd  3rd  
Less than 55.9 All equal   
55.9 - 55.7 Ad-hoc Stochastic All equal 
55.7 - 59.7 Stochastic Ad-hoc Block10 
59.7 - 60.7 Stochastic Block10 Ad-hoc 
60.7 - 61.9 Stochastic Block10 Average 
More than 62 All equal   
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Figure 83: Rankings by the Probability of Exceeding Total Cost Limit 
7.9.4.2 Probability of Exceeding the Second-Stage Spending Limit 
The ranking criteria or the risk-measure can be different from organization to 
organization, and now the study in the previous section is repeated with the definition of 
risk being the probability of incurring more than a certain amount in the second stage. 
The premise behind this risk-measure is that the first-stage cost is under control and the 
decision maker is solely concerned about the second-stage cost. This scenario would be 
plausible when a manufacture has a firm first-stage contract already from an entity, and 
it is seeking to maximize its profit by selling the derivative versions to other agencies. 
Alternatively, the manufacturer is competing for the first-stage contract and trying to 
win it at a loss in hopes of recovering the loss at the second stage. While the situation 
involving competitors would further complicate the decision-making process, a game 
theoretic approach would help in making better decisions. The value of EvoLVE is to 
provide quantitative information to support such decision-making processes.  
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The outcome of the Monte Carlo simulation is now investigated focusing on the 
second-stage cost. Figure 84 is the PDFs of the second-stage acquisition cost of the six 
different strategies. One can observe general properties of the distributions, such as 
location of the peak, dispersion, tails etc. In general, the New-design strategy costs the 
most, but the dispersion was the smallest. DetPPs cost less than both StoPP and AH, 
because of larger second-stage RDT&E cost savings. In addition, among the derivative 
strategies, DetPP(Block10p) showed the greatest possibility to cost the least with the 
smallest dispersion. The Ad-hoc strategy was the opposite and cost the most with the 
least variability.  
The CDFs in Figure 85 can be used to evaluate the probability of exceeding a 
certain second-stage cost limit. As an example, for the spending limit of 33 billion 
dollars, the probability with DetPP(Block10p) is 4.48%; with DetPP(Average) is 15.18%; 
with DetPP(Block10) is 21.86%; with StoPP is 51.92 %, with Ad-hoc is 78.94%; and 
with New-design is 100%.  
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Figure 84: PDFs (Top) and CDFs (Bottom) of the Second-Stage Acquisition Cost 
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Finally, the strategies are ranked in terms of the probability of exceeding the 
second-stage cost limit and the best strategy is found with the lowest probability. 
Formally, this concept is derived from the Risk-Averse Strategy Selection formulations in 
Eqs. (20) and (21), and they are reduced to 
 *1Prob{ (( ) }m ,in
p
p
Q τ>x ω)  (82) 
where *
1
(( ) ,pQ x ω) is the optimal value of the second-stage problem or the given first-stage 
optimal solution *
1
( )px  under strategy 1,..., 6p =  defined as 
 2
* *
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The solutions of these equations are sought using Monte Carlo simulation and are 
graphically represented in Figure 86. The ranking is quite different from the ones done 
by the total cost. When the cost limit was lower than 30 billion dollars, all strategies 
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Figure 85: CDFs of the Second-Stage Acquisition Cost 
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violated it with 100% probability. Then, all strategies could meet the cost limit of 39.5 
billion dollars under all scenarios. The DetPP(Block10p) was ranked on the top 
regardless of the cost limit. However, some other strategies were as good as 
DetPP(Block10p) in some areas. If the strategies are sorted by the rankings, the order 
exactly coincides with the order by the degree of overdesign as in Eq. (81) , which 
implies that the larger the first-stage aircraft, the smaller the probability of over-
spending the second-stage cost limit. 
 
Observation 12: When the risk is measured by the probability of the second-stage program 
costing more than a certain limit, the strategy ranking corresponds with the first-
stage aircraft size. Therefore, the larger the growth potential in the first-stage 
design, the smaller the expected risk in the second stage. 
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Figure 86: Rankings by the Probability of Exceeding the Second-Stage Cost Limit 
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7.9.4.3 Strategy Selection by Robustness 
The statistics of the distributions of the total cost and second-stage cost are provided in 
Table 56. The strategies were also ranked in terms of either low mean or variance values. 
The Stochastic strategy was the best in terms of the mean total cost. However, when 
only the second-stage cost was considered, DetPP(Block10p) showed the lowest mean. 
The variability of the distribution has been used as a measure of risk in the 
community of stochastic programming. However, the engineering design community 
regards the variability due to uncertainty is as a measure of robustness. When the 
strategies are ranked by the their robustness to future requirement growth, 
DetPP(Block10p) is the best, followed by DetPP(Average), DetPP(Block10), StoPP, and 
Ad-hoc. Interestingly, this order also matches the order by level of overdesign in Eq (81) 
and the probability of overspending the second-stage cost limit.  
 
Observation 13: The Stochastic Strategy is the best on average. However, either Ad-hoc 
or DetPP can be better under certain circumstances. Depending on the risk-
measure the best strategy changes. Risk-averse DMs can choose other strategies in 
order to mitigate risk. 
 
Table 56: Rankings by Mean and Variance 
Criteria Total Cost (f1+f2) Second-Stage Cost (f2) 
Strategy Mean Rank Variance Rank Mean Rank Variance Rank 
New-design 61803 6 550390 - 36993 6 550390 - 
Ad-hoc 58860 2 1044700 5 34049 5 1044700 5 
DetPP(Block10) 59011 3 756640 3 32512 3 756640 3 
DetPP(Average) 59162 4 713290 2 32303 2 713290 2 
DetPP(Block10p) 59681 5 583880 1 31864 1 583880 1 
Stochastic PP 58751 1 889690 4 33279 4 889690 4 
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7.10 Framework for Interactive Decision Making Support: 
Step 9 
While the outcomes of EvoLVE Steps 7 and 8 were the series of optimum solutions 
under various conditions, it is often more valuable to have a way to explore the design 
space in two time-phased stages simultaneously to investigate the options with greater 
flexibilities than the two approaches Steps 7 and 8 had offered. The ultimate goal of the 
final step of EvoLVE is to provide tools with which stakeholders can change the 
assumptions, apply the scenarios, and trade-off various requirements and figures of 
merits. While interactive, visual representation of the design space can take many 
different forms, two-stage contour plots and two-stage multivariate profilers among 
many are proposed in this study. The benefit of this environment compared to the Steps 
7 and 8 is that it is interactive, giving instantaneous feedback to the user. The use is 
able to perform “what if” studies for a wide range of scenarios beyond the scenarios used 
for the optimization.  
7.10.1 Two-Stage Constraint Analysis  
While the contour profilers can be generated in many different ways and can be used in 
many different ways, this document demonstrates the historical example of the upgrade 
of the F/A-18C/D to the E/F, the history of which was briefly introduced in §3.1.1.3, 
and the requirements of the two versions are summarized in APPENDIX B. Two-stage 
constraint analysis of the F-18 was performed using the contour profilers generated using 
JMP®. Using the environment for TSAD created in Steps 5 and 6, the data for the 
demonstration were generated by sampling the design points in the first- and second-
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stage design space, assuming uniform PDFs. With the data set, response surface 
equations (RSEs) were fitted in the JMP, and contour profilers were created.  
The demonstration starts from Figure 87, which shows the list of design variables in 
the current and future stages at the top, the list of performance and cost measures in the 
middle, and a contour profiler plotted with engine thrust and wing area at the bottom of 
the figure. The plot was set at the F/A-18C/D’s design along with the assumed 
performance limits. Since the actual F/A-18C/D’s performance thresholds were not 
known, some of them were set at its actual performance less some margin, and some 
others were set at actual F/A-18E/F’s thresholds. For identification purposes, the 
baseline design along with the setting is designated as Notional Fighter A. 
Figure 87 shows that the design is highly constrained. Since the baseline vehicle’s 
performance is very close to the limits, changing either wing area or engine thrust would 
cause infeasibilities. For example, if the wing area is reduced or wing loading increases, 
then the turn rate requirement is violated. Engine thrust cannot be reduced without 
violating the acceleration requirement. However, Notional Fighter A still has some room 
for growth on carrier operability metrics, such as launch WOD, recovery WOD, and 
approach speed, as is easily observed from the relative locations of the red diamonds and 
shaded area next to the list of each of the requirements. This suggests that the wing area 
could be reduced or wing loading could be increased if relaxation on the turn rate 
requirement was allowed.  
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Figure 87: Contour Plot of the Notional Fighter A 
The key improvements that the U.S. Navy wanted make on the F/A-18C/D were to 
bring back capability and interdiction mission radius. The bring back weight became 
more important in the late 1980s as highly advanced bombs were fielded, and the cost of 
jettisoning those weapons sharply increased. The Navy also wanted at least 430 nm of 
interdiction mission radius flying the Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi mission profile with three external fuel 
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tanks as the mission spectrum of the Hornet was extended to complement and eventually 
replace the aging A-7.  
To investigate the possibility of these two improvements to the Notional Fighter A, 
the attack radius is increased from 410 nm to 430 nm, which gives rise to infeasibilities 
as shown in the left of Figure 88. Then, in order to increase the mission range, external 
fuel tank capacity is increased from 6,720 lb to 8,000 lb, which opens up the feasible 
space back as shown in the right side of Figure 88. Thus, the requirement growth is 
fulfilled by upgrading external fuel tanks without modifying the aircraft itself.*  
Notional Fighter B is then challenged by increasing its recovery payload capability 
from about 4,800 lb to 9,000 lb, which is from the F/A-18E/F OSD. Recovery payload is 
solely determined by the landing weight. The landing weight of the F/A-18 Hornet was 
33,000 lb initially, and then increased to 34,000 lb with restriction. The U.S. Senate 
                                                                                       
*Fuel tank upgrade on F/A-18C/D was suggested by the U.S. Congress. However, the DoD opposed the idea, 
arguing that the use of 480 gallon tanks instead of 330 gallon tanks would cause physical interference and 
thus require substantial modification to the airframe itself. [191] 
 
Figure 88: Fighter A with 430 nm Attack Radius (Left) and Fighter B (Right) 
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suggested increasing the landing weight further by strengthening landing gears to 
improve the recovery payload capacity of the Hornet. To investigate such a possibility, 
the landing weight of Notional Fighter B is increased to 39,000 lb. The updated contour 
plot is presented in Figure 89, on the left. 
Upgrading landing gears caused unfavorable side effects; due to the increase in 
aircraft empty weight, turn rate and acceleration constraints were not met; higher 
landing weight also constrained the lift capability of the wing, and approach speed 
constraint is violated. To quickly resolve the issues, engine thrust was increased to 
19,000 lb and wing area was increased to 440 ft2 as shown in Figure 89, on the right. 
However, increase in engine thrust advertently degraded mission performance, and 
fighter mission radius was violated. In addition, further increase in empty weight due to 
a larger wing and engines caused violation of the load factor constraint.  
As a remedy, a series of design modifications were applied. Since fighter mission 
profile does not use external fuel tanks, fighter mission range increased by increasing 
internal fuel capacity to 11,500 lb. The load factor issue was directly addressed by 
 
Figure 89: Fighter B with 38,000 lb Landing Weight (Left) Fighter B’ (Right) 
 286
increasing design gross weight. Higher design gross weight was achieved by augmenting 
the structural strength of the airframe so that the aircraft could pull the required 
maximum gravitational force with a heavier body. Strengthening the airframe gave rise 
to unfavorable side effects because it increased the empty weight. Therefore, to resolve 
newly introduced infeasibilities, some other design parameters were changed but then 
caused additional infeasibilities in some other dimensions. Eventually, this spiral effect 
converged to feasible solutions near the design of F/A-18E/F. 
However, easier and lower cost solutions were also possible if some of the less 
important requirements were relaxed. For example, reducing the maximum load factor to 
7 g’s from the current 7.5 g’s and increasing the design gross weight to 33,000 lb reopens 
up the design space as shown in Figure 90. The new feasible design is designated as 
Notional Fighter D. Notional Fighter D is somewhere in between the F/A-18C/D and 
E/F and meets most of the F/A-18E/F’s requirement. Therefore, Notional Fighter D can 
be viewed as a de-rated, lower cost alternative of the F/A-18E/F.  
Finally, the contour profiler of the Super Hornet is created as presented in Figure 
91. The Super Hornet was designed to carry heavier avionics, to pull the maximum load 
factor of 7.5 g’s, and to reduce RCS. It also features improved LEX with higher CLmax 
and uses a new engine core with a higher thrust to engine weight ratio than F404-GE-
402. The contour plot of the F/A-18E/F indicates that it had growth margins on carrier 
suitability metrics but might lack some fighter performance, such as acceleration, turn 
rate, and excess power in the future, if weight growth is realized.  
The series of demonstration in this section showed that the F/A-18E/F’s 
requirement could not be fulfiled by retrofitting existing F/A-18C/D’s with better 
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landing gears and larger external fuel tanks as suggested by the U.S. Congress. Rather, 
completely resizing the vehicle at the system level was necessary because upgrading at a 
subsystem level causes infeasibilities in some other dimensions. However, if some of the 
non-critical requirements of the F/A-18E/F were relaxed, possibility of extending the life 
of the F/A-18C/D by fixing some of the most critical capability defficiencies.  
 
Observation 14: The mission performance, fighter performance, and carrier suitability 
requirements are highly conflicting each other, limiting the feasible design space. 
Since it is very difficult to improve performance in one dimension without 
sacrificing the others, a system-level resizing would be necessary to upgrade a 
vehicle, rather than retrofitting at the subsystem level. On the other hand, 
relaxation of non-critical requirements can open up the design space and offer less 
capable and less expensive alternatives. 
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Figure 90: Contour Profiler of Notional Fighter D 
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Figure 91: Contour Profiler of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 
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7.10.2 Multi-Dimensional, Multi-Stage Design Tradeoff  
Another useful tool to interactively investigate the evolution paths of a system 
simultaneously is a multivariate profiler (MVP). A multivariate plot is a relationship 
between multiple variables shown at a time. Therefore, it allows simultaneous 
consideration of desing variables and system attributes in all developing stages. In 
contrast to the contour profilers shown in the previous sections, where only two 
dimensions of multi-dimensional design space can be visualized at a time, the 
multivariate plot shows a designer the view of entire design space interaction 
simultaneously.   
For the notional fighter study, three different types of MV plots were created. The 
first two types, called MVPI and MVPII respectively, are created based on the optimal 
first-stage solutions of the five evolution strategies. The third type, called MVPIII, does 
not start from a specific baseline design but freely investigates the first- and second-stage 
design space. The benefit of this environment is that it is interactive and gives 
instantaneous feedback to the user. “What if” studies can be performed using a wide 
range of scenarios beyond the scenarios used for the optimization. All MVPs were 
created and analyzed using the multivariate analysis feature of the JMP® software 
package. 
7.10.2.1 Optimum First-stage Strategies and Future Design Alternatives 
The New-Design strategy was identical to Ad-hoc strategy in terms of the first-stage 
design and was excluded. On top of the five optimal first-stage decisions, *
1
( ) ,px  
2,..., 6,p =  the potential derivative aircraft designs are applied by running MCS with 
the 1,000 second-stage designs for each of the optimal first-stage designs. The 1000 
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samples were obtained by LHS techniques, assuming uniform distributions on the 
second-stage design variables. The outcome is 5,000 derivative aircraft options that are 
presented in Figure 92. The MVPs are symmetrical along the diagonal. Variable names 
appear in the diagonal starting from design variables, aircraft performance, and RDT&E 
cost.  Since the figure is hard to read, subsets of Figure 92 are presented in following 
figures. 
400
430
460
19000
20000
21000
34000
36000
38000
40000
33000
36000
39000
350
400
450
410
440
480
5000
7000
9000
135
139
143
660
690
720
11.5
11.9
12.3
7.3
7.5
7.8
51000
54000
57000
60000
1000
2000
3000
4000
2
4
6
1
2
3
4
400 440 19000 34000 33000 350 420 410 470 5000 9000 135 141 660 700 11.5 12.2 7.3 7.6 7.9 51000 1000 4000 2 4 6 1 2 3 4
 
Figure 92: Entire View of Multivariate Profiler Type I 
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One observation from the MVP is the correlation between any two variables. The 
scatter patterns of the design points in a box reveal either positive, negative, or no 
correlation between the two variables. The variables with no correlation show randomly 
scattered points. A more accurate way of examining the correlation is through the 
correlation map. The correlation map of MVPI is presented in Figure 93. The right side 
of the figure is the correlation color scale from -1 to +1. Negative one in the scale in blue 
is complete negative correlation, and positive one in the scale in red is complete positive 
correlation. Some of the noteworthy correlations are highlighted with yellow-outlined 
boxes. External fuel has a very strong positive correlation with attack radius but no 
correlation with fighter radius. Approach speed performance and Recovery Wind-Over-
Deck (RWOD) is highly correlated. In addition, engine thrust shows strong correlation 
with excess power and acceleration. Fighter performance metrics are closely correlated 
with each other. RDTE cost and duration are very strongly correlated to each other.   
Figure 94 is the subset of MVPI that only shows the design variables. The plot 
shows both the first-stage designs of the five strategies and the second-stage designs. The 
locations of the first-stage and second-stage designs illustrate relative and absolute size of 
the aircraft. For example, the first-stage design under the Ad-hoc strategy * Ad-Hoc
1
( )x , 
shown by a blue dot, appears at the low left corner, indicating the smallest aircraft in 
the design space. On the other hand, the first-stage design under the DetPP(Block10p), 
* Ad-Hoc
1
( )x , shown by an orange cross, is at the top right corner of the design space, 
indicating that it is even larger than most of the second-stage designs shown in grey dots.  
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Figure 93: The Correlation Map of Multivariate Profiler I 
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Figure 94: The Design Variables of Multivariate Profiler I 
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Once the future aircraft states are populated for each of the five optimum strategies, 
the next step is to apply future requirement scenarios to see which strategy offers 
feasibly design modification options under a specific scenario. MVPI was tested with the 
scenario of more emphasis on air-to-air combat. In this hypothetical scenario, a need for 
a dedicated air-to-air combat fighter has established by an international Air Force. The 
capability specifies the minimum fighter radius of 430 nm, minimum of 12.5 degrees per 
second turn rate, and minimum usable load factor of 7.5 g’s in combat weight. The 
RDT&E cost to acquire such capability is limited to $2,500, which will be paid by the 
customer. The scenario is applied on MVPI via the use of scenario filter. Figure 95 shows 
the performance and cost before the filter is applied, and Figure 96 is the same plot after 
the filter is applied. Figure 96 shows that only a few design upgrade options survived, 
and most of them are based on the first-stage design under the DetPP(Block10p) 
strategy in orange dots. One blue dot is the upgrade option from the DetPP(Average) 
design, and none of the upgrade options by the Ad-hoc, DetPP(Block10), and Stochastic 
strategies met the new requirement.  
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Figure 95: The Notional Fighter Upgrade Options 
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Figure 96: The Notional Fighter Upgrade Options with Scenario Filter 
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7.10.2.2 Robustness of Optimum First-Stage Strategies on Future 
Requirement and Technology Evolution 
The second type of MVP, or MVPII, is also built on the optimum first-stage designs 
from the five strategies as the MPVI is. Random variation on the requirement is applied 
on the five baseline designs to see how they react to the future requirement evolution. 
Here the design itself remains unchanged in the second stage. Aircraft performance, 
however, changes due to either more stringent requirements or the introduction of new 
technology. The random variables were fighter payload, attack payload, avionics weight, 
and technology factor on CLmax. One thousand random requirement evolution scenarios 
were sampled using LHS following the uniform distributions.  
Figure 97 is the subset of the created MVPII, showing the four random variables. 
The highlighted points are the original values of the four variables in the first stage. All 
other points are the future deviations from the original point simulating the evolution of 
the requirement and technology. Since the random variables were assumed independent 
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Figure 97: Uniform Variations of Requirement and Technology  
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of each other and the sampling takes uniform distribution, no correlation is observed 
from the figure. The color code shown in the far right column is to differentiate the five 
strategies. 
Here, a hypothetical mid-ocean air-to-air scenario was applied. In this scenario, 
enemy threat has advanced to a degree that the Navy fleet is under potential attack in 
the mid-ocean. It is desired that the enemy aircraft is intercepted at a distance, and a 
need for a carrier-based aircraft with long stand-off capability has risen. The notional 
fighter, originally designed to perform light air-to-air fighter missions, is reconfigured to 
add Phoenix missile capability and long-range active radar. The retrofit increased 
avionics weight to 1,400 lb and air-to-air missile weight to 1,500 lb excluding pylons. The 
scenario also requires the minimum fighter radius of 410 nm, minimum turn rate of 12 
degrees per second, and the usable load factor of 7.5 g’s. Again, the scenario is applied 
using a scenario filter. Figure 102 compares the performance variation of the five 
optimum designs under the five strategies before the filter is applied. Then, Figure 103 is 
the same MVP after the mid-ocean combat scenario is applied. By comparing the two 
figures, one can identify which strategy meets such new capability requirements, which 
does not, and what the impact of the scenario on other performance metrics such as 
carrier suitability is. No initial design under the Ad-hoc and StoPP strategies could meet 
the new requirement, while all three DetPPs showed potential to meet it. One can also 
trade-off some less important requirement, such as attack radius and recovery payload 
for example, to see how such constraint relaxation opens up new opportunities. 
 298
 
 
 
340
380
420
460
370
410
450
4000
6000
8000
21
25
29
128
132
136
140
680
700
720
11.8
12
12.2
7.5
7.6
7.7
1
2
3
4
340 410 370 440 4000 8000 21 25 29 128 135 680 710 11.8 12.2 7.5 7.7 1 2 3 4
Fighter 
radius
Recovery 
payload
LWOD
Attack 
radius
Approach 
speed
Excess 
power
Strategy
Turn 
rate
Load 
factor
Performance 
Comparison
The Initial Performance    
Ad-hoc
+ DetPP(Block10)
x DetPP(Average)
DetPP(Block10p)
StoPP
 
Figure 98: Feasible Designs after Applying Limits on $RDTE and Time to IOC 
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Figure 99: Feasible Designs after Applying Limits on $RDTE and Time to IOC 
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7.10.2.3 Simultaneous Exploration of Current and Future Design Space 
The third type of multivariate profiler or MVPIII was created by running Monte Carlo 
simulation with 15,000 design samples. The samples were generated using LHS, assuming 
uniform distributions on both the first-stage and second-stage design variables. The 
requirement was unchanged in this case, and they are applied as scenarios after MVPIII 
is created. Compared to MVPI and II, MVPIII allows larger degrees of freedom in the 
first-stage design and enables a reverse way of defining the baseline aircraft, working 
back from the future to the current time frame.  
Because of the increased degrees of freedom, the size of the matrix is very large and 
it is hard to display the entire view of MVPIII in a document. Figure 100 is the snapshot 
of the entire MVPIII that was created for the notional fighter study. The plot includes 
both first- and second-stage design variables, performance metrics, cost, and weight. It 
also includes the new requirement and technology that are applied in the second stage. 
The 15,000 data points were classified into three groups. The criteria were whether the 
designs meet the Block0 and Block10p requirements. The first group, in blue points, 
meets both the Block0 and Block10p requirements. The second group, in green points, 
only meets the Block0 requirement. The last group, in red dots, fails to meet either 
requirement.  
 301
First Stage 
Design 
Variables
First Stage Aircraft 
Performance, 
Weight, Cost
Second 
Stage Design 
Variables
Req/
Tech
Second Stage 
Aircraft 
Performance, 
Weight, Cost
 
Figure 100: Entire View of Multivariate Profiler Type III 
An example usage of MVPIII is to impose only cost and schedule limits on the 
future programs and then see what is available in the present stage design pool. Here, 
the RDT&E cost limit of $2500 million and RDT&E period less than 4 years is applied. 
After applying these two restrictions, the trends in the designs that met these two 
conditions are observed in Figure 101. 
An observation from the thrust and wing area diagram is that only those 
combinations of high engine thrust and large wing area from the beginning survived the 
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RDT&E cost and duration constraints imposed in the second stage. The combinations of 
small wing and engine did not qualify. The cost of changing wing and engine was too 
expensive so that the aircraft designed with small wing and engine were not viable 
options in the future. Another observation is made on the avionics system in the second 
stage. The avionics system weight in the first stage was fixed at 1,289 lb as in the F/A-
18C/D, and the second-stage avionics system weight was varied from 1,411 lb as in the 
F/A-18E/F. While viable designs are found all across the avionics weight values, more 
data points are clustered around the low avionics weight region. The correlation between 
the second-stage avionics and the first-stage design shows that keeping the exisiting 
avionics suite of the baseline aircraft in the second stage brings many first-stage designs 
viable in the future development programs. The U.S. Navy followed the spiral 
development strategy in the development of the F/A-18E/F. The F/A-18E/F’s avionics 
system is 90% common to the C/D’s avionics initially, and then it was upgraded later.  
 
Observation 15: The density plots reveal that a combination of high thrust and large wing 
ensures better probability of responding to requirement evolution with less time 
and cost. When a derivative aircraft development is under tight budget and 
schedule constraints, keeping the avionics suite of the baseline aircraft and 
upgrading it later opens up the solution space. 
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Figure 101: The MVPII after the RDT&E Cost and Duration Filter 
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7.11 Lessons Learned from the Notional Fighter Design 
Study 
These findings are obtained as the result of the study. The author hopes that these 
findings will help in guiding future implementations of EvoLVE both qualitatively and 
quantitatively; improving the EvoLVE process itself; and simply guiding the engineers 
and decision makers to provide better products for a longer future.  
7.11.1 The Issue of Objective Function 
As observed during the experiments in Step 4 of the EvoLVE process, the optimum 
solution is sensitive to the objective function that the user wants to optimize for. Two 
different objective functions—RDTE cost and acquisition cost—were tested in this study, 
and they yielded quite different results. It is very important and sometimes difficult to 
determine what would be the most important objective. The paradigm of design for 
lifecycle cost (LCC) would place emphasis on the entire LCC of a product rather than 
RDT&E or acquisition cost. The largest portion of LCC is O&S cost, and it is further 
broken down to personnel, maintenance, fuel, etc. While not documented, optimization 
including O&S was attempted in this study. The conclusion was that O&S cost is not 
sensitive to aircraft definition when the design parameters vary at a sizing level. Which 
means, aircraft using a common platform do not have very distinguishable O&S cost 
because one has a 400 ft2 wing and the other has a 410 ft2 wing, because they may not 
differ in terms of personnel cost and maintenance cost. Fuel cost might be different, but 
it is only a small portion of O&S cost. In conclusion, the author hypothesizes that 
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inclusion of O&S cost as part of objective function in aircraft design optimization would 
not provide much insight.  
7.11.2 Technical Challenges Experienced  
Considering aircraft design in two stages required more than twice the effort of a single-
stage design approach. Creation of modeling and simulation environment encompassing a 
very large design space required much rigorous modeling and validation processes. In 
addition, development and validation of the cost model was especially demanding. 
Fitting surrogate model was difficult because of the two reasons: wide design space and 
unsmooth behavior of the second-stage RDT&E cost. The use of ANNs instead of 
polynomial-based surrogate models could handle more complex, non-linear behaviors. 
The surrogate modeling process had to be repeated many times to adjust the range of 
the input parameters. When the bounds were too broad, many sampled cases crashed in 
FLOPS because they could not perform the given mission. Optimization in the setting of 
two-stage aircraft design was very demanding. Considering optimization at two different 
design stages simultaneously meant double the number of design variables.  Too many 
design variables not only exponentially increase the computational time, but also the 
possibilities of human errors since the problem gets too big to grasp by a human decision 
maker.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In an attempt to provide a more cohesive study and follow a scientific research process, 
this document encapsulated important findings, research objectives, contributions, tasks, 
and lessons-learned. This is shown in the form of Observations, Research Questions, and 
Hypotheses. The final chapter of the manuscript revisits these formal statements to draw 
conclusions. Finally, future research opportunities in the context of design for lifelong 
vehicle evolution are proposed. 
8.1 Contribution to Aerospace Systems Design 
This long journey started by observing the trend in the aerospace community for many 
successful aircraft designs to survive a lot longer than was expected when the design was 
originally created.  Extended design life has made it necessary to change the design over 
time as the operational environment, and thus the customer requirements, changes as 
noted in Observation 1. The modern trend in aircraft development raised Question 1: 
Can existing aerospace design methods address the issues of requirement and design 
evolution throughout the lifecycle of a product? Not surprisingly, review of current 
acquisition policies and design methods found that the same issue has been discussed 
amongst the government officials in acquiring major weapon systems since the early 
1980s. The culmination of such questions was formalized as acquisition policies, namely 
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) and Spiral Development (SD). These became official DoD 
policy to develop future weapon systems in 2000. While the review on the traditional 
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and modern design methods identified some of the potentially useful elements, a formal 
method to incorporate future requirements, design, and technologies into the current 
system following the philosophy of EA and SD has been missing. This finding was stated 
in Observation 2, citing the need for a new design method that considers the vehicle’s 
long-term growth.  
Questions 2 and 3 asked How can the traditional, single-stage design setting be 
expanded to allow integration of future designs? and What are the barriers and key 
enablers? Case studies solicited on past aircraft modifications in the areas of military 
aircraft, commercial aircraft, and military rotorcraft demonstrated some common issues 
and vehicle-type specific issues summarized in Observations 3 and 4. Past successes and 
failures were affected by many technical and non-technical factors, such as competition, 
international collaboration, and politics. However, uncertainty in future requirements 
was identified as the key challenge when one tries to incorporate future properties into a 
present physical entity. The goal of the study was then solidified and bound as the 
development of a new design methodology, capable of quantitative evaluation of the 
evolution paths of a vehicle while incorporating requirement uncertainties at the vehicle 
systems level. 
Question 4 asked How can an aircraft designer plan for design evolution under the 
presence of requirement uncertainty? The issue of uncertainty, inevitable when one 
makes a decision involving properties of a future timeframe, historically has been studied 
by other fields. A review of this topic identified two areas of research that seemed 
particularly relevant to the problem at hand: stochastic programming with recourse 
(SPR) and scenario planning. In particular, the remedial approach of SPR in its two 
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distinctive problem solving steps seemed intrinsically compatible to aircraft design 
problems. This occurred where derivatives, retrofits, and upgrades have been the 
“remedial” ways to fix the once optimal but later infeasible and incompetent original 
design stated in Observation 5.  
As a backbone of the new design methodology, Hypothesis 1 proposed a Two-stage 
Aircraft Design (TAD) formulation by expanding the traditional, single-stage design 
optimization setting. Then, Hypothesis 2 indicated that the adoption of SPR to TAD 
would find the optimum aircraft design that would best respond to the uncertain future 
on average. While SPR and TAD seemed a promising solution, the intrinsic assumptions 
behind SPR and its limitations in numerical optimization, in general, imposed 
restrictions in pursuing the path of SPR as summarized in Observation 6. The series of 
questions induced from the observation asked: What if the decision-maker is risk-avert? 
What if the random space is too complicated to model or it is too time-consuming to 
solve stochastic optimization? What if the decision-maker is willing to accept infeasible 
designs?   
To address the issue of non-risk-neutral decision makers, Hypothesis 3 proposed a 
Risk-Averse Strategy Selection (RASS), adopting the formulation of risk-averse 
stochastic programming and providing a means to preemptively identify and mitigate 
risk associated with aircraft development. Hypothesis 4 proposed a deterministic, 
scenario-based approach of capturing the full spectrum of possibilities with a few 
scenarios and with less computational overhead, yet providing a clear perspective of the 
future. Lastly, Hypothesis 5 proposed a flexible, interactive framework for decision-
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making support that allows concurrent exploration of two-stage design space free from 
the restrictions imposed on objective function, constraints, and design variables. 
Implementation of the proposed tasks in Hypotheses 1-6 into an actual aircraft 
design exercise required recasting of all the abstract elements of the mathematical 
formulations into tangible ones. A nine-step process of Evaluation of Lifelong Vehicle 
Evolution (EvoLVE) identifies and defines the current and future problems in steps 1 
and 2 and synthesizes the short-term and long-term solutions and strategies in steps 3 
and 4. EvoLVE also creates and validates a modeling and simulation in steps 5 and 6 
that evaluates candidate solutions in terms of the imposed requirement. The last three 
steps, 7-9, offer a two-stage design space exploration in three different perspectives as per 
Hypotheses 2-6.  
The proposed methodology was demonstrated with two engineering problems. The 
two-stage beam design problem was a simple proof-of-concept of compatibility and 
efficacy of SPR in the context of the engineering design problem proving Hypotheses 1, 2, 
and 4. Then, EvoLVE was implemented in its full range to a notional multi-role fighter 
based on the F/A-18C Hornet, selected for its unique evolution history and abundance in 
public data. A hypothetical requirement called for a new carrier-borne, multi-role fighter 
for the U.S. Navy. EvoLVE steps 1 and 2 created a set of requirements based on F/A-
18C and F/A-18E performance characteristics. Evolution of the requirements was 
defined following the transformation of F/A-18C to F/A-18E resulting in random 
variables in PDFs and five scenarios. EvoLVE steps 3 and 4 defined the baseline 
platform, the design space, six aircraft evolution strategies, and a set of technologies. 
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Steps 5 and 6 created computer models and an integrated TAD environment, which were 
validated against F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet data. 
Based on the TAD platform, steps 7-9 performed a series of experiments and tested 
hypotheses. The use of AAO reduced the convergence time from hours and minutes, 
proving Hypothesis 6, by converting the optimization problem of two hierarchical levels 
into a single hierarchical level. The deterministic, scenario-based study in step 7 made it 
possible to observe structured patterns in aircraft attributes, which solidified as 
inequalities. An important lesson learned was that in a system for which all the major 
subsystems are highly coupled, a design change in one dimension propagates throughout 
the entire system. Therefore, a lack of coordinated effort results in infeasibilities in other 
dimensions. The study showed that overdesigning landing gear systems to obtain growth 
potential in carrier suitability inadvertently hurt fighter performance. More importantly, 
preplanning for the future was beneficial in terms of total acquisition cost only if the 
future requirement is known from the beginning. Otherwise, not having a growth 
provision in the first-stage design or pursuit of the Perfect-fit Designs (PfDs) was the 
best strategy among others. The scenario-based study was repeated with RDT&E cost as 
the objective function. This complementary study, provided in APPENDIX D, showed 
how much design and long-term strategy is affected by the stakeholder’s interest. The 
findings from the scenario-based study, summarized in Observations 7-10 and 16, 
collectively supported Hypothesis 4.  
Exposition of the optimum designs using six strategies to explore the entire random 
space through Monte Carlo Simulation yielded the clouds of optimal recourse decisions.  
These decisions were then represented using PDFs and CDFs revealing the frequency 
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and severity of the strategies’ performance in the randomly evolving future. This holistic 
approach also enabled quantifications of risk, yielding ranking functions in terms of low 
risk using three different measures supporting Hypothesis 3. The low-risk-rankings varied 
significantly depending on how risk was defined, suggesting that the difficulty in 
decision-making with multiple stakeholders had different risk perceptions and conflicting 
goals. Lastly, the stochastic preplanning strategy was the best among others in terms of 
the average total cost, proving Hypothesis 2.  
The final step of EvoLVE created the proposed Decision Making Framework (DMF) 
in two different formats: two-stage contour plots and multivariate profilers. The two-
stage plot built based on the F-18C proved its efficacy by reproducing the F-18C’s 
evolution history to the F-18E. The step-by-step demonstration examined some of the 
background stories behind the development of the F-18E and other F-18C upgrade 
options considered by the U.S. Congress. The study showed that the retrofitting of the 
F-18C, as suggested by the U.S. Congress, was not a feasible option to meet the F-18E’s 
requirement. However, relaxation on some of the fighter performance parameters could 
have lead to cost and time saving solutions, avoiding the development of the F-18E. The 
multivariate plot based on TAD enabled simultaneous exploration of the first and second 
design space in one view. The inverse design approach demonstrated with the 
multivariate plot showed that the combination of high thrust with large wings from the 
beginning ensures higher probability of responding to requirement growth with less time 
and cost. These two demonstrations proved Hypothesis 5.  
Above all, the experiments performed in EvoLVE steps 7-9 were possible because of 
the expansion of the traditional, single-stage design process to a two-stage design process 
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proposed in Hypothesis 1.   This is approved by all the derivative hypotheses proven to 
be true. Table 57 is the summary of how each of the observations induced research 
questions, tasks, observations, and lead to more observations or hypotheses. Also, the 
tasks are documented and the specific page numbers of the observations, research 
questions, and hypotheses are given in the table. Finally, Table 58 summarizes the 
solutions each of the hypotheses proposed in an attempt to improve the identified 
deficiencies and how each solution was tested. The test of Hypotheses 7 and 8 are 
proposed as future research.  
Table 57: Mapping of Observations, Research Questions, and Hypotheses 
Observation Research 
Question 
Tasks Performed Where Outcome 
Obs1 Rq1 Literature review on design 
methods for aircraft evolution 
Ch2 Obs2 
Obs2 Rq2-3 Case study on past aircraft 
upgrade programs 
Ch3 Obs3-4, 
Hyp1 
Obs3 Rq4 Literature review on decision 
making under uncertainty 
Ch4 Obs5, Hyp2 
Obs4 Rq5 Future work Ch8 Hyp7-8 
Obs5 Rq6 Case studies/interview of 
engineers, military officials 
Ch4 Obs6 
Obs6 Rq7 Literature review on decision 
making under risk 
Ch4 Hyp3 
 Rq8 Literature review on strategic 
planning 
Ch4 Hyp4 
 Rq9 Literature review on modern 
design methods 
Ch2 Hyp5 
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Table 58: Summary of Hypothesis Test 
Hypothesis Proposed Solution Tasks Performed Outcome Proved? 
Hypothesis 1 TAD EvoLVE Steps 1-9 Obs7-16 yes 
Hypothesis 2 SPR + TAD EvoLVE Step 8 Obs13  yes 
Hypothesis 3 RASS EvoLVE Step 8 Obs11-12 yes 
Hypothesis 4 Scenario Planning + TAD EvoLVE Step 7 Obs7-10, 16 yes 
Hypothesis 5 DMF + TAD EvoLVE Step 9 Obs14-15 yes 
Hypothesis 6 MDO + TAD EvoLVE Step 7 - yes 
Hypothesis 7 EvoLVE in SoS Level Future work - n/a 
Hypothesis 8 Minefield Mapping of HQ Future work - n/a 
 
8.2 Future Research Opportunities 
This thesis is not a completion to the quest for a design method for lifelong aircraft 
evolution. Rather, it is the beginning of the research in the sense that it has brought up 
more questions than answers. Also, some of the research questions were left unanswered. 
This section identifies several areas of possible improvements to the current study, 
proposes the use of EvoLVE in different perspectives, and opens up new research 
opportunities in the context of design for lifelong evolution.  
8.2.1 Consideration of Retrofitting Existing Airframe 
One of the limitations of this study was that the option of retrofitting existing airframes 
was not considered due to the lack of the cost model of retrofitting. Inclusion of such 
cases would make the study more realistic and valuable. Furthermore, consideration of 
combinations of both newly manufactured and retrofit aircraft, e.g. 350 retrofits and 400 
new manufactures, can be studied within the EvoLVE framework and is identified as a 
future research opportunity.  
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8.2.2 Family of Aircraft Design 
It is a common practice of a military aircraft or engine manufacturer to develop a new 
product for the U.S. government and then sell the variants to other countries after the 
export license is cleared. Some of the foreign orders can be firm from the beginning if 
such development is supported by an international alliance as in the case of the Joint 
Strike Fighter. It is very common in commercial aircraft development that multiple 
variants are planned from the beginning to maximize the market capture as the case 
study on the Boeing 737 series in §3.1.3 exhibited. A typical case in commercial 
transport is to offer variants by the use of fuselage plugs, different engines, and 
equipments. For example, most of the Boeing aircraft can be configured as passenger 
transport, cargo aircraft, an executive jet, etc.  
While the current implementation of EvoLVE considered only one design solution 
for each stage, it can handle more than one first and/or second-stage design. For 
instance, the TAD optimization can be set up in a way that the first-stage design is the 
baseline aircraft and the second-stage problem prepares for multiple variants of the 
baseline. The time gap between the first and second-stage development can be set at 
zero if all the versions are developed in the same timeframe. The design of family of 
aircraft would be a trade-off between the degree of design commonality among the family 
members, the cost of development, and profit. These metrics from the manufacturer’s 
viewpoint are determined by market, competition, and essentially customer satisfaction. 
8.2.3 Weight and Balance Issue Affecting Stability and Control 
The F/A-18E/F was designed from the beginning for growth potential. The ORD 
specifically required internal volume growth potential of 17 ft3 to accommodate future 
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avionics. While the most critical physical constraint is the availability of the volume, 
provisions for the avionics upgrade must be coordinated with other systems and 
subsystems aspects. For example, adding more avionics creates more electrical power 
consumption and a need for additional cooling capacity. Growth provisions on those two 
subsystems must be planned from the beginning to ensure a successful avionics upgrade.  
Another important matter that should not be neglected is the issue of weight and 
balance. The 17-ft3 of room is most likely appropriated from the forward fuselage section. 
When the once empty room is filled with additional equipment, the weight increase in 
the forward part of aircraft will shift the center of gravity (CG) point forward. The 
relative location of the CG point to the neutral point (NP) of the aircraft, defined as 
static margin (SM), determines the vehicle’s longitudinal static stability and 
controllability. Since fighter aircraft are designed with very tight or negative static 
margin to increase agility, even a slight shift in SM can lead to less than desired 
performance. The issue raised here was not included in this study, but it warrants 
further investigation to avoid unexpected project failures and delays as in the case of the 
T-45 introduced in §3.3. To address the issue of the mass property change due to 
upgrade, it is further discussed in §0 along with a proposed solution.  
8.2.4 Systems-of-Systems Research to Identify the Uncertainties at Vehicle 
Systems Level 
In the notional fighter study, the random variables were defined by the author based on 
the actual evolution history of the F/A-18. However, implementation of EvoLVE on a 
real-world problem would require a different way to come up with the random future 
requirements. Considering the fact that the functional requirements are from higher 
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hierarchical levels than the level in which design solutions are synthesized, expanding 
EvoLVE to the SoS level would enable a more systematic and quantitative approach to 
define aircraft design requirements both deterministically and probabilistically. 
Figure 102 shows an example of a hierarchical structure involving a U.S. Navy 
fighter such as the F/A-18 Hornet. At higher levels, there are U.S. Navy Air Wings 
below which are Navy Combat Aircraft Fleets, consisting of fighter aircraft such as the 
F-14 Tomcat, F/A-18 Hornet, and A-7. Finally, the F-18 is at the vehicle systems level. 
The requirements for the F/A-18E/F as summarized in APPENDIX B were defined 
deterministically as threshold and objective values for each performance parameter. 
Although such behind-the-scene information is not available publicly, it is not hard to 
imagine that some higher level studies (for example the CBO study in 0) led to the 
definition of the F/A-18E/F’s requirements.  
The author hypothesizes that if such campaign level studies that defined E/F’s 
requirements had been conducted in a probabilistic manner by running a Monte Carlo 
Simulation with respect to probabilistically defined conflict scenarios, it would have been 
possible to provide the KPPs in the form of PDFs. This idea is formally stated as:  
 
Hypothesis 7: Observing the fact that the requirements at a certain hierarchical level in 
engineering design come from higher level problems, Monte Carlo Simulation at a 
System-of-Systems level would enable quantification of the probability density 
functions of the random variables at the air-vehicle systems level. (Research 
Question 6) 
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Figure 102: The Hierarchy of the Naval Fighter Design Problem 
8.2.5 Risk-Averse Stochastic Programming 
While systematic integration of risk associated with uncertainty, proposed by Hypothesis 
3, had proved its usefulness, the degrees of freedom were limited to which strategy the 
decision makers could choose among the finite number of strategies. A more rigorous 
treatment of risk would require the use of the risk measure as part of an objective 
function.  
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This formulation is particularly compatible with the situation where a fixed contract 
stipulation is amended by monetary penalty on the occurrence of schedule slippage and 
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cost overrun. Once the model of such penalty is developed, the equations can be readily 
applied to the notional fighter example.  
8.2.6 MDO Techniques for Deterministic Two-Stage Aircraft Design  
The use of AAO to solve the deterministic two stage aircraft design optimization 
problems in §7.8.2 demonstrated the order-of-magnitude reduction in time to converge; 
the application of an MDO technique was only limited to AAO. A more comprehensive 
study is proposed to compare the performance of widely accepted MDO techniques, such 
as CO and BLISS. Since a comparative study of MDO techniques requires solving the 
same problem with various different methods at numerous optimization settings, such as 
convergence criteria, optimization algorithm, finite difference methods, and finite 
difference step sizes, this study would be ideally conducted with a simpler problem than 
aircraft design, such as the two-stage beam problem.  
8.2.7 Design for Lifelong Vehicle Evolution Ensuring Satisfactory Handling 
Qualities  
Finally, a completely different approach than the current EvoLVE process is proposed 
herein. A current design practice in the helicopter industry is that the high-level design 
parameters are determined during conceptual design considering high-level design 
metrics such as performance.  Then, some of the lower level constraints, such as handling 
qualities, are analyzed, and control gains are fine tuned at later phases. If it turns out 
that Level-1 Handling Qualities (HQ) cannot be achieved within the current design 
setting, the design is changed at the higher level until it reaches a convergence. This 
traditional approach is essentially serial rather than parallel in that HQs are fall-outs 
rather than designed-in from the beginning of the design process. This ad-hoc or trial-
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and-error type of approach might take longer than a parallel process but might be 
inevitable because a lack of vehicle definition, lack of disciplinary analysis, test data, etc. 
at an early phase of design renders HQ analysis very difficult or meaningless. This 
traditional approach has proved to be practical as past successful rotorcraft 
developments have shown.  
However, modern trends in helicopter development include that the helicopters are 
operated longer than initially planned, and they are often reconfigured as the customer’s 
needs evolve over time. In most instances, the vehicle is not operated at the point where 
it was originally designed. The evolution of rotorcraft has been that the derivatives are 
heavier and carrying more payloads and fuel than the original version did. This weight 
increase often compromised agility, HQ, safety, and survivability. 
For instance, assume that the random variable under investigation is the gross 
weight of the vehicle including airframe, crews, payload, and fuel weight. When it is 
likely that the gross weight of the vehicle will increase in the future by as much as one 
hundred percent as shown in the case of the CH-47 in §3.1.2, it will not change 
aerodynamic properties of the vehicle or engine characteristics much. However, in the 
case of military aircraft, degraded agility and/or handling qualities due to sluggish 
response of the body can cause mission failure and loss of life. A research question that 
can be asked is: how can a design evolution path(s) be identified, with which future 
design changes or operational mission changes are safely implemented without 
compromising safety? Is there a systematic and efficient way to prevent poor HQ in 
derivative rotorcraft? 
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A solution is proposed by creating a map of design space showing the probability of 
design infeasibilities, for example having poor HQ. The idea is named “mine-field 
mapping” to indicate that the goal is not to find an optimum solution but to avoid bad 
designs. It would be possible to create such a mapping of the design space using an 
inverse design technique along with a Monte Carlo Simulation in a two-stage design 
setting. The use of a classification neural network can divide the design space into the 
regions of Level-1, Level-2, and Level-3 HQ. With the map, the designer can identify not 
only the original design point with Level-1 HQ, but also the potential evolution paths 
with high probability of Level-1 HQ. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Early identification and integration of the key physical constraints into the 
aircraft sizing and synthesis loop would reduce the possibility of technical 
infeasibility being identified during later stages. (Research Question 5) 
Sub-Hypothesis 8-1: Expansion of the traditional single-stage design process to a time 
phased design process along with the inverse design technique and classification 
neural network technique would enable identification of the design space mapping 
with which the designer can find safer design evolution paths and reduce the 
probability of unexpected system failure. 
 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
While our lives are full of decisions made under growing, uncertain needs, the author 
would like to claim that this thesis is the first solidified, analytic effort to address the 
paradigm shift to design for lifelong system evolution in the aerospace systems design 
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domain. While the work presented here is not complete, let alone perfect, the author 
hopes that it will make a small stepping-stone that researchers in the future will find 
helpful in their quest for better design methodology or processes incorporating lifelong 
system evolution.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
SYSTEM-OF-SYTEMS STUDY EXAMPLES 
 
Example SoS level studies that can be potentially used in identifying aircraft system 
level requirements are introduced here. A U.S. Navy Air Wings level study involving the 
F/A-18 conducted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1987 is introduced first. 
The Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) required by the DoD in major 
DoD acquisition programs and the system specific System Threat Assessment Report 
(STAR) prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are also examples of SoS 
level studies involving the friendly force structure and enemy capability projection in the 
future.  
A.1 A CBO Study on US Naval Combat Aircraft  
In 1987, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [80] conducted a study at the U.S. 
Navy Air Wings level, encompassing the U.S. Navy fighter aircraft fleet including the 
F/A-18. The goal of the study was to formulate and evaluate the modernization 
strategies of the U.S. Navy combat aircraft into the 1990s in terms of aircraft types and 
mission roles they would perform, production quantity, and the time frame they would 
be needed. The study started by projecting enemy threat into the future and simulating 
conflict scenarios. Figure 103 is the mission radii of various Soviet Union bombers and 
fighters launched from Kola Peninsula, covering most of Europe including the United 
Kingdom. The geographical region was the main theater they considered to identify the 
needed capability of the U.S. Naval combat aircraft fleet beyond the 1990s.  
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After the evolution of the threat was evaluated, the means to counter the increasing 
threat was sought. The alternatives were sought by projecting the friendly force 
structure at the Navy Air Wing fleet level. Table 59 from [80] lists the spectrum of 
missions performed by naval aircraft in the late 1980s. For example, the feet air defense 
and strike warfare missions were conducted by the F-14, F/A-4, F/A-18A/B/C/D, A-6, 
and AV-8. The CBO study examined the retirement/procurement schedule and the 
performance of the existing fleet, and then offered the options to fill the projected 
deficiency. For details on the alternatives and comparisons, refer to [80].  
 
Figure 103: Mission Radii of Unrefueled Soviet Union Bombers and Fighters [80] 
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Table 59: Naval Aircraft and Their Primary Missions [80] 
Fleet Air 
Defense 
Strike 
Warfare 
Anti-submarine 
Warfare 
Electronic 
Warfare 
Amphibious 
Assault 
F-14 F/A-18 P-3 E-2 CH-46 
F-4 A-6 S-3 EA-6 CH-53 
F/A-18 AV-8 SH-2 ES-3 V-22 
 F-4 SH-3  AH-1 
 A-4 SH-60B/F   
 
A.2 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) 
DoD’s system acquisition process requires a cost and operational effectiveness analysis 
(COEA) to be conducted for the Milestone I review as a means to determine whether a 
new acquisition program is warranted [14, 213]. The goal of COEA is to compare 
performance, cost, and schedule of alternatives under various operational and threat 
scenarios. Scenarios are generated to reflect the wide spectrum of possible operations. 
Alternatives are candidate systems and mixes of candidate systems that can fulfill the 
anticipated missions. The candidate systems include both the new system under 
consideration and the existing systems. The threat is developed by the entity conducting 
COEA and approved by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In particular, a system 
specific System Threat Assessment Report (STAR), produced during Phase 0, can be 
used as the basis for the threat in the COEA. Drivers of performance, cost, and schedule 
are identified as Measure of Effectiveness (MoE). Then, parametric variations of the 
threats are studied to see the impact on the effectiveness. The COEA that was prepared 
for the acquisition of the U.S. Marine Co.’s Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) concept is 
provided as an example case in Table 60. 
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A STAR was created by the Naval Maritime Intelligence Center (NAVMIC) for the 
F/A-18E/F program*. However, the formal COEA was waived since it entered the EMD 
(Phase II) directly. Although a formal COEA was waived, the Navy conducted extensive 
analysis to compare cost and benefit alternatives as provided in [83]. The study 
evaluated combinations of F-14 variants and F/A-18E/F to compare performance, cost, 
and program schedule. The MoEs for the F/A-18E/F COEA were [83]:  
• Survivability (measured by RCS)/Vulnerability (vulnerable area) 
• Unit cost 
• Strike mission radius 
• Carrier suitability (recovery and launch wind-over-deck) 
• Fighter performance (such as turn rate, climb rate, and excess power) 
• Weapons system features 
• Armament flexibility  
 
 
 
                                                                                       
*F/A-18E/F STAR, NAVMIC TA#037-92 is not available publicly.  
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Table 60: COEA Study for the USMC Medium Lift Replacement Program [214]  
Scenarios For Amphibious Assault  
• Ship ranges of 50, 75, and 100 nm  
• Operation Size of Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and 
Marin Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 
For Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Missions 
• Ship ranges of 25, 200, and 400 nm. 
Threat Use MLR STAR and following documents 
• Strike/Surface/Air Warfare Intelligence Compendium, 
NAVMIC Compendium #2-92 
• F/A-18E/F STAR, NAVMIC TA#037-92 
• Advanced Interdiction Weapon System STAR, NAVMIC 
TA#031-92 
Alternatives  
(Mix of CH-53E and) 
 
• Upgrade of existing helicopters 
• Major modifications of existing helicopters 
• New helicopter developments 
• V-22 
• V-22 and helicopter alternatives 
Measures of 
Effectiveness 
 
For MEB/MEF Vertical Assault Elements:  
• Combat power delivered over time 
• Correlation of forces/means (COF/M) 
For MEU Operations:  
• Time in/time out with objective met 
Cost Analysis RDT&E, procurement, military construction, and operation and 
support assuming a 20-year lifecycle 
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APPENDIX B 
 
F/A-18 DESIGN REQUIREMENT 
 
Military combat aircraft design requirements are prepared in terms of both mission 
performance and point performance requirements [215]. The point performance 
requirement decides the aerodynamic characteristics and the two important design 
parameters, thrust to weight ratio (T/W) and wing loading (W/S). The mission 
performance requirement sizes the air vehicle by matching fuel required and available. 
The mission requirement determines how much fuel an air vehicle needs to carry.  
The F/A-18 Hornet, conceived as a multi-role strike fighter to replace both the F-4 
and the A-7, was designed and sized by two different mission profiles. Those “primary” 
or “design missions” are fighter escort mission as a fighter aircraft and carrier-based 
interdiction mission using the hi-lo-lo-hi profile as an attack aircraft. These two missions 
dictated the design of the F/A-18 and its fuel requirement. Lenox [77] stated about the 
design missions of the F/A-18A/B in 1976 as follows:  
The basic design of the airplane comes out of an operational requirement, which, in 
its call for an airplane to replace the F-4 and the A-7, identified a fighter escort 
mission and an interdiction mission—with certain store requirements, certain range 
requirements, certain fuel reserve requirements, etc. So, it’s those two missions 
which determined the basic airplane design and internal fuel requirements. 
For the interdiction and fighter escort missions, the following external store conditions 
were specified:  
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F/A-18A/B/C/D [183] 
Attack configuration: two AIM-9s, FLIR, LTD, four MK-83 bombs, and three 
330-gallon fuel tanks 
Fighter configuration: two AIM-9s and two AIM-7s 
 
F/A-18E/F [175] 
Attack configuration: two AIM-9s, FLIR, NAVFLIR, four MK-83 bombs, and 
three 480-gallon fuel tanks 
Fighter configuration: two AIM-9s and two AIM-120s 
 
The F/A-18 A, C, and E versions’ mission performance data were collected from 
various sources and summarized in Table 61*. The sources include a paper by Lenox in 
1976 [77], a paper by Young in 1998 [76], a CRS report in 2007 [74], the DoD data found 
in the appendix of a GAO report in 1996 [191], another GAO report in 2000 [208], the 
Navy Fact File [216], and the annual Jane’s All the World Aircraft published from 1981 
to 1993. The table shows mission radius, external store conditions, and reserve condition 
for four different missions: the hi-lo-lo-hi interdiction, the hi-hi-hi interdiction, the fighter 
escort, the ferry, and the combat ferry missions. Data for the F/A-18A was most difficult 
to obtain, while C and E data were relatively abundant.  
   
                                                                                       
*all mission radius in nautical miles, range for the ferry missions 
Note 1.  (2) AIM-9, FLIR, Laser Spot Tracker Pod, (4) MK-83 
Note 1-1. includes but may not be limited to (2) AIM-9, (4) MK-83 
Note 1-3. includes but may not be limited to FLIR and Laser Tracker 
Note 2.  (2) AIM-9, FLIR, NAVFLIR, (4) MK-83LDGP 
Note 3.  (2) AIM-9, (2) AIM-7 
Note 4.  (2) AIM-9, (2) AIM-120 
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Table 61: Published F-18 Mission and Range  
Mission Type Version Radius Fuel Tanks Stores Source and Year Reserve Type Reserve Condition Other 
Interdiction A 550/575(3) 330 gallon Note 1 Lenox 1976/Janes 80-87 not listed not listed Includes sea-level dash 
(Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi) C 290(2) 330 gallon not listed Janes 1992-93 not listed not listed   
  C 304(2) 330 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Carrier-based fixed fuel not listed Standard profile 
  C 325(2) 330 gallon Note 1-1 Young 1998 Carrier-based fixed fuel not listed   
  C 369(3) 330 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Carrier-based fixed fuel not listed Standard profile 
  C 415(3) 330 gallon not listed CRS 2007 not listed not listed   
  E 468(2) 480 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Land-based 1900~2200 lb of fuel Standard profile 
  E 524(3) 480 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Land-based 1900~2200 lb of fuel Standard profile 
  E 490(3) 480 gallon not listed CRS 2007 not listed not listed   
  E 444(2) 480 gallon not listed GAO 2000 not listed not listed   
  E 496(3) 480 gallon not listed GAO 2000 not listed not listed   
Interdiction C 395(2) 330 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Carrier-based fixed fuel not listed Standard profile 
(Hi-Hi-Hi) C 470(3) 330 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Carrier-based fixed fuel not listed Standard profile 
  E 597(2) 480 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Land-based 1900~2200 lb of fuel Standard profile 
  E 666(3) 480 gallon Note 2 DoD 1996 Land-based 1900~2200 lb of fuel Standard profile 
Attack A 575not listed Note 1-3 Janes 1980-87 not listed not listed   
Fighter Escort A 400+None Note 3 Lenox 1976 Land-based 20 min+5% of initial fuel 2500 lb of combat fuel 
  C 366None not listed CRS 2007 not listed not listed   
  E 420None not listed CRS 2007 not listed not listed   
  E 462None not listed GAO 2000 not listed not listed Standard profile 
Ferry A 1800+not listed not listed Janes 1992-3 not listed not listed   
  A 2000+not listed not listed Janes 1980-91 not listed not listed   
  C 1546(3) 330 gallon (2) AIM-9 Navy 2008 not listed not listed   
  E 1660(3) 480 gallon (2) AIM-9 Navy 2008 not listed not listed   
Combat Ferry C 1089None (2) AIM-9 Navy 2008 not listed not listed   
  E 1275None (2) AIM-9 Navy 2008 not listed not listed   
    See the previous page for Note 1, Note 1-1, Note 1-2, Note 2, Note 3, and Note 4  
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As shown in Table 61, mission radii for the same version of the F/A-18 flying the 
same mission varies noticeably from source to source. The F/A-18 C’s mission radii for 
the hi-lo-lo-hi interdiction with two 330-gallon external tanks are reported as 290, 304, 
and 325 nm from three different sources. With three 330-gallon tanks, the discrepancy is 
even larger, ranging from 415 to 468 nm. Jane’s All the World Aircraft has been 
publishing F/A-18 performance data every year since 1980, and F/A-18 A ferry range 
has been listed as “2,000+ nm” from 1980 to 1991 and reduced to “1,800+ nm” after 
1992. The book also listed the attack radius of the F/A-18 A to be 575 nm from its 1980 
to 1987 issues, except for the 1981 issue at 550 nm. 
Possible sources of discrepancies include the difference in aircraft empty weight 
within the version, published data being based on estimation rather than flight test, and 
different reserve conditions being used. Aircraft empty weight varies (usually increases) 
production lot after lot, and it is not certain which mission radius is based on a vehicle 
from which lot. For a vehicle in development phases, its performance data is based on 
estimation and optimistic performance estimation is very common. Some of the F/A-
18A’s and the F/A-18E’s performance data published while the concepts were still in 
development seems to be based on estimation. This issue is discussed in more detailed in 
§7.6.6.2. 
The most critical source of the mission radius variations from data source to data 
source seems to be attributed to the inconsistent use of reserve types and conditions. 
While it is standard to have reserve fuel for 20 minute loiter at sea level, plus 5% of 
initial fuel for a land-based aircraft, a carrier-based aircraft is typically required a more 
stringent reserve mission profile in order to ensure adequate fuel to an alternate airport 
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during mid-ocean operations. According to MIL-STD-3031 [172], a reserve profile  for a 
carrier-based aircraft should choose from following three types: 
1. Any number of visual flight rules (VFR) and/or instrument flight rules (IFR) 
passes in the landing configuration (flaps and gears down; speed break at 
final turn and approach) 
2. 100 nm BINGO fuel (the minimum fuel required to divert to an alternate landing 
site using an emergency flight profile) 
3. A specified quantity of fuel (typically 3000 to 4000 lb) 
Most published mission performance did not specify what the reserve type was, but 
the inconsistent use of reserve type in the DoD’s documents was identified. The DoD 
compared F/A-18 C’s and E’s mission performance to illustrate the performance 
deficiency of the C version and to justify the Super Hornet program. Such comparison, 
appearing in Appendix III of the 1996 GAO report [191] and provided in Figure 104, 
shows that the F/A-18E’s promises 42 to 54 percent mission radius increase over the C 
version. The DoD stated the that standardized mission profiles were used for the 
comparison “in order to get an apples to apples valid comparison with other platforms.” 
However, it seems that the DoD used the less stringent land-based reserve type for the 
F/A-18E’s performance estimation, while they used the carrier-based reserve type for the 
F/A-18C’s performance. The land-based reserve only requires about 1,900 to 2,200 lb of 
fuel, while the carrier-based reserve requires about 3,500 to 5,000 lb of fuel. The GAO 
report [191] caught this discrepancy, stating that 
 According to NAVAIR data, in the E/F Early Operation Assessment, the E/F’s 
first pass fuel level for determining combat range varies from approximately 1,900 
pounds to about 2,200 pounds, depending on the mission profile. If the higher 
5,000-pound reserve fuel DoD stated is needed for carrier recovery payload were 
used for range calculations, the range would be lower than reported.     
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Figure 104: F/A-18C and E Mission Range Comparison by the DoD [191] 
What is more interesting is that the DoD used the stringent carrier-based reserve fuel 
weight in order to justify the improvement of the F/A-18 Hornet’s bring back capability. 
The DoD stated in the GAO report that “Air Wings consistently set operating 
procedures for first pass fuel at 4,000 lbs. day/5,000 lbs. night during early work ups. As 
the experience base increases, first pass fuel is brought down to 3,500 lbs. day/4,500 lbs. 
night.” 
On March 22, 2000, the honorable Colye [217], Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the issue:  
… the ORD-defined specification missions using a 2000-lb. reserve fuel… 
Associated with these KPP range requirements, as established by the ORD, are 
specific flight profiles. These are the Fighter Escort Mission and Interdiction 
Mission flight profiles established by the F/A-18E/F Specification. These profiles 
are well defined in the system specification and are documented in the F/A-18E/F 
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TEMP. All computations of ORD profile ranges were conducted to include the 100 
nautical mile divert leg to arrive overhead at the divert location with 2000 lbs. of 
fuel. In contrast, the CNO/operational missions did not have a reserve fuel 
specified, and as such the threshold values were interpreted relative to current 
F/A-18C/D practices. For these missions, the peacetime training reserve fuel of 
4000 lbs. was used. 
The difference in reserve fuel amount directly affected mission radius. Considering 
the fact that specific range of the F/A-18 in attack configuration is about 0.1 nautical 
miles per pound of fuel at best cruise altitude and Mach number [183], the aircraft gains 
roughly 50 nm in mission radius if the reserve fuel requirement is reduced by 1,000 lb.  
The key performance parameters (KPPs) are the most critical performance measures 
of a given system. The KPPs are often defined as objective and failure to meet the 
threshold value can cause the program to be terminated [153]. The list of KPPs of the 
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet was obtained along with the threshold, objective, and 
demonstrated values. All the values related to F/A-18E/F are either from a GAO report 
in 2000 [208] or from a DoD report in 1999 [153]. In addition, the F/A-18 C’s 
performance data were collected from [74, 175, 183, 191, 201, 218]. The actual 
performance values of both F/A-18C and E are provided in Table 62. The F/A-18 C’s 
performance is for the LOT XIX production model with the F404-GE-402 engines, 
except for the combat ceiling. The combat ceiling data was from the F/A-18A/B/C/D 
NATOPS Flight Manual with the F404-GE-400 engines [183].  
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Table 62: F/A-18C and E Performance Requirements 
 F/A-18E F/A-18C  
Constraint \ Data Type Objective Threshold Actual Actual Units 
Fighter escort radius* >425 >410 462 366 nm 
Interdiction mission radius† >450 >430 496 369 nm 
Combat ceiling >50,000 >50,000 52,300 53,141 ft 
Recovery payload >9000 >9000 9,125 5,623 lb 
Launch wind over deck  < 25 < 30 28 not listed knots 
Recovery wind over deck  <10 < 15 8 not listed knots 
Approach speed  <140 < 150 142 141 knots 
Specific excess power‡ at 0.9/10,000 ft > 650 > 600 648 699 ft/sec 
Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M at 35,000 ft  < 60 < 70 65 55.8 sec 
Turn rate at 15,000 ft not listed not listed 11.6 12.3 deg/sec 
 
                                                                                       
*One way unrefueled range using internal fuel and no external fuel tanks 
†One way unrefueled range using external fuel tanks (3-480 gallon for E and 3-330 gallon for A and C) 
‡1 g level flight in fighter configuration, maximum thrust, 60% total fuel remaining; 2 AIM-9 and 2 AIM-120 
for E and 2 AIM-9 and 2 AIM-7 for C; 33,325 lbs of combat weight for C 
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APPENDIX C 
 
F/A-18 COST DATA 
 
APPENDIX C.1 provides some military cost definitions and some useful data sources for 
military cost analysis in general. To construct and validate the cost model of the F/A-18, 
numerous public domain sources were consulted. The F/A-18 specific cost data are 
collected and reviewed in APPENDIX C.2. Validation of the cost model was conducted 
by modeling the four aircraft configurations proposed in the Hornet 2000 study that is 
introduced in APPENDIX C.3. Finally, APPENDIX C.4 reviews the F/A-18A/B/C/D 
and E/F test and evaluation programs. 
C.1 Military Cost Definitions and Data Sources 
US Code, Title-10, Chapter 44 on major defense acquisition programs [219] presents cost 
definitions with respect to a major defense acquisition program: 
Program acquisition (unit) cost: the total cost for development and procurement of, 
and system-specific military construction for, the acquisition program, (divided by 
the number of fully-configured end items to be produced for the acquisition 
program.)  
Procurement (unit) cost: the total of all funds programmed to be available for 
obligation for procurement for the program, (divided by the number of fully-
configured end items to be procured.) 
Full life-cycle cost: all costs of development, procurement, military construction, 
and operations and support, without regard to funding source or management 
control.  
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [220] defines O&S costs as  
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The total of the operation and maintenance accounts, the military personnel 
accounts, and the portion of the family housing accounts aimed at short-term 
maintenance of DoD family housing. 
Operation and maintenance includes: fuel, spare parts, supplies to run and maintain the 
equipments, transportation, logistics, training, education, recruiting, medical, 
administration, salaries for civilian personnel, etc. Operation and maintenance cost and 
military personnel cost account for 99 percent of the total O&S cost [220].  
The Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) are quarterly status reports from the 
Department of Defense to the Congress on major defense acquisition programs in 
accordance with Title 10, US Code 2432 [219]. SARs present “each system program 
manager’s current best estimate of key performance, schedule, and cost goals from the 
total program [221].” SARs are focused on program total acquisition cost and do not 
provide data for O&S. 
SAR summary tables from 1969 to the present are available through the DoD’s 
Acquisition Resources and Analysis website, and it provides the total program 
acquisition cost and production quantity for the F/A-18. An issue with using the SAR 
summary table for this study is that it does not differentiate A/B and C/D programs, 
because the C/D program was a minor upgrade that was done through several 
engineering modification proposals. Also, SAR summary tables only provides the total 
program cost and do not break it down to RDT&E, procurement, and military 
construction.  
RDT&E Descriptive Summary (RDDS) is the budget report on the DoD’s RDT&E 
programs. The report is issued annually and is a very good source of studying the 
RDT&E cost of aircraft upgrade programs. For example, the F/A-18C/D radar upgrade 
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program RDT&E cost and F/A-18C/D aircraft upgrade RDT&E cost were reported in 
FY 1998 RDT&E, N Budget Item Justification Sheet. The F/A-18A/B/C/D 
improvement programs were conducted until 2005, well after the production of the last 
F/A-18C/D [222]. 
A good source of O&S cost data is the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating 
and Support Costs (VAMOSC) that has been established since the mid-1970s. The 
VAMOSC is an on-line based information management system that “collects and 
reports U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps historical weapon system operating and 
support (O&S) costs. VAMOSC provides the direct O&S costs of weapon systems, 
some linked indirect costs (e.g., ship depot overhead), and related non-cost 
information, such as flying hour metrics, steaming hours, age of aircraft, etc [223, 
224].” The database is accessed via www.navyvamosc.com.  
The Department of the Navy reports its budget estimates annually or biennially to 
the Congress. These unclassified documents provide detailed RDT&E and procurement 
cost estimates to justify the Navy’s budget request for the following fiscal year. These 
reports are particularly useful in studying aircraft modification cost at the sub-systems 
level. Procurement of upgrades to existing aircraft are done in installation kits. For 
example, 219 F/A-18A/B and 464 C/D were retrofitted with GPS using installation kits 
between 1994 and 2000 [224].  
C.2 Collection of the F/A-18 Cost Data 
This section introduces the F/A-18 cost data that were collected from various public 
domain sources. While collecting cost data, a wide range of literature was consulted from 
as early as 1975 to 2006, encompassing the lifecycle cost of all F/A-18 variants.  
In 1975, F/A-18A/B’s unit flyaway and unit acquisition costs were projected to be 
5.9 and 9.97 million dollars according to [225], based on production of 800 units. In 1982, 
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CBO [221] studied modernization strategies for the U.S. Navy Air Wings and compared 
the cost for various Navy aircraft. The report listed the procurement, operation and 
support, and lifecycle cost estimations of the Navy aircraft of interest including the F/A-
18, A-7E, A-6E, F-14, E-2C, S-3A, and others. The estimation of F/A-18’s average unit 
procurement cost was 20 million assuming the production of 1,366 units, and 17.2 million 
for the last 665 aircraft, in 1983 dollars. The CBO report is also a good source for 
operation and support cost modeling, since it listed the number of officers and enlisted 
required for each aircraft type, the number of aircraft required for one squadron, and the 
number of squadrons for one carrier air wings, and so forth. For example, Table 63 
summarizes the operation costs of various U.S. Navy aircraft for one carrier air wing per 
year in 1983 dollars. The readers are referred to [221] for assumptions and details.  
Table 63: Operation Costs for One Carrier Air Wing per Year   
Aircraft # of A/C per  
Air Wing 
Personnel Operation and  
Maintenance 
Total 
F/A-18 24 4 40 44 
F-14 24 6 51 57 
E-2C 4 4 8 12 
EA-6B 4 4 12 16 
S-3A 10 6 21 27 
SH-60 6 4 19 23 
 
The F/A-18 Hornet program was included in SAR from 1976 until December 1994. 
The final F/A-18 Hornet program cost when the program was ended in 1994 was 
36,783.4 billion in 1994 dollars [226]. The program cost includes the RDT&E and 
procurement of 1,026 aircraft in total [226]. The F/A-18A/B and C/D programs were 
not reported separately in the Navy’s and DoD’s budget reports. While the RDT&E cost 
of the F/A-18A/B was not separately available from the SARs, a Rand report [227] 
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qualitatively compared the total RDT&E engineering hours of the F/A-18A/B and the 
E/F programs as shown in Figure 105.  
On June 30, 1992, the House of Armed Services Committee held a hearing to handle 
the Defense Acquisition Board review of the F/A-18E/F program [83]. The hearing 
discussed various U.S. Navy fleet options after the mid-1990s, including 40 F-14D carrier 
air wings (CVWs); 20 F-14D and 20 F/A-18E/F CVWs; 40 F/A-18E/F CVWs; 20 F/A-
18C/D; and 20 STC-21 CVWs. The comparison included lifecycle cost of pursuing each 
option. Table 64 shows the cost of acquiring and operating the F/A-18E/F, F/A-18C/D, 
and F-14D in 1990 million dollars, assuming 20 years of service life. The F/A-18C/D 
E&MD cost of 500 million dollars was the only number the author could come across 
that separately reports the F/A-18C/D program development cost and used in cost 
modeling process. 
Table 64: Cost Comparison of F/A-18C/D, E/F and F-14D 
 E/F F-14D C/D 
Aircraft quantity 962 1,084 481 
E&MD 4,880 330 500 
Total procurement 43,480 47,150 16,550 
Operations and support 23,540 31,840 11,340 
Total  71,900 79,320 28,390 
 
Figure 105: Comparison of F/A-22 and F/A-18 EMD Engineering Hours [227] 
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Figure 106: F/A-22 and F/A-18E/F EMD Program Cost Drivers [4] 
The 4,880 million dollars spent on the F/A-18E/F EMD program is broken down 
into cost spent on airframe, propulsion, avionics, system test and evaluation (ST&E), 
and others as shown in Figure 106 along with the F-22 EMD cost. It is important to 
note that the portion of EMD cost spent on the F/A-18E/F’s avionics is not only 
absolutely but also relatively small compared to the avionics cost of the F-22. The cost 
saving is attributed to the fact that the F/A-18E/F used 90 percent of the C/D’s 
avionics in the beginning, followed by P3I upgrades. 
A Master’s Thesis by Duma [228] from the Naval Postgraduate School developed a 
model that estimates aviation depot level repair (AVDLR) cost based on the F/A-18. In 
addition, a MBA professional report [229] also from the Naval Postgraduate School 
includes operation cost comparison of the F/A-18A/B and the F-5 E/F based on the 
VAMOSC data. The study broke down the operation cost into fuel, maintenance, and 
AVDLR costs per flight hour. These reports did not cover entire O&S cost but focused 
on major subsets of O&S cost elements.  
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In 1996, GAO [191] investigated the E/F program for the U.S. Congress and 
published a reliable cost breakdown of the F/A-18E/F program as provided in Table 65. 
It also listed the average recurring flyaway cost of 36 C/D’s built in 1994 as $26.175 in 
1994 million dollars. The data set in the table was used as the main source for the F/A-
18E/F cost model calibration. 
Table 65: F/A-18E/F Unit Cost Estimation in 1996 million dollars 
  E/F 
RDT&E 5.783 
Recurring Flyaway 43.6 
Total Flyaway 48.7 
Initial Spares and Support 8.61 
Procurement 57.31 
Total Program 63.093 
Number of Aircraft Assumed 1,000 
 
The F/A-18E/F program has been included in SAR since December 1991. Table 66 
summarizes important changes to the program classification, program cost estimation, 
and the production quantify found in the SARs from 1992 to 2007. The Super Hornet 
program was classified as a PE program from December 1991 to March 1992, then as a 
DE program as the EMD phase started from June 1992 to December 1997, and then as 
PDE after the conclusion of the EMD phase. Total production of 1,000 E/F was initially 
planned but reduced to 548 in December 1997. The total number of aircraft changes 
several times afterwards, and as of December 2007 the total planned production is 493 
aircraft.  
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Table 66: F/A-18E/F Program Cost and Production Quantity Projections 
 Dec-91 Jun-92 Dec-97 Sep-00 Dec-01 Dec-03 Dec-07 
 PE PE/DE DE DE/PDE PDE PDE PDE 
RDTE (BY1992) 1,738.6        
RDTE (TY) 5,109.9        
Program (BY1990)  53,959.6 34,292.9 43,489.6    
Program (TY)  94,583.0 46,064.1 46,825.7    
Program (BY2000)     45,289.7 41,665.3 43,257.6 
Program (TY)     48,791.1 43,845.2 46,344.8 
Aircraft Quantity  1,000 548 548 548 462 493 
    *in million Base-Year(BY) or Then-Year(TY) 
 
C.3 The Hornet 2000 Study 
In 1987, McDonnell Douglas studied the options to upgrade the F/A-18A/B under a 
contract to the US DoD [171]. Figure 107 from [76] shows the seven different 
configurations investigated as the upgrades options. By taking the 1988 version of 
Hornet as the baseline, a series of upgrades, such as improved avionics, new cockpits, 
more internal fuel volume, and higher thrust engines were considered. Table 67 lists the 
changes planned for each of the configurations. Configuration I was essentially the F/A-
18C/D and Configuration IIIC became the basis for the F/A-18E/F. All other 
configurations were discarded.  
The Hornet 2000 study compared both recurring and nonrecurring cost for the seven 
options. While the original document was not available to the author, the non-
dimensionalized numbers were published by Young [76]. By combining some of the cost 
data found in §C.2 and the non-dimensional cost from Hornet 2000 study, dimensional 
cost for F/A-18 upgrade was constructed. These cost data set were used in calibrating 
the RDT&E and production cost model of the notional multi-role fighter in §7.7.  
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Figure 107: F/A-18 Upgrade Options from Hornet 2000 Study [76]  
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Table 67: F/A-18 Upgrade Cost from Hornet 2000 Study [76, 171] 
Configuration I II III IIIA IIIB IIIC IV 
Major 
upgrades 
FY88 plus, 
- Avionics 
upgrades 
- Weapon system 
upgrades 
- F404-GE-402 
engines 
I plus, 
- Increase fuel capacity 
- F414-GE-400 engines 
- Active array radar* 
- INEWS 
Configuration 
 changes 
Retrofit of new 
equipments and 
engines without 
modification to 
airframe 
Raised 
dorsal 
Stiffened 
wing 
Raised 
dorsal 
25% Larger 
wing 
(increased 
chord) 
Larger tails 
2'3.5'' 
Fuselage 
plugs 
25% Larger 
wing 
(increased 
chord) 
Larger tails 
Raised dorsal 
25% Larger 
wing 
(increased 
chord and 
span) 
Larger tails 
2'3.5" 
Fuselage 
plug 
25% Larger 
wing 
(increased 
chord and 
span) 
Larger tails 
Fuselage 
plugs 
Cranked 
arrow wing 
with 
canards 
New V tails 
Additional  
Internal Fuel 
zero 2700 lb 3700 lb 2700 lb 3700 lb 2700 lb 3197 lb 
$Recurring 1.14 1.3 1.37 1.36 1.4 1.39 1.46 
$Non-
Recurring 
1 2.22 2.88 2.77 2.89 2.78 3.44 
 
C.4 Overview of the F/A-18A/B and E/F Test Programs 
For military acquisition programs, conformation to the specified requirements defined by 
the ORD is supported through a series of test and evaluation programs that are prepared 
in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.2 [230]. Figure 108 from DoDI 5000.2 shows 
military acquisition process and testing activities at each milestone and phase. Before 
milestones B and C, a test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) is prepared by the 
program manager and approved by the Director of Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E).  
                                                                                       
*F/A-18C/D and E/F Radar upgrade to active array radar was done as one of the F/A-18 radar 
P3I programs starting in 1999 [224]. Budget for RDT&E and procurement costs for these radars 
were prepared separately from the F/A-18C/D and E/F programs. Thus, the F/A-18 cost model 
in this study also excluded cost related to the radar upgrade.  
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The testing and evaluation process for a major acquisition program can be divided 
into developmental testing and evaluation (DT&E) and operational testing and 
evaluation (OT&E). DT&E is usually conducted by the contractors to prove that the 
system functions as intended and is usually completed before the approval of low rate 
initial production (LRIP) at Milestone C. Military Handbook 881 [231] provides work 
breakdown structure (WBS) for T&E programs. A typical fighter DT&E program 
includes but not limited to: M&S, wind-tunnel tests, static article and test, fatigue 
article and test, drop article and test, subsystem ground tests, avionics integration tests, 
armament and weapon delivery integration tests, flight tests, etc. DT&E is typically 
conducted using the prototype or EMD vehicle. OT&E, also called operational 
evaluation (OPEVAL) by the US Navy, is performed by the user of the product using 
 
Figure 108: Testing and the Defense Acquisition Process in DODI 5000.2 
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the some of the LRIP vehicles and takes much less time than DT&E. Successful 
evaluation will give the approval for the full-rate production (FRP).  
In the case of the F/A-18A/B program, eleven test aircraft were used for its flight 
test program, while the C/D program used two test vehicles and the E/F program used 
7 flight test articles and 3 ground test articles [71, 209]. The F/A-18A/B full-scale 
development flight test program tasks and schedule is shown in Figure 109. The figure 
shows what tests each of the test vehicles performed and how long it was scheduled to 
take. The radar test was conducted with a T-39.  
In 1997, the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins published the list of the 
F/A-18E/F flight test categories and number of required flights based on the F/A-18E/F 
                                                                                       
*ECS: Environmental Control System 
 MEI: Maintenance Engineering Inspection 
 EMC: Electromagnetic Compatibility 
 NPE: Navy Preliminary Evaluation 
 NPA Navy Preliminary Assessment 
 IOT&E: Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
 BIS: Board of Inspection and Survey 
 
Figure 109: F/A-18A/B Flight Test Program Schedule* [71] 
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TEMP as shown in Table 68 [232]. The TEMP for the F/A-18E/F flight test program 
was prepared by an integrated Navy/contractor test team based on the F/A-18A/B 
flight test experience and the F/A-18E/F flight test requirements. According to the 
TEMP, 1,839 test flights in 13 categories were required to fulfill the demonstration and 
test objectives for the F/A-18E/F aircraft. 
Table 68: F/A-18E/F Flight Test Program Projection [232] 
Flight test category No. of required flights  
Flying qualities  265 
Performance  125 
Propulsion  130 
High angle of attack  250 
Flutter  255 
Empennage buffet  25 
Noise/vibration 30 
Flight loads  195 
Dynamic store release 40 
Carrier suitability/ground loads 173 
Mission systems 74 
Weapons separation  267 
New technology  10 
 
The required number of sorties for the E/F program was more than doubled over 
time from the number of sorties originally planned in the TEMP. A Rand study 
performed in 2004 on test and evaluation cost of military aircraft [13] provides a good 
summary of the F/A-18E/F flight test program. The study summarized the flight test 
program conducted from November 1995 to April 1999. According to the study, from the 
first flight in November 1995 to April 1999, “eight aircraft made 3,141 flights, logging 
4,620 flying hours, for a total of 244 aircraft months.” Then, the OPEVAL program 
followed from May to November 1999 using seven aircraft and consisting of over 1,200 
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flight hours in 850 plus sorties [233]. Total flight test hours reached almost 6,000 hours. 
The actual F/A-18E/F flight test program from the first flight to the end of OPEVAL is 
summarized by Fox [13] and duplicated in Table 69. 
Table 69: Actual F/A-18E/F Flight Test Program Summary 
  Test aircraft (no.) Sorties (no.) Flight hours 
Avionics   600 
Flying qualities, flutter   1,890 
Propulsion, performance   195 
Aircraft systems   275 
Armament   310 
Structures   1,126 
Carrier suitability   189 
Other   35 
Total EMD/FSD flight test 8 3,141 4,620 
OPEVAL 7 850 1,200 
Total flight test 8 3,991 5,820 
 
F/A-18A/B and E/F test program statistics are summarized in Table 70. Most data are 
from Fox [13]. In the case of the F/A-18A/B and E/F test programs, 305 and 244 
aircraft months were flown by 11 and 8 aircraft, respectively. Each test aircraft flew 16.1 
and 18.9 hours per month on average. Also, each of the test aircraft was used for 27.7 
and 30.5 months on average. Test duration measured from the first flight to the end of 
DT, was 40 months for the F/A-18A/B program and 40 months for the F/A-18E/F 
program, excluding the OPEVAL periods.  
NASA Langley Research Center [96] summarized the F/A-18E/F wind tunnel test 
programs as follows:  
The vehicle's performance at subsonic and transonic speeds was validated in a 
series of wind tunnel tests at NASA Ames (11-Foot Transonic Tunnel, 1991-94). 
During approximately 3,000 hours of tunnel occupancy, data were obtained on four 
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different scale models to determine performance and stability and control 
characteristics. The tests included aerodynamic measurements to evaluate a series 
of aircraft design options, such as engine inlet studies. Stability and control 
characteristics at high-angle-of-attack flight conditions were evaluated in numerous 
wind tunnel tests at Langley (approx. 1,500 occupancy hrs in 30- by 60-Foot Full 
Scale Tunnel, 1993-4). 
Fox [13] describes the ground test program of the F/A-18E/F as follows: 
“… three ground test articles—static, drop, and fatigue—were built, and seven 
flight test vehicles were built and flight tested in EMD… During DT-IIA 
(November 1995 to November 1996), the static test article was used for initial 
wing-bending tests; the drop-test article was used for a series of landing-gear tests 
at increasing sink rates …”  
Fatigue testing was completed in July 1998 before flight testing was completed in April 
1999.  
Table 70:  F/A-18A/B and E/F Flight Test Programs 
  F/A-18A/B F/A-18E/F Units 
Total aircraft month 305 244 month 
Total flight hours 4,922 4,620 hrs 
Number of vehicles 11 8 ea 
Average flight hours per aircraft month 16.1 18.9 hrs/month 
aircraft month per vehicle 27.7 30.5 month/aircraft 
DT duration 40 41 month 
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APPENDIX D 
 
OPTIMIZATION WITH RDT&E COST AS OBJECTIVE 
 
This complementary study is a repetition of Step 7 of the EvoLVE process with the 
objective function as RDT&E cost instead of acquisition cost. A large portion of 
acquisition cost is production cost, which acts as a deterrent or penalty of overdesigning 
in the first stage. Therefore, the study with RDT&E cost as objective function examines 
an extreme case in which the cost of changing the design dominates the game. The study 
was conducted deterministically only. The optimization results are provides in Tables 
from 71 to 76. The bar graphs are also provided from Figures 110 to 118 for comparison.  
General equalities and inequalities are also observed that are fundamentally different 
from those found in §7.8. In terms of the cost, the graphs show similar trends that were 
found with the optimization results conduced with the acquisition cost as the objective 
function. The major difference is that the second-stage cost is significantly saved by 
pursuing the DetPP strategies. In addition, the difference between New-design and Ad-
hoc is also amplified. From the perspective of designs, a clear difference from the results 
with acquisition cost is that all DetPPs overdesigned x1 to meet the predicted 
requirement 
u
ω  and retained it in all cases in which the second-stage requirement was 
less rigorous than the predicted one.  
 
s
* *
2 1
ˆ ˆif , then ( ) ( )p p
s u s
≤ =x xω ω  (86) 
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 Observation 16: The TAD optimization with RDT&E cost as an objective function 
showed that if the realized scenario is less demanding than the predicted scenario, 
the first-stage design is retained in the second stage. 
 
Table 71: First-Stage TAD Optimization Results 
 Strategies New 
Design 
Ad-hoc DetPP 
(Block10) 
DetPP 
(Avg.) 
DetPP 
(Block10p) 
Unit 
x11 Wing area 396.6 396.6 449.4 464.0 498.5 ft
2 
x12 Thrust 18355 18355 20441 20855 21947 lb 
x13 Ref. weight for DLF 34131 34131 38251 39170 41816 lb 
x14 Landing weight 33248 33248 39539 40830 43839 lb 
x15 Internal fuel 10827 10827 12777 13190 14692 lb 
x16 External fuel 6724 6724 6691 7920 9608 lb 
x17 Ref. thrust for aft-body 18355 18355 23508 23982 25238 lb 
x18 Fuselage length 53.08 53.08 54.68 54.79 55.60 ft 
g11 Fighter escort radius 350.1 350.1 409.6 423.5 478.8 nm 
g12 Interdiction mission radius 410.9 410.9 431.4 461.4 505.8 nm 
g13 Recovery payload 4508 4508 7910 8547 9846 lb 
g14 Launch wind over deck 22.06 22.06 22.29 24.47 28.14 knots 
g15 Recovery wind over deck  -0.01 -0.01 3.55 4.80 9.27 knots 
g16 Approach speed  138.1 138.1 141.5 141.5 141.4 knots 
g17 Specific excess power 708.7 708.7 699.2 696.2 685.9 ft/sec 
g18 Accel. from 0.8 to 1.2M 63.66 63.66 63.60 63.54 63.42 sec 
g19 Turn rate 12.042 12.042 12.066 12.112 12.093 deg/sec 
g110 Usable load factor 7.609 7.609 7.609 7.610 7.609 g 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 25738 25738 28628 29282 30992 lb 
Attack TOGW 50520 50520 55325 57699 62697 lb 
Fighter TOGW 37975 37975 42815 43882 47095 lb 
RDTE 4639 4639 4904 4963 5116 $m 
RDTE year 8.58 8.58 8.82 8.87 9.01 year 
Production 20172 20172 21595 21897 22701 $m 
f1 24811 24811 26499 26859 27817 $m 
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Table 72: Second-Stage Optimization Results under the New-Design Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 396.8 426.6 453.1 465.0 502.6 529.9 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 18366 19703 20558 20910 22068 22927 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 34138 36359 38563 39401 42194 43865.6 lb 
x24 Landing weight 33246 37532 39877 40916 44046 45360.5 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 10827 11495 12854 13189 14729 15447.1 lb 
x26 External fuel 6707 7091 6664 7991 9851 10288 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 18366 22658 23642 24046 25378 26366 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 53.08 53.82 54.81 55.00 55.80 56.08 ft 
g21 Fighter escort radius 350.0 350.5 410.4 420.0 475.5 493.7 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 410.3 410.1 430.1 460.1 504.5 509.9 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 4501 7000 8001 8403 9701 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 22.00 22.35 22.23 24.89 28.65 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  -0.05 3.53 3.56 4.93 9.32 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  138.1 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.2 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 709.1 709.3 697.7 694.0 683.4 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.60 63.60 63.60 63.60 63.54 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.046 12.123 12.061 12.068 12.069 12.175 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.609 7.609 7.612 7.609 7.609 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 25743 27531 28874 29513 31344 32560 lb 
Attack TOGW 50507 53373 55619 58004 63341 65735 lb 
Fighter TOGW 37980 40436 43139 44112 47483 49417 lb 
RDTE 4640 6491 6636 6703 6892 7022 $m 
RDTE year 8.59 9.35 9.49 9.55 9.73 9.85 year 
Production 20175 27605 29249 29967 32213 33850 $m 
f1/ f2 4640 6491 6636 6703 6892 7022 $m 
Total cost - 11439 11585 11651 11841 11970 $m 
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Table 73: Second-Stage Optimization Results under the Ad-hoc Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 396.8 426.6 453.0 465.0 502.6 532.4 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 18366 19698 20551 20920 22068 23011 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 34138 36363 38533 39416 42194 44033 lb 
x24 Landing weight 33246 37534 39865 40921 44046 45467 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 10827 11506 12846 13193 14729 15544 lb 
x26 External fuel 6707 7084 6669 7997 9851 10249 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 18366 22653 23634 24058 25378 26463 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 53.08 53.83 54.80 55.00 55.80 56.13 ft 
g21 Fighter escort radius 350.0 351.2 410.1 420.0 475.5 496.9 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 410.3 410.3 430.1 460.2 504.5 510.7 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 4501 7001 8000 8400 9701 9802 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 22.00 22.37 22.22 24.91 28.65 28.56 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  -0.05 3.54 3.55 4.94 9.32 9.55 knots 
g26 Approach speed  138.1 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.2 139.4 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 709.1 708.9 697.7 694.3 683.4 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.60 63.60 63.60 63.54 63.54 62.82 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.046 12.119 12.063 12.069 12.069 12.181 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.609 7.608 7.609 7.610 7.609 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 25743 27532 28864 29520 31344 32664 lb 
Attack TOGW 50507 53376 55607 58021 63342 65896 lb 
Fighter TOGW 37980 40448 43120 44123 47484 49618 lb 
RDTE 4640 2832 3716 4018 4640 5137 $m 
RDTE year 8.59 4.87 6.35 6.75 7.35 7.83 year 
Production 20175 27109 28739 29499 31866 33743 $m 
f1/ f2 4640 2832 3716 4018 4640 5137 $m 
Total cost - 7472 8355 8658 9280 9777 $m 
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Table 74: Second-Stage Optimization Results under the DetPP(Block10) Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 453.7 453.7 453.7 465.0 502.6 529.9 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 20564 20564 20564 20917 22068 22927 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 38576 38576 38576 39413 42194 43866 lb 
x24 Landing weight 39887 39887 39887 40920 44046 45361 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 12853 12853 12853 13193 14729 15447 lb 
x26 External fuel 6672 6672 6672 7990 9851 10288 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 23649 23649 23649 24055 25378 26366 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 54.66 54.69 54.79 55.00 55.80 56.09 ft 
g21 Fighter escort radius 411.4 411.2 410.2 420.1 475.5 493.7 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 431.0 430.8 430.1 460.1 504.5 509.9 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 8082 8067 8000 8401 9701 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 22.00 22.03 22.17 24.89 28.65 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  3.48 3.48 3.48 4.93 9.32 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  141.4 141.4 141.4 141.5 141.2 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 699.2 698.9 697.6 694.2 683.4 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.54 63.54 63.66 63.60 63.54 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.096 12.091 12.069 12.068 12.069 12.175 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.629 7.626 7.612 7.610 7.609 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 28804 28819 28886 29518 31344 32560 lb 
Attack TOGW 55557 55572 55639 58012 63341 65735 lb 
Fighter TOGW 43067 43082 43149 44121 47483 49417 lb 
RDTE 4920 650 1291 2910 3560 3985 $m 
RDTE year 8.83 0.83 2.21 5.63 6.33 6.71 year 
Production 21683 28988 28813 29127 31461 33170 $m 
f1/ f2 4920 650 1291 2910 3560 3985 $m 
Total cost - 5570 6211 7830 8480 8905 $m 
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Table 75: Second-Stage Optimization Results the DetPP(Average) Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 465.0 465.0 465.0 465.0 500.7 530.3 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 20920 20920 20920 20920 22029 22940 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 39416 39416 39416 39416 42127 43889 lb 
x24 Landing weight 40921 40921 40921 40921 43990 45376 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 13193 13193 13193 13193 14710 15461 lb 
x26 External fuel 7997 7997 7997 7997 9748 10289 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 24058 24058 24058 24058 25333 26381 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 54.77 54.79 54.90 55.22 55.83 56.09 ft 
g21 Fighter escort radius 422.2 422.0 421.0 418.1 475.2 494.1 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 461.8 461.7 460.9 458.7 504.0 510.1 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 8550 8535 8468 8265 9702 9800 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 24.62 24.65 24.78 25.17 28.62 28.65 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  4.94 4.94 4.94 4.94 9.42 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  141.5 141.5 141.5 141.5 141.4 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 697.1 696.8 695.5 691.7 683.4 682.9 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.36 63.42 63.48 63.72 63.54 62.88 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.117 12.112 12.090 12.026 12.053 12.176 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.640 7.637 7.623 7.584 7.609 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 29370 29385 29452 29655 31287 32575 lb 
Attack TOGW 57871 57886 57953 58156 63157 65765 lb 
Fighter TOGW 43973 43988 44055 44258 47407 49446 lb 
RDTE 4971 654 1300 1399 3390 3835 $m 
RDTE year 8.88 0.84 2.22 2.30 6.17 6.58 year 
Production 21941 29609 29427 29669 31321 33134 $m 
f1/ f2 4971 654 1300 1399 3390 3835 $m 
Total cost - 5625 6271 6370 8361 8806 $m 
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Table 76: Second-Stage Optimization Results under the DetPP(Block10p) Strategy 
 Stage 1 2  
 Requirement/Scenarios Block 0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Unit 
x21 Wing area 502.6 502.6 502.6 502.6 502.6 530.7 ft
2 
x22 Thrust 22070 22070 22070 22070 22070 22961 lb 
x23 Ref. weight for DLF 42191 42191 42191 42191 42191 43919 lb 
x24 Landing weight 44102 44102 44102 44102 44102 45397 lb 
x25 Internal fuel 14732 14732 14732 14732 14732 15474 lb 
x26 External fuel 9850 9850 9850 9850 9850 10290 lb 
x27 Ref. thrust for aft-body 25381 25381 25381 25381 25381 26405 lb 
x28 Fuselage length 55.54 55.56 55.67 55.78 55.80 56.09 ft 
g21 Fighter escort radius 478.0 477.8 476.8 475.8 475.5 494.4 nm 
g22 Interdiction mission radius 506.3 506.2 505.5 504.7 504.5 510.1 nm 
g23 Recovery payload 9919 9904 9836 9768 9753 9801 lb 
g24 Launch wind over deck 28.36 28.39 28.51 28.63 28.66 28.64 knots 
g25 Recovery wind over deck  9.50 9.50 9.50 9.50 9.50 9.56 knots 
g26 Approach speed  141.3 141.3 141.3 141.3 141.3 139.5 knots 
g27 Specific excess power 686.2 685.9 684.8 683.6 683.3 683.1 ft/sec 
g28 Acceleration from 0.8M to 1.2M 63.36 63.36 63.42 63.54 63.54 62.82 sec 
g29 Turn rate 12.118 12.113 12.093 12.073 12.068 12.180 deg/sec 
g210 Usable load factor 7.637 7.635 7.622 7.610 7.607 7.609 g 
 
R 
E 
S 
U 
L 
T 
S 
OEW 31183 31197 31265 31333 31348 32595 lb 
Attack TOGW 63182 63197 63264 63332 63347 65799 lb 
Fighter TOGW 47325 47339 47407 47475 47490 49479 lb 
RDTE 5133 667 1329 1363 1370 3266 $m 
RDTE year 9.02 0.85 2.25 2.28 2.28 5.95 year 
Production 22792 31814 31611 31692 31710 32992 $m 
f1/ f2 5133 667 1329 1363 1370 3266 $m 
Total cost - 5799 6462 6496 6503 8399 $m 
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Figure 110: Total Program Cost Comparison w.r.t. Strategies 
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Figure 111: Total Program Cost Comparison w.r.t. Scenarios 
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Figure 112: RDT&E Cost Comparison 
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Figure 113: RDT&E Year Comparison 
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Figure 114: Wing Area Comparison 
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Figure 115: Engine Thrust Comparison 
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Figure 116: External Fuel Comparison 
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Figure 117: Empty Weight Comparison 
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